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This study examines how states combat episodes of violence that pose an 
ontological threat to the state. Sovereignty is a bundle of practices that draw, maintain, 
and redraw boundaries around political authority, the state is the polity constructed by 
these boundaries.  The boundaries can be physical su h as a border between state or 
conceptual such as that between public and private. Th se boundaries create the 
‘conceptual maps that state leaders use to make sens  of the world. The threat posed by 
violent action is constructed by narratives.  Revisioni t narratives of violence, the focus 
of this study, are illegible to states using current conceptual maps  and therefore cannot 
be defeated while they remain. States are forced to redraw the boundaries of sovereign 
authority in the course of combating these threats, resulting in a transformed state. 
In my three cases – golden age piracy in the 18th century, anarchist ‘propagandists 
of the deed’ at the turn of the 20th, and al Qaeda – I demonstrate that the state develops 
creative solutions to concrete crises.  For instance, golden age pirates exploited a surfeit 
of ungoverned land and open markets in the early 18th century Atlantic to attack trade 
 
 
forcing colonial states to bring their Atlantic colonies into the domestic sphere and shift 
the sea into an open space. Similarly, the rise of the labor movement and the development 
fingerprint databases and the universal passport system were, in part, responses to the 
threat of anarchists propounding “propaganda of the deed” at the turn of the 20th century.  
Finally, counterterror innovations devised to combat al Qaeda, such as targeted killing 
and bulk data collection, have transformed borders from sites of exclusion designed to 
keep out undesirables to sites of collection where they are tracked and controlled. Each 
case demonstrates how states re-inscribe themselves by r drawing conceptual boundaries, 
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At 2:49pm on April 15, 2013 the first of three explosions took place at the finish 
line of the Boston Marathon, resulting in 3 dead an264 injured.  A few days later the 
National Guard and Boston Police were on a manhunt for suspects Tamerlan and 
Dzhokar Tsarnaev.  Tracked by a cell phone left in a car they had stolen, the Tsarnaev 
brothers would find themselves in a shootout with the authorities that killed 26 year old 
Tamerlan and injured 19 year old Dzhokar before the latt r was able to escape.  Thus 
began the manhunt; surreal  scenes where armed National Guardsmen blocked off a 
perimeter thought to be where Dzhokar Tsarnaev was hiding and then went house to 
house, knocking on doors and searching the suburban homes of the residents of 
Watertown, Massachusetts.  They entered houses and e rched backyards producing a 
contrasting aesthetic of quiet, sanitized suburbia ag inst the urgency and raw power of 
militarized searches.  Only thing is, Dzhokar Tsarnaev was not within the area blocked 
out and searched.  He had escaped onto a boat just outside the area, hiding under a tarp.  
After hours of these searches, it was only after a loc l man noticed blood on his boat and 
tipped off the police that Dzhokar Tsarnaev was arrested.   
 This story stands as a metaphor for many the challenges posed to the state in the 
21st century.  The Boston policemen and National Guardsmen sealed off a particular 
territory and searched it slowly, house by house, uing a method of force that could be 
seen as an exemplify the modern territorial state attempting to exercise authority and 
power in the way that it knows best.  Dzhokar Tsarnaev is one of the types of challenges 




from a place, physical or conceptual, just outside of its reach. No matter how much force 
was used, no matter how much land was covered or how many basements and sheds were 
searched, Dzhokar Tsarnaev would have evaded capture because he simply was not in the 
place police were looking.  The way in which the state was responding was inadequate 
for his capture, and, intentionally or not, he was able to use it against them.  Of course, 
the metaphor should not be taken too far.  Dzhokar Ts naev was captured and police 
obviously were not incapable of looking at a boat a few blocks from the sealed off area.  
Sooner or later they were likely to get there.  Butit does capture the idea that the state is 
besieged by challenges and threats it is not currently adept at handling.  
  The metaphorical story told above has become part of the conventional wisdom: 
the state is retreating as it does not have the capacity to deal with the threats to its 
sovereignty posed by the set of processes we call globalization.  Processes such as the 
movement of people, goods, money, and information across boundaries, and the 
developing linkages between people thousands of miles apart have come to be seen as 
eroding the state.  They are of particular danger to the state, not necessarily because they 
are non-territorial (or at least function with a different relationship to territory) but 
because the state itself depends upon boundaries.  Drawing, redrawing, and maintaining 
these boundaries are what make states sovereign and differentiates the state as a political 
form from polities such as empires, city-states, and feudal orders.  If it is the creation of 
boundaries that defines the state, and therefore politics and political science, then 




 Of course, ‘globalization’ is a rather opaque term many times taken to mean 
increased economic interdependence.1  This is only a part of the ‘phenomenon’ of 
globalization.  I define the term as a series of prcesses and flows of people, goods, 
capital, and information that have the effect of drawing the world closer together.2  
Inherent in many of these flows and processes are an ability to transcend the boundaries 
that create and define the state.  It is these transboundary processes that ‘threaten’ the 
state.  The idea of bringing the world closer together can be opposed to a world of 
discrete boundaries that divide it up.  Of course, transboundary processes are nothing new 
and have existed for centuries; if there is anything ‘new’ about globalization, it is the 
higher volume of these process as their concatenation creates the push towards what 
Roland Robertson has called the ‘whole earth picture’.3  One could even argue that it is 
the configuration of transboundary processes that is most important, not the aspects of 
any particular process. For instance, where in the past migration could be defined as 
moving from one state to another, when combined with capital mobility, environmental 
degradation, increased trade, and social media, among others, migration could now also 
be viewed as another force erasing the distinction between those states.  
 How states have dealt and can deal with challenges to boundaries is the focus of 
this study.   Of course this is a very large topic, one that many careers may not be able to 
satisfactorily explore, let alone a single project.  In this manner I sympathize with 
Tzvetan Todorov in his study of ‘the other’ in whic he muses, “My subject…is so 
enormous that any general formulation soon ramifies nto countless categories and 
                                                           
1 Keohane and Milner, Internationalization and Domestic Politics; Stiglitz, Globalization and Its 
Discontents; Friedman, The World Is Flat; Peláez and Peláez, Globalization and the State. 
2 Jackson and Nexon, “Globalization, the Comparative Method, and Comparing Constructions”; Robertson, 
Globalization. 




directions…how to speak of such things?”4  One way of doing this is recognizing that 
these types of threats are not unique to the state’ history and its development from early 
modern Europe to the present day.  Therefore, we can choose a particular type of threat 
and look back through history to see how the state h s dealt with it.  One of the major 
processes associated with the challenges faced by the state is that of the violence typified 
by, though by no means limited to, the jihadist terrorism of al Qaeda.5  In this instance, a 
group with a different relationship to territory than the state and no settled relationship to 
any state has successfully attacked many of the world’s most powerful states, causing 
crises of authority and security which had at one point been unthinkable.  Such terrorism 
is said to provide threats to the future of the state, especially as it concerns what could be 
called ‘de-territorialization’.6  Willem Schinkel sums up the position nicely by stating 
that, “these forms of terrorism, then, leave the state seemingly helpless, thus undermining 
its legitimacy since they make it clear that the monopoly of legitimate violence is then 
helpless against globalized forms of terrorist violence”.7  Studying the threat typified by 
al Qaeda is an interesting way to gain leverage on the larger puzzle posed above, that of 
how the state deals with transboundary processes, because the threat posed is so 
immediate and has been repeatedly recognized by those involved as dangerous.   
 The type of threat posed to states by al Qaeda is not historically unique.  Al Qaeda 
is a group that poses a challenge to the state as a political form and history can give us 
some interesting parallels between it and similar episodes of violence such as the golden 
                                                           
4 Todorov, The Conquest of America, 3. 
5 Ulrich Beck, “The Terrorist Threat"; Faisal Devji, Lanscapes of the Jihad; Barak Mendelsohn, 
“Sovereignty Under Attack”; Stuart Elden, Terror and Territoriality; Zygmunt Bauman, “The Demons of 
an Open Society”; Ayşe Zarakol, “What Makes Terrorism Modern?". 
6 Bauman, “The Demons of an Open Society”; Elden, Terror and Territoriality. 




age pirates of the early 18th century and the anarchist violence propagated by men who 
called themselves ‘propagandists of the deed’8 at the turn of the 20th century.  In both 
cases, the state was challenged, transformed and reproduced in a recognizable manner.  
There is a history of successful responses to these cris s built around creative solutions.  
Therefore, violence can act as a site for the drawing, redrawing, and maintenance of the 
boundaries of political authority. This relationship between polities built on the drawing 
and maintenance of clear, delineated boundaries of political authority and entities that are 
able to perpetrate violence with a disregard for these boundaries hints at some central 
questions about the state in the 21st century.   
 In this work, I will not provide a definitive answer to the problem posed above 
about the future of the state in the face of globalization.  However, the argument that the 
state has found ways to combat similar problems as those posed by globalization can 
provide us with some questions that can be used to probe the larger issue of globalization 
and the state.  While obviously al Qaeda poses a different sort of problem to the state than 
increased capital mobility, social networking, migration, and climate change, studying it 
and its historical corollaries can give us a series of theoretical tools that could help us 
understand other processes and flows usually associated with the concept of 
globalization.  Therefore, we should view the relationship between globalization and the 
state as part of the larger theme of this dissertation which focuses more closely on the 
production of boundaries through the relationship between the state and violence.    
I argue that the state can be transformed and reproduced in the process of 
responding to this type of violence with creative solutions to concrete crises.  With this in 
                                                           
88 From here on out these men will be called ‘propagandists’ unless otherwise noted.  For more on why 




mind, I argue that state transformation is as likely, if not more so, than state erosion.  
Simply because the world does not look like it did yesterday does not meant that we have 
seen the end of the state.  Such a position tends to overemphasize the attributes of the 
state, say a strong welfare state or control over a domestic economy, which were 
prevalent in a particular historical time and place.  History tells us that the state has not 
been the same across time or space and therefore we n ed to conceive of it as something 
that can and has changed and keep this in mind whenassessing the impact of 
globalization on our own polities.   
The argument 
 My central argument is that violence with transboundary aspects acts as a site for 
the redrawing of the boundaries of political authority.  This violence cannot be made 
sense of using contemporary boundaries, creating crses for states and compelling state 
leaders to creatively redraw the boundaries of politica  authority in order to effectively 
combat the threat.  In other words, the state or state  that defeat such actors are not the 
same entities as those which originally faced the crisis.  There are new boundaries as 
what is now thought of as part of the state was not before, while parts that were 
previously included no longer are.  The threat has been made legible9 and can now be 
defeated.  This argument can give us insight into a few major issues in world politics.  
First, as mentioned above, it can give us some leverage in understanding the role and 
future of the state in a globalized world.  It does not do so by claiming that the state will 
transform and remake itself as a new, yet still dominant, actor in world politics.  Instead, 
the claim is that the state has the capacity to transform in the face of such threats, giving 
                                                           




us some leverage to think about what is currently happening in world politics.  For 
instance, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, as a consequence of the Global War on 
Terror (GWoT) we are seeing a growth of state surveillance over both citizens and non-
citizens alike through the proliferation of drones and bulk data collection,  an area where 
previously the state did not claim or exercise authori y.  This is happening while it 
becomes easier for people and information to cross b rders in a way that seems to violate 
20th century practices of statehood.  New boundaries have been drawn. 
Second, through the use of two historical cases, we can develop a set of ideal 
typical tool or ‘mechanisms and processes’10 that can help us to understand the current 
GWoT both empirically and ethically.  Empirically, the framework developed below can 
help us to understand the response of the United States and give us some deeper 
theoretical understanding of why it appears that the later strategies of targeted killings via 
the use of drones and data surveillance have been more successful than the previous 
strategy of intervention.  It also alerts us to the possibility that some of what we take for 
granted in the states that we live in will change as a result of the GWoT.  
 There is also an ethical component to this study.  No empirical claim proffered 
here should be read as determinative.  There is no reason why any particular outcome had 
to come about the way that it did, only explanations why it did do so.  When combined 
with the recognition that changes in these situations are largely inevitable if the threat is 
to be defeated, it becomes apparent that citizens of any state are empowered to shape 
state responses to these crises if given the responsibility to attempt doing so.  If change 
itself is the only thing resembling a certainty, then there is both an opportunity and an 
                                                           




imperative to shape the response in a manner consona t with the goals that we hold for 
our own polity.  In addition, it becomes perfectly legitimate to question whether or not 
we would even like to ‘defeat’ the threat.  Is our society better off with the threat and the 
status quo if the only imaginable ‘solutions’ are worse?  What are not helpful are the two 
extremes of defeating the threat at all costs and denying the capacity to change because 
we are tied to current manifestations of our goals.  Ultimately this entails a political 
morality, taken largely from John Dewey,11 that may hold certain goals not as universal 
principles but as tools to help guide us in finding solutions in particular times and places.  
These themes will be revisited in Chapter 7.   
Finally, this study attempts to explain change in the practice of sovereignty 
through processes that can be referred to as happening ‘o  the margins’ of the state 
system.  That the state has changed over time is a topic that is well covered in 
constructivist International Relations (IR).12  However, most of these studies deal with 
changes that happen at the center, either through changes in governance and/or major 
changes in the interactions between states such as war, diplomacy, trade, etc.  In contrast, 
this study focuses on change that has happened throug  the interaction of the state with 
the ‘non-state’ and ‘transnational’ in peripheral regions such as the colonial Atlantic in 
the 18th century and Afghanistan and Pakistan today.  Such change may not have been as 
obviously monumental as that wrought by the French Revolution or the Second World 
War, but it is important nonetheless and helps us to understand the state all the more. 
The argument that campaigns to combat major episodes f transnational violence 
force states to transform how they draw boundaries of political authority depends upon 
                                                           
11 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 161–186. 
12 Barkin and Cronin, “The State and the Nation”; Hall, National Collective Identity; Reus-Smit, The Moral 




particular conceptions of both ‘the state’ and ‘sovereignty’ as well as the threats posed to 
the state by different types of violence.  The state is conceived of as something performed 
through the practice of drawing boundaries around political authority.  To quote Michel 
Foucault, “The state is a practice not a thing”.13  These boundaries define the state and set 
it apart from other types of polities.  They include territorial borders but are not limited to 
them.  Conceptual boundaries between international/domestic, public/private, and 
citizen/alien, among others, are just as important to the state as anything that can be seen 
on a map.  Territorial borders are merely one type of boundary.  If the state is a polity 
performed through the drawing of boundaries, sovereignty is the practice of drawing 
them.  Sovereignty then is a bundle of practices that draw, redraw, and maintain 
boundaries around political authority. Traditional conceptions of sovereignty such as 
those leaning on ‘authority’, ‘legitimacy’, ‘the exception’, etc. implicitly recognize the 
claim that sovereignty is about drawing boundaries.  Exercising authority, having a 
“monopoly of legitimate physical violence over a particular territory”14 means the 
construction of boundaries between one territory and other and between legitimate and 
illegitimate.  The same goes for any attempt to “deci  the exception”,15 create nations, 
etc.  Only the focus is different: instead of a norm, a concept, or an action, it is the 
boundary that is the focus of this study. 
 This conception, or recasting,16 of the state and sovereignty helps us to view how 
violence can threaten and force change in the nature of the state.  It is not so much 
through the violence itself, the casualty count, or any particular competing claim to 
                                                           
13 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. 
14 Weber, The Vocation Lectures, 33. 
15 Schmitt, Political Theology, 5; Elshtain, Sovereignty, 114–117. 
16 For similar treatments see R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside; Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty; 




authority or legitimacy.  Instead it is by challenging these boundaries, by turning the 
boundary against the state so that its continuation means the continued existence of the 
episode of violence in question.  In other words, violence that cannot be made sense of 
within boundaries in situ exists in part because of them and is therefore a thre t to them.  
As described in Chapter 4, the presence of ‘the line’ in the early 18th century, an 
imaginary boundary that separated Europe from the New World, created a plethora of 
open markets, sympathetic publics, and ungoverned lan  that made nearly perfect 
working conditions for pirates.  Since the state is defined by its ability to draw and 
maintain boundaries around political authority, this becomes something of an existential 
crisis for the state and requires new boundaries to be drawn in the process of combatting 
this threat for the state to be re-inscribed.  Using the concept of ‘practice’ we can view 
any particular boundary as something habitual, a performance that constructs what might 
be called the ‘conceptual map’ of political actors.  These conceptual maps tell us what is 
possible and not and what is thinkable and not in a given situation.  The episodes of 
violence studied in this dissertation ‘shatter’ these boundaries, tear up these maps, and 
force those in power to come up with, in the words of Hans Joas, “creative solutions to 
[concrete] problems”.17  Thus, something new, in this case a political boundary, is 
brought into the world.  A new conceptual map is created among those participating in 
the political sphere and the state survives.   
 Of course not all violence, or even violence directed against the state, produces 
this type of threat or is able to trigger these dynamics.  The type of threat produced by 
violence varies.  Violence can threaten a particular st te, it can be used by a state, it can 
                                                           




be carried out outside of the state, and it can threaten the state as a political form.  It is 
only this last group, which I term revisionist violence, which challenges state boundaries 
in the manner necessary to cause the sort of change that is the focus of this study.  
Moreover, these threats come not necessarily from attributes of the act or actor such as 
the number of casualties, level of damage, ideological motivations of the actors, the 
structure of the group perpetrating violence, or the type of act (i.e. piracy, terrorism, 
infantry movements, etc.) undertaken.  Instead, the meaning of violent actions, and thus 
the threat that they pose to the state, derives from the narratives built around those actions 
from a multitude of actors.18  Narratives of revisionist violence cast violence as a 
challenge to the state as a political form.  They ar  used when violence cannot be made 
sense of or recognized within current conceptual maps, ‘shattering’ boundaries, and 
forcing change.  In this dissertation I demonstrate how three such episodes – the golden 
age of piracy in the early 18th century Atlantic, propaganda of the deed at the turn of the 
20th century in Europe, and the jihadist terrorism typified by al Qaeda at the turn of the 
21st century – have challenged boundaries and forced change.   
Finally, I want to take the time to point out two features of this argument.  First, it 
should be noted that these ‘changes’ do not usually fol ow a form whereby states gain or 
lose control over territory, policy area, peoples, tc.  Instead, what we tend to see is an 
‘authority swap’ where some areas are drawn inside of boundaries that were previously 
outside and vice versa.  This is present in each case and is important for my theory that 
the state re-inscribes itself as an ‘authority swap’ means that the state neither gains nor 
loses authority. For instance, in Chapter 4 I show states gained greater control over 
                                                           
18 For more on narrative, meaning, and action see Carr, “Narrative and the Real World”; Somers, “The 




colonial territory in the Americas as a result of their campaign against golden age piracy 
but gave up claims of direct control over sea lanes i  the Atlantic. Since most boundaries 
are conceptual, as opposed to territorial, new onestend to take the form of these sorts of 
‘swaps’.   
Second, while change and transformation are the focus f this study, continuity 
needs to be recognized as well.  Recall the argument ade above about the state’s 
continuance as the dominant actor in world politics.  Here, change is the vehicle through 
which we view continuity.  Since the state has no otological core outside of its own 
performance, replacing a ‘shattered’ boundary with a new one means the state is not the 
same as before.  Yet, it is still the state.  It isst ll performed through the practice of 
drawing, redrawing, and maintaining boundaries around political authority.  By changing, 
the state is perpetuated. 
Method  
The theories/conceptions of sovereignty and revision t violence outlined above 
should not be thought of as hypotheses or concepts tha  are to be tested again an 
empirical reality but instead as ideal types that will be sketched out in more detail in the 
following chapters.19  Since we are always subject to our own biases even in ways we 
cannot imagine, testing theories against ‘reality’ becomes problematic.  For instance, 
testing for X means that X is important and therefor  we should look for it.  Y might be 
present and causally important but if it is not alre dy implicated in X, we pay little or no 
attention to it because we have already stated our interest in X.  Therefore, we as social 
scientists are not ‘getting at reality’ but are instead viewing reality from a particular 
                                                           




viewpoint that has already valued X over Y.  This is essentially the critique of 
mainstream social science by feminists, post-colonia ists and the like.  Experience, and 
therefore what we think of as reality, is as much fashioned by our own socially 
constructed view of the world as it is by that external world.  For this reason there is no 
separation between the mind and the world as Descart  claimed.20   
So how can we do social scientific research if “in practice it is impossible to talk 
about what something ‘really is’”?21  This is what ideal types help us to accomplish.  
According to Max Weber, ideal types are “one sided points of view” based on a value 
position and are used to “construct a unified analytical construct”.22  It is important that 
they are recognized as deliberately capturing some part of reality while equally 
deliberately leaving other parts out in order to give us some analytical leverage on that 
reality.  The point is not to design them so that tey match up perfectly to the external 
world.23  For instance, when arguing that the state is defined by the construction of clear 
and delineated boundaries around political authority, I do not mean to say that this is the 
only way the state can or should be presented.  More is going on in any polity than 
merely the construction of boundaries.  I am only sa ing that we should look at them in 
the manner I am advocating in order to see something important, something we miss if 
we do not.  John Dewey concurs when he argues that theories are not universals that are 
to match reality or to be continually reproduced in a situation but instead, “they are tools 
                                                           
20 Descartes, Discourse on Method. 
21 Ringmar, “On the Ontological Status of the State,” 450. 
22 Weber, Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences, 90. 
23 This is largely the approach taken in discussion of typologies by George and Bennett and Elman.  See 
George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences; Elman, “Explanatory 




of insight”.24  They “suggest possible traits to be on the lookout f r in studying a 
particular case”.25  
Ideal types are not to be tested nor changed so that empirical reality matches up 
with them.  Doing so, Dewey claims, “sinks [the scient st] to the level of the routine 
mechanic”.26  They are, in Weber’s words, a “utopia…found nowhere in reality”.27  Such 
assumptions can range from the ‘all actors are ration l’ to ‘rationality is culturally 
determined’.  Instead, ideal types are supposed to be useful, defined as “worthy of being 
known”.28  Of course “worthy of being known” is a very subjective standard that can only 
be determined by the researcher, hence the importance of value positions in the creation 
of ideal types.  The researcher must be able to persuade the reader that what they study s 
worthy of being known.  But ideal types can be very useful in telling us about specific 
cases and have become increasingly utilized in certain s rands of what is usually termed 
constructivist IR.29  It is also very common in formal theory approaches, where the formal 
model is an ideal typical construction of the world that emphasizes only one or two 
aspects of that world in order to gain analytical leverage on a problem of choice.30 
Ideal types are meant to give us analytical leverag on a single case by comparing 
that ideal type to the case in question with the aim of explaining the divergence.  This is 
best done through an analytic narrative, defined as the process of working through the 
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logical extension of one or more ideal types in a particular ‘case’.31  In this case, the 
emphasis on narrative analysis is due to the belief that the meaning and intelligibility of 
all human action comes as much from context as the action itself.  Therefore, “action 
itself has a basic historical character”.32  Philosopher Alisdair MacIntyre argues that 
human life, and in fact the entire social world, is constructed of narratives with 
beginnings and endings.  We cannot understand morality or human action without 
narrative since the meaning, and thus the causes and consequences, of all action is 
grounded in the contexts and understanding that human beings have of the world around 
them.  For these reasons, “narrative history of a certain kind turns out to be the basic and 
essential genre for the characterization of all human action”.33  It is only through telling 
these stories that we can understand and explain human action.  What cannot be produced 
are generalizable laws of social and political behavior meant to be applicable in multiple 
cases, the goal of positivist social science where questions such as, “does democracy 
make war less likely?” and “why do some states put u  trade barriers while others do 
not?” are explored.  This method views such endeavors skeptically, unconvinced that we 
can come to final answers for such general questions, trading this type of generalizability 
for depth in the attempt to talk about specific cases. 
The narratives are constructed by looking to excavate the narratives of both state 
leaders and those perpetrating the violence in question by using primary documents.  For 
the golden age of piracy, I use sources from the Public Record Office of the National 
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Archive in Kew, London, UK,34 as well as the online database of the Calendar of State 
Papers Colonial Series35 in addition to assorted other primary documents. For propaganda 
of the deed I use documents in Kew36 in addition to the Archive de Prefecture de Police 
in Paris.37  For my chapter on al Qaeda I intereviewed policymakers, experts, and 
activists in Washington, DC in the Summer of 2014.  These sources allow me to 
construct the necessary narratives with some confide ce by using and interpreting their 
own words.   
Each narrative in this study starts with an ideal-typical conception of the state 
based on one or more boundaries unique to that time and place.38  For example, Chapter 4 
starts with ‘the line’ separating Europe from its Atlantic colonies in the early 18th century.  
This does a good job of explaining patterns of colonial trade, rule, and governance in the 
Atlantic during the 17th and early 18th centuries.  However, this ideal typical construct is 
not ‘useful’ in understanding these same patterns for much of the 18th century, as a 
system of mercantilist trade and close colonial rule developed.  Why?  This problem 
situation becomes apparent because of the decision to construct an ideal type, without 
which this may not look like a puzzle.39  In this case, as with the others, the ‘cause’ was 
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an episode of revisionist violence.  Since I am not attempting to argue that golden age 
piracy, for instance, was the only factor contributing to the change described, my mission 
is to talk about how it interacted with other factors.  The meaning of action is determined 
in large part by the context of that action, in particular the narratives built around it. Some 
of these factors will have had an effect (colonial w rs, mercantilist trade in the piracy 
case, rising nationalism and the First World War in the propagandist case, rise of social 
networking technologies in the al Qaeda case) but will not be sufficient to have caused 
the change.  The trick is to show that revisionist violence had the effect I have claimed 
and to show how that interacted with the context around it to create the change in 
boundaries.  Instead of necessary or sufficient conditi s, golden age pirates, 
propagandists, and al Qaeda are instead ‘adequate’ conditions for change.  Adequate 
causation asks the question of why the world is “hitor cally so and not otherwise”.40 
Therefore, golden age piracy, for instance, tells us why the practices of colonial rule in 
the 18th century developed as they did, which is vitally important for those people 
experiencing that episode of violence, even if vaguely similar outcomes could have 
developed anyway.   
 Since each instance of change is in many ways unique and every event is largely 
dependent upon its historical and social context for its outcome, how can theory help us 
to understand more than any single case?  Again, this is the goal of positivist social 
science which provides an answer built around correlations across cases.  Since I have 
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stated that there is no way to view the world from the necessary Archimedean viewpoint, 
such recourse is not available to me.  That said, I am looking at three cases and 
attempting to add to debates on globalization and the s ate or transnational violence and 
the state that are based on hundreds or possibly thousands of possible cases.  How can I 
do this if my chosen method is geared towards enlightening a single case?  What social 
scientists working in the mode of ‘ideal types’ look f r is analytical, not empirical, 
generalizability.  For instance, Charles Tilly argues that what we should look for are a 
series of mechanisms, processes, or configurations thereof that are recurrent through 
cases of particular phenomena, even as the outcomes f those cases are not 
generalizable.41  Mechanisms are abstract features of complex events and they 
“compound into processes”.42  How they do so in any particular case is dependent on the 
particulars of that case.  There is no reason why any p rticular mechanism must be 
wedded to a particular outcome as in any covering law account.  As Tilly explains, “their 
aggregate, cumulative, and longer-term effects varyconsiderably depending on initial 
conditions”.43  Daniel Nexon agrees, arguing that, “dynamics will concatenate with other 
factors…to produce historically variable outcomes.”44  Mechanisms and processes are 
abstract concepts that can be carried from case to case to help us to understand the 
outcome of a particular situation.  As Nexon argues, “to the extent that…contexts endure 
across time and space, we should expect to see similar echanisms and processes at 
work”.45   
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Plan of dissertation 
 To restate, revisionist violence acts as a site whre the boundaries of political 
authority are drawn and redrawn because it cannot be made sense of within contemporary 
boundaries.  So long as those boundaries exist, so does the threat posed by episodes of 
violence characterized by revisionist narratives.  Since the state is defined by the presence 
of these boundaries, redrawing them results in state tr nsformation and perpetuation.  
Golden age pirates, anarchist propagandists, and al Qaeda are three such episodes.  By 
examining how states have dealt with the former two we can develop a series of 
analytically general ‘mechanisms and processes’ that give us some leverage into how 
states are dealing with the third episode and other current and future threats.  This, in 
turn, allows us to contribute to the debate on the future of the state in the face of 
globalization. 
The above argument is laid out piece by piece over the next five chapters.  
Chapters 2 and 3 outline the theoretical framework of this project, developing the ideal 
types necessary to carry out a rigorous narrative analysis.  The state and sovereignty are 
the focus of Chapter 2.  Following post-structural or critical analyses of s vereignty and 
pragmatist philosophy, I will lay out a conception f the state and sovereignty as practice, 
as something that is ‘done’ and maintained as opposed to something that exists on its 
own.  As stated above, sovereignty is the practice of drawing boundaries around political 
authority and the state is the entity that is created through these practices.  As such, the 
state is the polity of modernity, reflecting its focus on the separation between the mind 
and the world.  This mirrors the separation between state and society, or the boundaries 




differs from other ideal typical polities (universal, composite, buffer, and overlapping) 
that are not characterized by boundaries.  This definition of sovereignty is necessary for 
me to put forth a theory of state transformation in the face of the crises created by 
episodes of revisionist violence. 
Chapter 3 has two parts.  The first part focuses on the ways in which threat is 
produced from violence, focusing on role of narratives.  Surveying the current literature 
on terrorism in IR, I describe the construction of threat from violence in a way that goes 
beyond the actions undertaken, the ideological underpinnings of the group undertaking 
them, the structure of said group, or the ‘severity’ of attacks.  These more traditional 
ways of thinking about violence obscure how such violence relates to the state as a 
bundle of boundary-producing practices. Instead, building on the literature on threat 
construction,46 I argue that it is narratives that explain the threat that violence poses to the 
state. I create four ideal typical narratives on violence in order to draw out qualitatively 
distinct genera of threat – Entrant, Resource, Revisionist and Criminal.  This typology is 
derived from four short narratives on different episodes or ‘waves’ of piracy, each 
demonstrating one of the four types.  As mentioned above, narratives of revisionist 
violence are of particular importance for the purposes of this project because it poses a 
challenge to the state as a form of governance.  Revisionist violence can only be 
determined by looking at the narrative constructed to give that violence meaning by both 
the state AND those perpetrating the violence.   
In the second part of Chapter 3, I typologize the mechanisms extracted from my 
narrative, connecting my conception of state sovereignty with my conception of 
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‘revisionist’ violence.  Drawing heavily on the pragmatist social theory of Hans Joas, 
who also relies heavily on Dewey and Mead, I will show how and why these episodes of 
revisionist violence create crises for states by ‘shattering’ the habit of practice and 
forcing states to come up with something creative.  From here, I construct two distinct 
processes: “Shattering” and “Re-inscribing”, each with their own set of mechanisms.   
Chapters 4 and 5 take this theoretical framework and apply it to two historical 
cases of ‘revisionist’ violence in order to demonstrate how creative solutions to the crises 
created by these episodes of violence re-inscribed th  state.  Each Chapter, as well as 
Chapter 6, will be constructed as a narrative structu ed by the ‘mechanisms and 
processes’ developed at the end of Chapter 3 while simultaneously outlining the relevant 
boundaries and demonstrating each case as an episod of revisionist violence.  It should 
be mentioned here that the ‘states’ under review in this study are of a particular type.  
They are all either European or what might be called a great power, often both.  There are 
a few reasons for this.  First, it is assumed that t e powerful states that not only sit at the 
center of a state system but also compose its charater.  In other words, hegemons are 
more likely to set standard practices and therefore their existence is more important to the 
continuance of the state system than their weaker pe rs.  This also holds, though to a 
lesser degree, for weaker states closer to the core such as Belgium or Luxembourg in 
Europe.  Relatedly, each of the violent actors that follows explicitly challenges the state 
in some manner.  If you are looking to upturn the entir  social and political system it 
makes sense to attack its center than its periphery.  Finally, as will be discussed more in 
the conclusion, there is every reason to think that t e manner in which smaller, weaker 




Thus this study is Euro- and great power centric; the state itself is largely a European 
construct and it is European states and their close c usins in North America and East 
Asia that have dictated the boundaries that the stat dr ws in any particular historical time 
and place.   
Chapter 4 examines the golden age of piracy in the Atlantic i  the early 18th 
century.  During this time, sea lanes were contested paces between rival European 
powers and Atlantic colonies remained ‘beyond the lin ’, largely ungoverned outside of 
cities and ports and chiefly thought of as international holdings of the crown.  Golden age 
pirates exploited these dynamics by relying on ungoverned land and colonial markets to 
attack trade.  British attempts to combat piracy led states to bring the Colonial Atlantic 
into the domestic sphere.  What we have then is a transformed state which, by moving 
‘the line’ so as to include the American colonies while simultaneously beginning the 
process of relinquishing control over the sea, paved th  way for the mercantile 
colonialism of the 18th century and the near constant warfare this system engendered. 
Chapter 5 tackles the violence conducted by propagandists in the decades leading 
up to the First World War.  These terrorists were able to exploit open borders to plan 
attacks on target states, such as France, in relativ ly ‘safe’ states, such as Britain.  They 
were also able to use media coverage of state repression as a recruiting tool, making it 
harder for the state to crack down ruthlessly despit  many attempts to do just that.  In 
response, continental European states were forced to allow peaceful anarchists into the 
public sphere, following Britain’s lead, while facilitating greater police cooperation and 
coordination between states, and establishing greater border controls, including the 




domestic state, part of a process that led to more strict labor laws and greater speech 
rights, while they were simultaneously tightened across states, restricting the movement 
of people and goods that defined the prewar era.  
Chapter 6 attempts to apply the insights of these two historical chapters to help 
us understand the contemporary violence of al Qaeda n  its associates and the resulting 
GWoT.  Of course, this story is still playing itself out, so the conclusion and the type of 
change that is to happen are still dependent upon further events.  However, there is 
evidence that such changes are indeed taking place even if their content is yet to be fully 
settled.  Therefore, this chapter will look into the future and set some plausible scenarios 
for how this may work out. Al Qaeda and its allies have taken advantage of greater flows 
of information and people to create a decentralized network that challenges strict 
territorial conceptions of jurisdiction and authority.  This has created the type of threat 
that has become synonymous with the new security challenges brought about by 
globalization.  However, once again we are seeing the development of creative solutions 
to the crisis created by revisionist violence.  While early attempts to defeat al Qaeda by 
the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan backfired or we e largely ineffective, targeted 
killings via drones and the recently leaked NSA surveillance programs, such as PRISM, 
have the potential to draw new boundaries of state au hority based on surveillance across 
borders.  In particular there are three new boundaries worth watching.  Targeted killing 
via drones in Pakistan and Yemen, among other places, has the potential to change the 
relationship between the US and other powerful state  nd the states not deemed strong 
enough to protect their territory.  This could mean a rewriting of what it means to be a 




the use of drones as well as big data surveillance programs allows the US, and those who 
will soon be able to boast these capabilities, to track movements across borders.  
Therefore, following the ‘surveillant assemblage’47 literature, borders go from sites of 
exclusion meant to keep out undesirable people, goods, and information to sites of 
collection used to control increasingly high numbers of flows.  Collection sites become 
new boundaries in cyberspace, drawing the state into this realm.  Finally, this has the 
potential to change boundaries around citizens, extracting citizenship from the body and 
creating ‘data doubles’, part of which may not even b  considered ‘citizen’.  What must 
be kept in mind is that while there is no reason to think that this saga will turn out any 
one particular way, we as political actors have some control over it. 
Chapter 7 will conclude this study by summing up the argument and beginning 
to project its implications forward.  In the beginning of this introduction, I stated that 
there were three major payoffs from this study: great understanding of the state and 
sovereignty, globalization, and the Global War on Terror.  Each of these will be taken in 
turn.  First, the state and sovereignty will be put front and center as I recap the findings 
and analysis of this study.  Second, I talk about globalization by looking forward.  The 
theoretical tools developed above do not solve the impending puzzle of what will happen 
to the state in the face of globalization.  What they do is provide us with another way of 
tackling the problem, one that works beyond the ‘will it stay or will it go’ dichotomy that 
plagues the literature.  It can be argued that globalization is just as likely, if not more so, 
to transform the state as it is to erode its importance in political and social life.  If we are 
to take the admittedly large step of generalizing this process to explain how the state 
                                                           




deals with the crises and challenges of all globalizing processes, we can start to think 
about what the politics of the 21st century will look like.  There are a number of 
implications of this statement and the bulk of Chapter 7 will begin to sort through them.  
There is the chance that that state will begin to fail to deal with a particular problem and 
therefore the process will be broken.  There is also the interesting possibility that even if I 
am correct in my diagnosis of the situation, the state will change at such a rapid pace that 
it will become something else and it will no longer be recognizable unless we are able to 
create stable ‘conceptual maps’.  Either way, this c apter attempts to bring the focus back 
out to the state in the 21st century.  
Finally, I attempt to draw out the implications forour understanding of the GWoT 
by taking a normative turn.  Building on the work of J hn Dewey, I argue for morality to 
be rooted not in universals but instead in situations.  If the conclusions of this study are 
correct, change is a necessity if we hope to defeat th  threat in each case.  Taking this into 
consideration, we must make sure that the outcome is something that is in line not with 
particular manifestations of universal goods but ins ead with flexible interpretations of 
them.  In other words, we may have to reconceptualize what ‘privacy’, ‘democracy’, or 











The State, Sovereignty, and Boundaries 
 
 “My task is…to maintain the skin that keeps the law in place.  
Two laws in two places in fact”.   
        
~ Tyador Borlu 
          The City and City 
         China Mieville48 
 
In order to understand how the golden age of piracy, propaganda of the deed, and 
the jihadist terrorism typified by al Qaeda have all acted as sites for the redrawing of the 
boundaries of sovereign authority, we must understand sovereignty, and by extension the 
state, and its relationship to boundaries.  That is the purpose of this chapter.  It also means 
revisiting, as has happened so often in the past 20 years in IR, the concept of sovereignty.  
Despite, or maybe because of, the importance of the concept in scholarly and policy 
discourse, the literature on sovereignty has given us multiple variations on the use, 
meaning, and construction of sovereignty.  Thus we get realist, liberal, constructivist, 
rationalist, feminist, post-colonial, and post-struc ural (among others) writings on 
sovereignty.  It can reasonably be argued that mostof these conceptions capture 
important aspects of sovereignty, the state, and international politics that others leave out.  
However, with so many options it is tempting to follow the advice of Nuno Monteiro and 
Kevin Ruby to ignore sovereignty and simply “get on” with the work of producing 
knowledge about world politics.49  However, as will be shown below, how a scholar 
conceptualizes sovereignty can go a long way toward determining the type of theories he 
or she will develop.  This is especially true in a project like this one that deals with 
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boundaries.  Therefore, there is a need for a solid, clear ideal typical conceptualization of 
sovereignty, one that allows us to see how these episodes of revisionist violence act as 
sites for the drawing of the boundaries of political authority. 
The state is a polity constructed and characterized by an ideal of clear, delineated 
boundaries while sovereignty is the practice of drawing those boundaries.  This sets the 
state apart from other types of polities such as empires, city-states, universal systems, etc. 
while tying sovereignty to the state.  At any particular time, the state is made up of 
multiple boundaries that are not limited to the physical, territorial ones that can be seen 
on a map.  Examples include those delineating the stat from society, the public from the 
private, the citizen from the alien, and the international from the domestic, among other 
possibilities.  Conceiving of sovereignty in this manner helps us to understand how the 
state has traditionally dealt with the types of challenges that violence presents to it.  We 
can pinpoint particular boundaries and particular threats to them as well as the creative 
solutions arrived at to solve these concrete problems and redraw boundaries to mitigate 
such threats. 
The plan of this chapter is as follows.  The next sction will review the different 
popular conceptions of sovereignty in the field of IR and how each one, while more or 
less useful for their own purposes, does not help us understand the problem at the heart of 
this study.  This will be followed by a more thorough explication of sovereignty as a 
bundle of practices that draw boundaries around political authority and the state as a 
bounded polity.  Two aspects will be foregrounded: boundaries and practices.  I will 
develop each part of this concept in some detail and then draw on the work of James 




around political authority” can mean.  The goal of this chapter is to develop a workable 
conception of sovereignty that can serve as an ideal typical platform on which to argue 
that states redraw boundaries as a consequence of succes fully combating episodes of 
revisionist violence. 
Sovereignty in international relations 
In this section I want to split the literature on sovereignty not into the 
paradigmatic camps that typify the study of IR (though these splits are still apparent) but 
instead into the different ontological positions on sovereignty. One major school of 
thought attempts to define sovereignty as a property of states, something held (or not) by 
a pre-existing entity.  Therefore, the state is something that can, in principle, exist without 
sovereignty.  To these scholars sovereignty is an either/or proposition.50  For example: Is 
Entity X, say Somalia, Afghanistan, or Palestine, a sovereign state?  Can a state lose or 
forfeit its sovereignty?  When does intervention violate sovereignty?  Do powerful states 
actually respect sovereignty?  Such studies do, of course, go beyond a simple dichotomy 
in talking about entities such as ‘quasi-states’51 or splitting sovereignty up into different 
categories, allowing for states to have sovereignty in some arenas but not others.52  Still, 
the overarching idea is that sovereignty is something states have (even if it is more or 
less).  Therefore, despite claims that sovereignty is necessary for a state to exist, there is 
still a clear separation between the state that can have sovereignty and the sovereignty 
that can be had.  The state must exist without sovereignty if it is to ‘have’ or ‘get’ it.  
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This can be demonstrated in some of the major works n overeignty in this vein.  
Robert Jackson talks about quasi-states as a problem since they occupy a nebulous 
middle ground, breaking up the naturally dichotomous nature of sovereignty. 53  Quasi-
states are ‘states’ that cannot live up to the ‘statehood’ conferred on them by the 
international community.  They have ‘negative’ sovereignty but cannot perform the 
functions of the sovereign state, or ‘positive’ sovereignty, and therefore are at the root of 
many security and development problems plaguing international politics.  In his work on 
hierarchy, David Lake views sovereignty as a contract, with authority given to a party in 
return for protection, market access, or other goods. 54  However, here sovereignty is 
treated as an object, something that can be given (or ot) to someone or something.  Lake 
splits sovereignty up along policy lines (economic, security, etc.) so that it is not 
indivisible, therefore helping him to build his conception of hierarchy where another state 
may have de facto or even de jure control over an aspect of another state’s sovereignty.  
However, sovereignty is still a property of states – it must be in order to be contracted out 
– and therefore an existing entity in its own right.  This property does not change.  And, 
while it is possible that contracts could be rewritten, the fundamentals (economic, 
security, etc.) do not change nor is there a mechanism for this rewrite to take place. 
Sovereignty can also be viewed as a certain set of rules, rights and responsibilities 
that is the same for all states in all times.  Stephen Krasner demonstrates this concept 
when he argues that powerful states prioritize the aspects of sovereignty that are in their 
own interests.55   While this may seem like a mechanism for change as some aspects are 
emphasized over others due to the interests of the powerful, it does not assume that the 
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list of rules, rights, and responsibilities changes at all.  This constitutes his evidence of 
‘organized hypocrisy’ because the conception of a particular set of rules, rights, and 
responsibilities is read back through time and in places where it does not fit.  Instead he 
argues that,  
…the norms and rules of any international institutional system, including the sovereignty 
state system, will have limited influence and will always be subject to challenge because 
of logical constrdictions (non-intervention versus promoting democracy, for instance), 
the absence of any institutional arrangement for authoritatively resolving conflicts (the 
definition of an international system), power asymmetries among principlaed actors, 
notably states, and the differing incentives confroting individual rulers.56   
 
In other words, anarchy and power matter more than e rules of sovereignty because 
those rules have routinely been broken by those powerful enough to do so. However, as 
Martha Finnemore and others have pointed out, what may look like the breaking of a 
particular rule may actually be well within the rules and practices of a particular time 
period.57 
A lack of variability in sovereignty and the state is also seen in many rationalist 
studies that use the state as the unit of measurement, such as studies on the democratic 
peace, trade, development, and interstate war, among a y others.  This type of study 
tends to mold the state into a ‘box’ which contains distinct ‘variables’ that vary in time 
and place.  One of these variables, the dependent variable, is then chosen as the important 
one for a particular study and the others are tested to find correlations.  In doing so, a few 
assumptions are relevant for the purposes of this sudy.  First, the state, as the container 
holding the variables, does not change.  In the words f Janice Thomson, “The state is the 
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state is the state”.58  If it did change, the study itself would be compromised.  At most, a 
changed container drops out of the dataset as it becom s something else since units of 
measurement should not vary within a particular study. While each container must be 
distinct from other containers in order to count as its own container, it must be similar 
enough that a) all containers can still be recognized as containers and b) it does not 
change over time.  Second, the variables that are supposed to be so important are to have 
no effect on the presence, absence, or dynamism of the container.  If different values of 
any of the variables could make the container exist or not, or even change into a different 
type of container, the study would be compromised.59  There is a danger here that 
sovereignty becomes irrelevant, the state is unchanging and it can be controlled for.  
While many scholars doing this type of study would probably accede that the state can 
change, that there is dynamism, their research takes littl  account of this in order to draw 
out general, if not universal, laws of state behavior in the form of statistical correlations.60  
Studies that impart, implicitly or explicitly, that the state does not change, that 
sovereignty is a property of states, tend to lead us to one of the two major predictions 
about the future of the state facing the challenges of globalization: either that nothing is 
changing or that everything is changing.  Both come from a place where the state is a 
single thing that is unchanging and therefore must either continue or pass away.   
The idea that sovereignty is a variable concept has been a foundational claim of 
the constructivist and critical theory schools of IR since their inception.61  This has 
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created three relevant literatures for this study.  The first is concerned with how 
sovereignty, or at least modern sovereignty and the modern state, came to be a major 
idea/force in politics.  Specifically, it attempts to explain the move from a heteronymous 
system of overlapping or non-existent sovereignty i Medieval Europe to a system of 
sovereign states, the so-called Westphalia question.62  While this literature does not 
necessarily think of sovereignty only as a fixed property of states, it does bring a certain 
dichotomy.  At one point there were no states, at ano her there were states.  Why?  
Variants of this question drive all of these works.  Change in this regard is seen as a 
change in the “organizing principle” of, and the “mode of differentiation”63 between, 
actors in the system from one of heteronomy or suzerainty (and increasingly empire) to 
one of sovereignty that still exists to this day.  
This literature can shed some light on any discussion about the future of the state 
in the face of globalization.  The comparison of the ‘before’ and the ‘after’ serves to 
define the state while simultaneously working as an implicit theory of the state.  The state 
is not eternal and since it developed historically, it will one day exit the world stage.  It 
can provide a theory of what to look for in divining the presence of systems change.  For 
instance, Daniel Nexon contends that the Reformation created linkages between 
Protestants that posed serious problems for the composite polities of Early Modern 
Europe.64  This suggests that one site to be looking for change would be political 
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relationships that cannot easily be folded into, in his terms, “the nested governing 
structures of the state”.  Therefore, such a literature can prove quite valuable in not only 
understanding the state and sovereignty but also imagining how it might unravel. 
Without denying the importance of this literature, its framing can mask change 
within the sovereign state.  Christian Reus-Smit argues that it “obscures the significant 
differences between historical systems of states”.65  Through this lens, changes in 
sovereignty becomes apparent but, under the two groups f literature above, they are 
either not apparent or not a focus of study.  This second constructivist literature66 
attempts to look at how sovereignty has changed over tim , what might be termed 
‘systemic’ change as opposed to the systems change of th ‘Westphalia’ group above.67  
This literature attempts to demonstrate that in different eras, particular logics or 
normative understandings undergird the state system and the practice of sovereignty. 
The era of the modern sovereign state is usually broken up into three different 
periods.  Rodney Bruce Hall’s categorization is typical.  Dynastic Sovereignty was the 
dominant political culture in the century and a half before 1648 and was based on the idea 
that the state and the crown, or court, are one and the same.  What mattered politically is 
one’s relationship with the Monarch.  The period between 1648-1789/1815/1848 was 
characterized by Territorial Sovereignty.  While much of Europe was still ruled by 
monarchs, the state itself had come to be objectifid above and beyond the Monarch.  
Finally, from some time in the early 19th century to today is a period where sovereignty 
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rested in the nation.  Here the nation serves the stat and the state serves and protects the 
nation.  Some scholars have begun to argue that a st e based on liberal individuality and 
the global logics of the market have begun to develop over the past few decades.68 
Much of the literature on this topic is focused on demonstrating that such changes 
have indeed taken place, setting out the logics of each era and their consequences for 
international politics.69  Mlada Bukovansky concentrates on how sovereignty changes 
across the system, building a theoretical framework around the contradictions and 
complementarities between ideas and practice.  Starting in the 18th century, she argues for 
a dialectic between monarchical hierarchy as the dominant practice of rule on the one 
hand, and the Enlightenment as the dominant scholarly discourse on the other.  The two 
were able to come together to reproduce aristocratic and monarchical rule, with the 
‘enlightened absolutism’ of Central Europe as a cler example, but differed in the latter’s 
call for equality and popular sovereignty.  The power of the American and French 
Revolutions was due not simply to their success (or lack thereof) but instead to how they 
spoke to political actors across the western world that had the similar ideas and levels of 
disaffection  While many contradictions can be ‘suppressed’ by those in power, they do 
create moments where disaffected actors align politics along the fissures of these 
contradictions.  Since all eras and cultures will have contradictory ideas, it is here that we 
need to look when attempting to explain major episode  of political change. 
While sympathetic to Bukovansky’s use of contradiction and complementarity, it 
is useful to question her use of ‘international culture’ as a unified and causally 
determinative concept.  Here, as in other writings of this type, all practices of 
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sovereignty, international and domestic, derive from a single norm (or bundle of norms) 
of legitimacy; causation only flows from the big to the small.  The cultural norms of 
legitimation exist in and of themselves and are the locus from which practices of 
sovereignty follow.  Thus, sovereignty is something l ke an entity, if an unseen one, that 
is similar to the conception of the rationalist literature above.  Of course instead of 
‘having’ sovereignty, sovereignty is now something shared between states about how 
they should behave.  But it is still a singular entity with a real, if variable, core. 
Hall argues in a similar fashion, seeing practices or characteristics of an era 
following from these norms.  One example is his discus ion about the differences 
between the colonial practices of the territorial and national sovereigns.  To Hall, these 
patterns of rule are not the result of actions taken in the colonies, in the process of 
colonial trade, or in ruling the colonies by the metropole.  Instead, he argues that they 
follow logically from the legitimating norm that isdominant at the time, either territory 
or nation.  Thus, the whole of sovereignty and international politics depends on a few 
‘crises’ or a few moments when contradictions were able to lead to change.  Once such a 
norm or culture is changed everything follows from it.  Are patterns of colonial rule 
(especially in the Atlantic) in the 18th century really due to the legitimating norms of 
territory that grew out of the Treaties of Westphalia?  Or is Westphalia merely a 
backdrop as events and actors ‘on the ground’ challenged current state practices and 
forced it to develop new ideas, interests, and ultima ely new practices?   
The argument that unobservable, immeasurable forces such as normative or 




but it is also suspect.70  The idea of grand historical changes within the state system 
builds on just such an idea.  A ‘culture’ of sovereignty has changed and with it how the 
state operates.  However, this commonly gets it backw rd, ignoring how practice can 
come before culture.  Getting the ‘how’ wrong not only means that the ‘why’ is probably 
wrong as well but also serves to obscure much of what is going on.  Therefore, the idea 
that the state might be changing via creative solutions to concrete problems is off the 
table.  However, an approach of this study allows for change in how the state operates, 
even at a larger level.  It is possible to recognize both that the French Revolution could 
usher in the concept of a ‘nation’ and that smaller, y t still meaningful changes can occur 
as well. 
Each of these three broad literatures on sovereignty has their strong points.  The 
state as an entity that can ‘have’ sovereignty alights us to the ways in which sovereignty 
can be ‘given’ and yet still not realized, providing us with a jumping off point to question 
the world map even if many end up rejecting the proposed dichotomy.71  The Westphalia 
literature tends to develop sound theories of the sate and has the ability to show us how 
systems change can occur.  The systemic change literatur  shows us how sovereignty is a 
variable concept that has had different manifestations n different times and places.  
However, each comes with weaknesses that make them ill- quipped to deal with the 
subject of this study. 
The state and sovereignty 
The third major literature on sovereignty that has grown out of constructivism 
broadly conceived views sovereignty as produced through “discourse, practice, and 
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performance”.72  Here the state is not an entity that can exist and ‘have’ sovereignty, nor 
is sovereignty a singular norm from which the practices of states derive.  Instead, it is 
something that creates the possibility of the state even as the state allows sovereignty to 
be realized.73  Utilizing this literature, this section will make the argument that 
sovereignty is a bundle of practices that draw, redraw, and maintai  boundaries of 
political authority.  This section has three parts.  First, I will demonstrate how 
sovereignty and the state are linked; one cannot exis with the other.  Nor can they exist 
without other ‘entities’ as the relations between states and these entities logically precede 
the state’s existence.  Second, sovereignty is concerned chiefly with boundaries, not order 
or authority (though these are usually necessary components for boundaries).  Finally, 
sovereignty can best be understood through the concept of practice.  Each of these 
aspects will be taken on its own, before being put back together and its significance 
demonstrated. 
Before explaining the why, how, and significance of s vereignty as “a bundle of 
practices that draw, redraw, and maintain the boundaries of political authority” and the 
state as a “bounded polity”, we need to figure out what type of things we are talking 
about when we talk about sovereignty and/or the stat .  The state is an entity.  It is a type 
of entity that we may call a polity, which, following Ferguson and Mansbach, is simply a 
‘political community’ or congeries of authority relationships which have “a distinct 
identity; a capacity to mobilize persons and their r sources for political purposes, that is, 
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for value satisfaction; and a degree of institutionalization and hierarchy”.74  The state, 
therefore, is merely a type of polity right alongside, but distinguished from “tribes, 
empires, corporations, trading leagues, city-states, rebel groups, religions, private groups, 
and so forth”.75  This study is placed within a literature that describes the state as a 
particular type of polity as opposed to work that uses the term ‘state’ as an equivalent of 
‘polity’. 76 
Thinking ideal typically the state can be distinguished from other types of polities 
such as universal systems, composite polities, buffer zones, and overlapping or 
heteronomous systems.  Universal systems claim all to be within their reach and therefore 
have no boundaries.  The medieval Catholic Church and many dynastic Chinese empires 
made similar claims and Alex Wendt’s ‘state on an island’ displays similar 
characteristics.77  Composite polities such as empires are predicated on the relationship 
between center and periphery, a relationship that is often personal and is usually based on 
some form of tribute.78  Buffer zones exist between small polities in areas where 
boundaries are not drawn, for example the Italian countryside between city-states in the 
15th century or the zones separating 19th century kingdoms in Southeast Asia.79  Finally, 
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overlapping systems break up the inside/outside dichotomy of sovereignty into multiple 
insides and outsides, similar to the heteronomous order of medieval Europe.80  In fact 
many claim that this is what lies ahead in the 21st century.81  Of course any real world 
polity can contain elements of multiple ideal typical polities.  For instance, during the 
Cold War, the Soviet Union could be characterized as both a state with clear boundaries, 
and a composite polity in its relations, not only with the Warsaw Pact states, but also in 
many areas within the USSR proper.82 
If the state is an entity, then sovereignty is the set of actions that it undertakes to 
create and perpetuate itself.  However, it would not be correct to imagine a pre-existing 
state undertaking a series of actions called ‘sovereignty’.  This is because the state does 
not exist outside of these actions; it is only by undertaking them that it can be recognized 
as such.  As Michel Foucault put it, “the state is a practice, not a thing”.83  There is no 
reason to privilege the existence of the state when attempting to undertake a study that 
must allow for the possibility that said existence may be coming to an end.  Therefore, 
sovereignty and state are indelibly intertwined; we cannot talk about one without talking 
about the other.  We can tell that sovereignty exists by observing the presence of clear, 
distinct boundaries and the only way that we know the state exists is through sovereignty. 
Sovereignty is therefore ‘socially constructed’.84  In order for boundaries to be 
created, other entities must exist and be recognized to constitute the other side of that 
boundary.  This means that the state and sovereignty are ‘relational’ entities.  
Relationalism is a theory that the relations between ntities should be ontologically prior 
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to the entities themselves.85  Actors have no prior existence outside of their rlations (or 
actions, since most actions are relational).  So a state cannot exist without the 
simultaneous existence of the other entities that i creates and separates from itself such 
as society, citizens, ‘the international’, or other states.  Therefore, the state and society do 
not exist until the relationship that allows them to exist is formed.86 
What might stand out from the attempts to define the state and sovereignty above 
is a lack of specifics.  The state is not defined using concepts like ‘bureaucracy’, 
‘international recognition’, ‘monopoly of violence’, ‘standing army’, ‘nation’, or 
‘citizen’, let alone even more specific concepts.  Such specifics are rooted in time and 
place and using them in a definition of the state would root that definition in time and 
place as well.  This tendency has two effects that make it hard to perceive change over 
time and space.  First, it obscures the fact that many entities that we would define as 
states did not have these characteristics.  So either these characteristics are imputed onto 
entities that did not have them or we fail to recognize some states as such.  Second, doing 
this makes it hard to see how the organization of ‘bureaucracy’ or ‘the welfare state’ and 
their meanings have changed.  They do not mean the sam  thing in all times and places 
and these different meanings and processes have important consequences for people 
living in these states and international politics more generally – not to mention scholars 
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who study the state.  If ‘statehood’ is not constant over time, large-N and many 
comparative historical studies need to be done withcare. 
Many if not all of these attributes or processes have been associated with the state 
for periods of its history, but simply because something has been does not mean that it 
needs to be.87  Friedrich Kratochwil has argued that, “The institution or institutions that 
are part of this concept [sovereignty] and the practices need not stay the same or have a 
clearly identifiable trans-historical core, but posse s a certain ‘family resemblance’ 
without necessarily sharing all or several of the same features”.88  The key distinction 
here is the difference between a ‘trans-historical core’ and ‘family resemblances’.  This 
can be taken to mean that the former includes the typ s of specifics – features to 
Kratochwil – warned against above.  The latter, on the other hand, calls for a level of 
analytic generality.  ‘Family resemblances’ may include similar properties or dynamics 
around a broader concept such as ‘boundaries’ without mention of what types of 
boundaries are necessary or what their effects mustbe.  Operationally this entails setting 
out large scope conditions and letting the rest play out in the process of doing narrative 
analysis.  So the state cannot be defined in terms of bureaucracy89 or the ability to 
marshal economic90 or coercive power,91 among other popular characteristics.  Both of 
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these points, 1) that the state and sovereignty are indelibly linked to each other, creating 
and depending on each other and 2) with features only t  be decided in-case, are 
important aspects of the concept of the state argued for here. 
Boundaries 
As mentioned above, it is clear, delineated boundaries that set the state apart from 
other types of polities and therefore define it.92  This is what Deleuze and Guattari call 
“the state form”, which has a tendency to create bounded spaces for rule.93  Boundaries 
are lines of political significance which “decide which issues, activities, and practices fall 
within [the state’s] authority realm – the political – and which lie in the provenance of 
non-state authority”.94  It is said that the state is ‘Janus faced’, with an inward looking 
apparatus and an outward looking one.95  Boundaries create this arrangement.  However, 
we need to be careful that we do not start with the presence of a boundary but instead 
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problematize it.  This is the only way to question the state and its existence.  As Jackson 
and Nexon argue, “It is somewhat problematic to consider the way in which the state 
project operates ‘domestically’ without considering how it operates ‘internationally’, and 
in particular to pay attention to the ways in which the operations of the project constitute 
this demarcation”. 96 
It is these boundaries that set the state apart from other types of polities.  The 
most obvious type of boundary is a physical one that delineates the authority of one state 
from that of another.  These are the borders97 that can be viewed on a map such as the 
48th parallel or the Rio Grande.  They are meant to be total in that while we cannot see 
such vanishing lines, we can say that on one side of the line lies the authority of Canada 
and Mexico, respectively, and on the other side that of the United States.  Therefore, the 
state is bounded as regards other states and itself ju t as it is created along with those 
states with which it shares borders.98 
However, we can easily begin to think beyond the presence of physical, territorial 
boundaries and into the realm of the conceptual boundaries that further demarcate the 
state and are of greater significance for this study.  For instance, the very idea behind 
there being something called ‘domestic politics’ and ‘i ternational politics’ as opposed to 
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simply ‘politics’, owes its purchasing power to sovereignty.99  This has created not only 
the field of study termed political science but also the very possibility of such 
interactions.  This is not to say that we should not classify but instead suggests that those 
classifications change over time, that their content is embedded in historical context and 
that we should investigate them so as to guard as well as we possibly can against 
reification.  Yes, physical or territorial boundaries can tell us ‘where’ we may look for 
‘domestic’ or ‘international’ politics so that Washington refers to dealings with one side 
of Niagara Falls as ‘domestic’ and the other ‘interational’.  However, this fact itself does 
not separate the difference between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ politics.  Another 
distinction needs to be made as there can be international issues, dynamics, crises, etc. 
that are not fully explained by a physical border.  Therefore, in addition to territorial 
borders, which are ‘real’ in the sense that we can see them on a map and they are 
supposed to demarcate pieces of the earth, we can talk about a conceptual border between 
the ‘international’ and the ‘domestic’. 
The idea that certain processes are international and others domestic is at the root 
of the notion of ‘two-level’ games.  For instance, Robert Putnam argues that U.S. 
President Jimmy Carter had to balance domestic politics and international concerns in his 
dealings with Iran100; Andrew Moravscik argues that we need to foreground domestic 
political concerns when looking at how states interact with each other as opposed to 
simply starting with the environmental pressures of the international system and the 
‘given’ state interests they engender;101 and Jeffrey Legro argues that grand strategies 
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need to be accepted by a large enough portion of the domestic constituency, enumerating 
the problems of such acceptance, before they can be e acted on the international stage.102  
Each study assumes a boundary. 
This is not the type of study being done here.  Such studies take the boundary that 
separates international from domestic politics as agiven and looks for linkages between 
these two realms.  Instead, this study is looking at how certain episodes of violence 
challenge the boundary that creates these two realms.  In order to do this, we must 
understand what that boundary is and what the meaning of the challenges posed by 
violence are.  Of course the argument here is that these challenges produce an ontological 
threat to the state as a polity.  This becomes imperceptible if we are assuming the 
presence of the boundary that creates these two realms.  In fact, the very process of 
practicing domestic or international politics as such reinforces this boundary and 
recreates these realms of action.  This is something at is not remarked upon by the likes 
of Putnam, Moravscik, or Legro, but is entirely constitutive of the worlds that they create. 
There is no reason to stop at the boundary creating the international and domestic 
realms as other types of conceptual boundaries are integral to the existence of the state.  
For instance, we can theorize about the boundary between who counts as a ‘citizen’ and 
who as an ‘alien’.  This is something currently playing out in the United States where 
debates on immigration policy are effectively debats over where to draw this line.  In 
addition, boundaries between what is considered public and what is considered private, or 
what is the state and what is society are also prevalent.  These boundaries have the same 
properties as those above.  Both ‘realms’, i.e. citizen/alien, state/society, public/private, 
                                                           




are created through the presence of the boundary even as acting in them as such 
reinforces that boundary.  They are clear and distinct as well as universal. 
However, it should be noted with some force that not only are these not the only 
places where boundaries are drawn, none are necessary for the presence of a state.  The 
state is not simply a list of boundaries that separate pre-determined realms like 
citizen/alien and public/private, or even territory; this would be the creation of the trans-
historical core warned against above.  Instead, the stat  is a polity that creates such 
realms of political action and authority demarcated by clear, delineated boundaries.  What 
those boundaries separate in any particular time and place is to be decided through 
empirical study not a priori theorizing.  The examples above are just that; examples 
meant to demonstrate that states have multiple boundaries that are both physical and 
conceptual. 
We should also warn against taking any particular boundary as existing wholly 
separate from others.  The idea of a ‘single’ boundary that is totally distinct from others is 
an analytical fiction, albeit a very useful one utilized in this study.  Take the border that 
separates India from Pakistan.  Is this a single border?  In one sense, we could see the 
border that encapsulates India from its neighbors (r the sea) as singular.  In another 
sense, the border between India and Pakistan could be thought of as a singular segment of 
India’s border.  In yet another, the boundary betwen India and Pakistan that runs through 
Kashmir could be characterized as a single border separate from others.  Therefore, what 
counts as one boundary is not something that is ontologically distinct but is instead 




course, that it needs to be created and justified in the course of doing research and does 
not exist on its own, a process I will undertake in ach narrative in this study. 
A focus on boundaries also allows us to highlight the importance of action on the 
‘margins’ of the state and the state system and how it affects the machinations of the 
center.  These margins are where the cases of this dissertation take root; the colonial 
Atlantic, the working class slums of European cities, and the rugged terrain of Central 
Asia.  None could be considered consolidated parts of the states of their time.  Of course 
many of those listed in the literature above focus on interactions between centers as major 
moments of change.  Focus on such events – the Treaties of Westphalia, Seven Years 
War, French Revolution, Congress of Vienna, World Wars, Cold War – can obscure the 
importance of the margins in constructing a polity defined by boundaries meant to keep 
them outside.103  The center itself is constituted through power relations with the margins 
and therefore is as dependent on them for their existence as such as it is on other 
recognized centers.  This can be captured by a theory of sovereignty built on boundary 
drawing since any boundary draws what is ‘outside’ as much as it draws what is ‘inside’.  
All three of the cases in this dissertation include groups and peoples at the margins of the 
state at their own times and places.  The golden ag pirates existed on the physical edge 
of the system in the Colonial Atlantic and were comprised of men who felt they were 
being bypassed by the state.  Propagandists were comprised of those crushed by 
industrialization in the late 19th century and al Qaeda of men and women who feel left 
behind, many in places such as Afghanistan and Somalia, which are at the margins 
already.  All challenged the state and its existence, all created crises that forced a redraw 
                                                           




of the boundaries of sovereign authority.  The margins have deep impacts on the 
machinations of the center because the center itself is defined through its interactions 
with the margins and the boundaries created through these interactions. 
Finally, it should be obvious that these boundaries ar , in real life, not as clear, 
distinct, or absolute as I make them out to be.  Thus is the nature of the ideal type.  
However, making them so clear makes it more obvious when transgressions occur.  For 
instance, as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 of this study, European states in 
the late 19th century attempted to create a distinct boundary betwe n those who could and 
could not speak legitimately in the public sphere.  However, this proved nearly 
impossible and revolutionaries such as those promulgating propaganda of the deed found 
ways to get their ideas out while their suppression only sparked further attacks on state 
authority.  This boundary was being challenged and was redrawn by many western 
European states in the 20th century.  Here, the transgression of a boundary is the 
interesting part and only by setting out a clear, distinct boundary as an ideal type can we 
really see the transgression for all that it was. 
Sovereignty and boundary drawing as practice 
Finally, the last part of the conception of sovereignty outlined in this chapter is 
that boundary drawing is best conceived as a practice.  The boundaries that define the 
state and sovereignty are not simply drawn on a map or decided in a legislature or smoke 
filled room.  Instead, they are drawn as a consequence of repeated action, what has been 
termed practice.  Practices are defined here as habitual, patterned action that both 
constitutes the social world and its inhabitants and structures possible future action.104  
                                                           





Practice allows us to look at and analyze the observable, the measurable, even the 
quantifiable, while focusing on the possibilities they create for or take away from actors 
in the material world. Sovereignty becomes something that states ‘do’. 
Practice is patterned action.  Adler and Pouliot make this clear by claiming 
distinctions between behavior, action, and practice.105  Behavior is something acted upon 
the material world such as running through the streets.  Action is behavior imbued with 
meaning, such as running after a thief.  However, practice is patterned action and can be 
seen in actions such as “police squads chasing down criminal gangs” because this is 
action that is “socially structured and reiterated”.106  Practice is patterned.  It is not 
merely doing something or doing something imbued with meaning.  It must be repeated.  
It is not an ‘event’, so that the drawing of a boundary does not happen with a single 
‘event’, i.e. a peace treaty, a diplomatic mission, r a law passed in a legislature, but 
happens instead through time as actions become repeated often enough to become 
practices. ,As will be discussed in Chapter 3, events do play a role, especially in 
‘shattering’ practices and in helping to decide which practices are performed at which 
times, but events are not enough to draw lasting, meaningful boundaries around political 
authority. 
Over time, these patterned actions become habitual or unthinking.107  As Hans 
Joas explains, “all perception of the world and all action in the world is anchored in an 
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unreflected belief in self-evident given facts and successful habits”.108  This explains 
most of what we do.  When we put our clothes on in the morning or open a door, we do 
not think about it.  We do not debate the positives and negatives and make a calculation 
on whether or not we should do it.  Nor do we debat whether it is appropriate or how we 
should attempt to solve the problem.  We just do it.  “Habits” are important because, as 
John Dewey argues, “[they] economize intellectual as well as muscular energy.  They 
relieve the mind from thought of means, thus freeing thought to deal with new conditions 
and purposes”.109  If we spend so much time thinking about how, why, and whether we 
should get out of bed, brush our teeth, or open the bedroom door, there would be little 
time to make economic transactions, to govern peoples, or to write academic books and 
articles.  And of course, there is much that goes into these processes and problems that 
we are not thinking about.  Those things that we do think about, those problems that we 
do solve, only happen because so much of what we do is ‘hidden’ in practices, no matter 
how trivial. 
Practices constitute the social world by helping us to create ‘conceptual maps’ of 
what is and is not possible.  They do this for two reasons.  First, practices help to create 
what we think of as ‘facts’.  Practices as habitual action can be so deep, so reified, that 
we tend to take them for granted.  They become unquestioned ‘facts’ to us because we do 
not and cannot think of other alternatives.  As examples, we can use the economic liberal 
thinking of the west or the protocols of diplomatic exchange.  Each of these becomes a 
part of the conceptual maps of those actors taking part in them, unquestioned and habitual 
actions that give the world meaning.  In the narratives below we see that in each case the 
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relevant states ‘doubled down’, a mechanism I call retrenchment, on the boundaries being 
challenged because they could think of no other altnatives even after recognizing the 
nature of the problem.  In other words, practices construct the reified knowledge that we, 
as humans, need to think, to reason, to solve problems.110  This brings us to our second 
reason: action is the fundamental ontology of social life.  Without ‘doing’ there is no 
doer.  Without performing the functions that define t, namely boundary drawing, states 
do not exist.   
Think about what a state is.  How do we know that te United States exists?  Is it 
because we can visit Washington, D.C. and see the Wite House or the Capitol?  Or is it 
because those of us who are citizens pay taxes to it, v te in the elections that it 
administers and abide by the laws that it has passed?  If the Department of Treasury 
stopped performing the day to day tasks that it is assigned, would it exist?  Would it not 
just be a building with a bunch of people in it?  This is based on phenomenalist ontology.  
As Dewey argues, there is no need to “transcend experience by some organ of unique 
character that carries them into the super-empirical”. 111  Therefore, “knowledge is purely 
related to things that can be experienced and empirically observed”.112  There is no ideal 
form in which the state exists.  If it does not draw boundaries through its practices, we 
would have no evidence of its existence and therefore it would not exist. 
Finally, practices have a discursive effect (i.e. th  action conveys meaning to 
those who experience it), creating and structuring possibility in the material world.  In 
other words, since they are unthinking and since they constitute the world, they help to 
dictate subsequent action.  The decision to undertak  any sort of action is dependent upon 
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historical context; on what is happening around any ctor or group and what has 
happened to her or them in prior situations.  Therefore, the unthinking actions that are 
practices are what create the possible menus of acti n.  Of course most of the time action 
is repeated, we make the action of turning a doorknob because we have experience that 
doing so opens the door.  We do not think about it.  But even in cases, such as those 
highlighted in this project, where practices change, where they are shattered, what is 
possible depends on what came before (the shattered practice) and/or what is currently 
happening (other, ongoing, unshattered practices).  New actions are not taken from a 
menu of all possible action.  Even if the list of pssible actions is infinite, all of those 
options are not open to actors because they either have not or cannot think of them in a 
context in which so much of what they do is based on the idea of habit.113 
So what does it mean to think of the state as a bundle of practices?  It means that 
it is manifest in habitual action that creates our ‘conceptual maps’ of the world, not by 
drawing lines on a map.  An example from the narrative on golden age piracy in Chapter 
4 can help to demonstrate this.  This narrative focuses on an imaginary line drawn in the 
Atlantic that separated Europe from its colonial enterprises in that region such that there 
was no ‘peace beyond the line’.  This line, a major feature of the historiography of the 
Early Modern Atlantic, has been said to have been drawn by Pope Alexander VI as part 
of the Treaty of Tordesillas.114  Putting aside controversies over whether or not this was 
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the case,115 we can begin to question the idea that boundaries  drawn in the conscious 
act of doing so.  First of all, such a boundary needs to be agreed upon by all actors 
involved, not just in the act of drawing it but in subsequent years as the sides involved act 
as though the boundary or boundaries in question are meaningful.  Simply drawing a line 
on a map and shaking hands does not create a boundary.  At most, it starts a process of 
doing so wherein those involved now have the challenge of acting in ways that re-draw 
and maintain said boundary. 
Secondly, a boundary is usually only drawn in a way that reflects what has 
already taken place or is currently taking place.  It must in some way reflect current 
practice in order to be intelligible.  If the Spanish did not hold colonies in what is today 
Latin America while the Portuguese had their colonial holdings centered on Africa, 
Brazil,  and South Asia, drawing the line where it was would have made little to no sense.  
Finally, in this case, the meaning of the line changed dramatically between Tordesillas 
and the early 18th century.  When it was originally drawn in 1494, it was meant to 
separate the New World into two realms, one for Portugal and one for Spain in order to 
settle disputes about future findings and rights to major trading lanes.  By the early 18th 
century, it was used to separate the states of Europe f m their colonies as two different 
spheres of politics.  So while ‘the line’ that is so important in understanding how states 
dealt with golden age piracy may have been ‘drawn’ in the late 15th century, it was not 
this act that drew it.  Instead, it was a series of practices such as the protection of trading 
lanes, low levels of direct colonial governance, and the use of peacetime privateers that 
                                                           




upheld the boundary and gave it its meaning.  These practices became so commonplace 
that when they were challenged, the first impulse of states was to double down on them. 
It is important that boundaries are habitual, meaning that there is a certain level of 
stability inherent in the actions that draw these boundaries and give their meanings to 
those participating in 18th century colonial politics.  If these boundaries are not drawn by 
habit but instead are drawn by any action, if they are so in flux as to not be recognizable, 
the state project itself begins to unravel.  Habit nd stability are immensely important for 
the construction of the state as conceived in this c apter.116 
In other words, to focus on the boundary and when and where it was drawn, not to 
mention simply assuming its existence, is to miss vrtually everything interesting about 
that boundary.  It misses how the boundary was cemented as something meaningful, it 
misses why the boundary was drawn where it was, and it misses the way in which the 
boundary took on meaning and had consequences far beyond its original intent.  These 
are all aspects that are picked up by looking not oly at the state as a boundary drawing 
enterprise but also at that enterprise as one that is built on practice.  Boundaries are not 
drawn on maps but instead through habitual, patterned action.  This allows us to better 
investigate how they are drawn, why they are drawn, and more importantly for this study, 
how and why they change and the consequences of such changes. 
Finally, echoing my warning of overspecification above, what these practices are 
can only be decided in case.  As Dewey warned aftergiving his own conception of the 
state, “What the public may be, what the officials re, how adequately they perform their 
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functions, are things we have to go to history to discover”.117  For instance, in the case of 
golden age piracy, pertinent practices such as the use of privateers, loose governance of 
the colonies and colonial land, and the competition over sea lanes all created a boundary 
separating the colonies from their European masters, s tting them apart as a different, 
non-state sphere.  The boundary for the narrative on pr paganda of the deed is one in 
which western states attempted to control the public sphere, shutting out revolutionary 
voices while also allowing citizens and goods to crss borders easily in the name of free 
trade.  This is the two-pronged boundary that was seized upon and turned against 
European states by the propagandists.  As these two xamples illustrate, there is no 
particular boundary, set of boundaries, or bundle of practices that create boundaries that 
we can define before looking at the case.  Nor is there a particular type of boundary that 
is linked to major episodes of transnational violence.  However, we can come up with the 
conception of sovereignty as boundary making and the s ate as the bounded polity. 
The state as a bounded polity 
That the state is and should be defined by the practice of boundary drawing is 
apparent in the works of Timothy Mitchell and James C. Scott, respectively.  In 
Colonising Eqypt, Mitchell argues ‘order’ was applied to Egypt by colonial power by 
creating a ‘state’ that was set above ‘society’ so that it could be governed without 
effecting  the nature of this ‘society’.  From this vantage point, the colonizers saw 
disorganization and chaos and attempted to ‘solve’ the objective problem of chaos though 
measures such as reforming schools so that they ‘made sense’ in the mind of the 
‘objective’ observers and redesigning houses, villages, and streets.  Egypt had its own 
                                                           




order prior to the arrival of the colonizers but this order was viewed as chaotic by western 
observers.   ‘Disorder’ was created by the British in their attempt to create ‘order’. r. 
Elsewhere, he argues for the state as a ‘structural effect’, something that is created 
as apart from and above society by those undertaking different practices of political 
authority.118  This necessitates boundaries.  In order to have the state set apart from the 
society that it exerts control over, boundaries must be created that separate it from that 
society.  These boundaries are created not by being drawn on a map or by law or decree 
but by the practice of ruling, by sovereignty, and re reinforced through the creation of 
‘order’ as a means of dispelling ‘chaos’.  Mitchell choes Foucault by stating that “the 
politics of the modern states were modeled on this method of replacing a power 
concentrated in personal command…with powers that were systematically and 
uniformally diffused.  The diffusion of control required mechanisms that were measured 
rather than excessive and continuous rather than sporadic”.119  R.B.J. Walker echoes this 
thought: 
I have come to believe that it is less important to insist on the possibility of a critical 
social theory of international relations as such than to refuse the Cartesian demarcations 
between inside and outside, “Us” and “Other”, which permitted the theory of 
international relations to occur as a discourse of community and anarchy in the first 
place.120 
 
A similar dynamic is demonstrated by James C. Scott in his inquiry into failed 
state projects, Seeing like a State.121  Scott argues that major state development projects, 
derived from what he calls “Authoritarian High Modernism”, necessarily fail because 
they neglect to take account of practical knowledge, m tis.  For our purposes, we can see 
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his emphasis on how states make people and things ‘legible’ in order to rule them.  This 
is apparent in his discussion of 19th century German forestry where trees were valued 
only for their timber.  Therefore, forests were created that contained only those trees that 
produced the highest yield of desirable timber, only to grow fallow in a few generations 
due to a lack of biodiversity and the resultant rich soil.  This is shown further in the 
distinction between ‘crops’ that we use and ‘weeds’ that we do not.  Animals that we use 
for food or other purposes are ‘livestock’ and those that we do not use are ‘pests’ or 
‘varmint’.  He argues that similar processes occurred during the creation of surnames for 
the inhabitants of early modern England and Wales, the development of planned cities, 
the process of Soviet collectivization and Tanzanian villagization.  In each case, the state 
made people ‘legible’ according to their own interests in order to rule.  In the language 
used for this study, the state had to make people and things ‘legible’ and in the process, 
drew the boundaries of rule that sustain, create, and define it.  Both Mitchell and Scott 
provide useful examples of what a social scientific study of the state built around the 
practice of drawing boundaries can look like. 
This section can be summed up as follows.  The statand sovereignty implicate 
each other as the former is an entity that can onlyexist in how it undertakes the actions 
implied in the latter.  The actions that it takes logically precede the entity taking them 
because without those actions, the entity would not exist as such.  Those actions involve 
drawing boundaries around political authority so that t e state is a polity defined by those 
boundaries and sovereignty is the action of drawing them.  This is evidenced by how 
states have been able to set themselves apart from society, creating both in the process, in 




by other types of polities.  Finally, boundaries are d awn through a bundle of practices 
which become habitual, creating ‘conceptual maps’ of what is and is not possible.  They 
are not drawn through the action of drawing lines on a map or other singular events.  This 
helps us to understand the types of change argued for in this study as it allows us to 
pinpoint particular boundaries that have been challenged by major episodes of 
transnational violence that take place on the margins.  By understanding what these 
boundaries mean, we can also understand the stakes involved. 
Conclusion 
As the quote at the beginning of this chapter demonstrates, the state and 
sovereignty are not defined by law, authority, contr l, territory, nation, or coercion but by 
the boundaries that allow such concepts to take hold in a particular place.  In order to 
understand the effects of revisionist violence, and by extension globalizing processes, on 
the state we need to come up with a workable conception of the state and sovereignty, 
one that allows us to study how the state can adapt in addition to the possibility that it 
erodes.  In other words, we need to understand these boundaries.  This chapter attempts to 
do this by defining the state as the bounded polity se  apart from other polities and its 
own society and sovereignty as a bundle of practices that draw, redraw, and maintain 
boundaries of political authority.  Therefore, while in its ideal-typical form the state may 
be singular and cohesive, it can be broken up into different boundaries that can be studied 
on their own.  Particular boundaries are not clearly distinct from one another and existing 
as such in the world.  Instead, it is more accurate to say that these boundaries are a single 
boundary that can be broken up and studied in different segments depending on the needs 




Breaking up the state into different boundaries in th s way gives us the ability to 
see how it could change in response to the ‘threats’ that the golden age of piracy, 
propaganda of the deed, and al Qaeda (circa 2001) posed.  Common conceptions of 
sovereignty as a property of pre-existing states do not leave room for the possibility of 
change and lead to the Manichean character of most writings on the state and 
globalization.  In addition, studies conceiving of s vereignty as an overarching, singular 
bundle of norms (and therefore the state as a singular type) tend to overlook what might 
be called smaller scale changes in favor of larger ‘revolutions’ such as the Treaties of 
Westphalia, the French and American Revolutions, and the end of colonialism.  These 
are, indeed, major turning points in the history of the state, but this type of study probably 
overstates their importance as it leaves no room for change through the solving of 
concrete, practical problems.  Conceptions of sovereignty as the drawing of boundaries 
and the state as the creation of a series of boundaries llow for the possibility of such 
methods of change and therefore for the possibility of a shifting state in the face of 
globalizing processes. 
The next chapter covers two more theoretical issues before heading into the 
historical narratives.  First, it will outline the types of threats that violence can pose to the 
state and sovereignty.  In doing so, we will see how a particular relationship between the 
state and violence can pose the ontological threat n cessary to be a challenge to the state 
and how this can lead to the redrawing of a boundary.  Second, the chapter will outline 
this process by drawing the work of Hans Joas and pragmatist philosophers such as John 
Dewey and William James to show how the concept of ractice, and by extension 




concrete problems.  This should provide us with the theoretical platform on which to 


























Violence, Threat, and the Boundaries of Sovereign Authority  
 
 At the turn of the 20th century, bombings and assassinations by men reputed to be 
anarchists put Europe and North America on edge.  Between 1892 and 1894, eleven 
bombs went off in Paris.  Between 1898 and 1901, four heads of state were killed.  These 
‘propagandists of the deed’ became ‘enemies of humanity’ 122 and arguably the greatest 
security threat of the age.  A major, multi-lateral effort was launched – including 
summits, overt and covert police cooperation, and the acceptance of transnational spying 
– that some have likened to the current global war on terror (GWoT).123  However, while 
propaganda of the deed subsided prior to the First World War, assassinations of European 
leaders actually increased in the interwar years due to a spate of anti-colonial groups.124  
The response to these attacks by affected states was more localized and less urgent.  
Why?  Both groups have been described as “terrorists” and utilized the same tactic: 
assassination.125  How can we understand differing responses to similar actions?  Why 
would the period that resulted in fewer deaths and less destruction have provoked the 
more comprehensive, urgent response?  Why did thesesimilar actors and actions pose 
diverse threats to the states of their time and place? 
 Similar puzzles present themselves across history.  Piracy has posed different 
threats and as a consequence has been accepted, used, criminalized, and extirpated by 
states, sometimes simultaneously.  Similarly any famili r military action ranging from 
launching a missile to shooting a gun has provoked different sorts of threats.  Threat is a 
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relational concept.  In order to understand how threat is constructed from violence we 
need to place context logically prior to actor, action, motivation, structure, and even body 
counts.  In particular we need to focus on the case-specific narratives constructed upon 
the relationship between violence and the state. 
In Chapter 1, I briefly introduced a concept called ‘r visionist violence’ that I use 
to refer to the golden age of piracy, propaganda of the deed, and al Qaeda.  The mission 
of this chapter is to outline the concept of revisionist violence and demonstrate how it 
interacts with sovereignty as the practice of drawing, redrawing, and maintaining 
boundaries around political authority.  The practices that draw boundaries are given 
meaning through narratives that give state actions a past, present, and future.  Violence is 
a large part of these narratives and there are a few basic ways that it relates to boundary-
producing practices which range from producing them to upholding them to challenging 
them.  Therefore, different narratives or narrative configurations on the relationship 
between the state and violence produce distinct qualitative genera of threats.  For 
instance, the dominant narrative built around propaganda of the deed was that they posed 
a threat to the existence of the state and bourgeois society.  Violence in this case posed a 
threat to the state’s ability to draw boundaries and reproduce itself.  However, the 
narrative built around the anti-colonialists was that they posed a threat to specific 
imperial holdings of specific states.  Violence here posed a threat to the amount of 
political power held by those able to draw boundaries.  In each case, violence had a 





The plan of this chapter is as follows.  First will be a look at how violence and 
threat are characterized in much of IR by looking specifically at the literature on 
terrorism.  Next, building on the work of Ayse Zarakol, Barak Mendelsohn, and Oded 
Lowenheim in addition to the emphasis on threat construction in the securitization 
literature, I put forth a theory that the type of threat posed by violence is best understood 
through narratives on the relationship between violence and the state.  This will be 
followed by a section explicating four basic, ideal-typical narratives – entrant, resource, 
revisionist, and criminal – each posing qualitatively different threats to states.  The 
significance of each will be fleshed out by looking at different episodes of piracy.  The 
last part of this chapter will then explore the relationship between revisionist violence and 
sovereign boundaries, developing a series of ‘mechanisms and processes’ through which 
we can understand how revisionist violence has the pot ntial to force the redrawing of the 
boundaries of sovereign authority. 
Terrorism and threat 
Much of the literature on violence in IR explains the threat violence poses to 
states using variables associated with either the typ  of action undertaken or the attributes 
of the actor(s) involved.  While these can be important variables, I argue that we need to 
understand narratives on the relationship between violence and sovereignty in order to 
understand threat.  In this section, I explore examples of each in the context of the 
literature on terrorism.  First, the literature on violence in IR is massive – including war, 
conflict, nuclear politics, and non-state violence among others – and it makes sense to 




literature as well.  Second, the terrorism literatue displays features of each variable listed 
above as well as growing voices of dissent that are he jumping off point for this study. 
Many studies on terrorism126 obscure variance in threat by decontextualizing the 
actor(s) perpetrating the violence, assuming that this actor comes into being with its own 
interests, goals, and preferences d  novo.  The focus is then on actor attributes either as a
set of variables or as a background categorization exercise.  Such an approach, while 
useful in many situations, cannot explain how actors and their attributes emerge.  This is 
important in divining the types of threats or challenges posed by violence.  The most 
common of these are studies that start with the tactic, method or action of a particular 
group in an event-based framework and then allow for the variance of pre-specified 
variables to cause the outcome of interest (or not).  A  its heart, such work tends to 
assume that all terrorism, for instance, is largely similar and asks questions like “what 
causes terrorism?”, “how do states respond to terrorism?”, and “what types of counter-
terror strategies work?”.  Examples of literature in this vein include Robert Pape’s study 
on suicide terrorism, Max Abrams’ study on the success of terrorist acts, and Ethan 
Bueno de Mesquita’s study on the effectiveness of conciliations as a tool of counter-
terrorism.127  All three studies are event-based, taking each attack as the object of study, 
necessarily making use of datasets constructed on the assumption that the relevant action, 
terrorism, is similar enough to be taken out of its context and studied separately.  In 
addition, some of the more well-known historical approaches to terrorism such as those 
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by Hoffman and Lacquer focus on the similarities of the act of terrorism to construct a 
narrative as opposed to its diversity.128   
 Another way that action is said to determine threat is through the scale or severity 
of the attacks; the damage caused.  One class of argument deals mostly with ‘severe’ 
terrorist attacks or how to explain the frequency of such attacks.129  Similarly, Garrick et 
al talk about the ‘scale’ of threat being similar to the scale of harm or damage.130  One 
may argue that it was the nearly 3,000 people killed on September 11th, 2001 which 
determined the United States’ response.  However, en if this were the highest death toll 
of any single attack, al Qaeda is not responsible for the most deaths as a result of its 
activities.  Many secessionist groups which have utilized ‘terrorism’ have been 
responsible for many more deaths without provoking a ‘war on terror’ and state on state 
violence far exceeds both.  The same point can be made using the contrast between 
propaganda of the deed at turn of the 20th century and the anti-colonialists of the interwar 
years. 
Additionally, threat is said to be derived from theattributes of those actors posing 
the threat.  One common manifestation of this claim in terrorism studies are those who 
focus on the motivations of the groups in question, whether religious, ideological, 
nationalist, etc.  Toft, Philpott, and Shah concentrate on the Salafism of al Qaeda to 
explain the group’s actions.131  Andrew Phillips draws parallels between al Qaeda and the 
French Protestants of the 16th century, arguing that religious terror transcends boundaries 
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and threatens the state.132  Barak Mendelsohn focuses on how the religious doctrine of al 
Qaeda places it outside of international society.133  Audrey Kurth Cronin argues that 
groups with nationalist aims tend to last longer than those with ideological ones.134  In 
each case the salient factors determining threat ar the ideas or motivations of the 
terrorists. 
Another common categorization is along the lines of gr up structure, specifically 
the way in which terrorist groups have come to be identified as networks.135  Usually, 
networks are described as flat and decentralized (though they may include a central node) 
and are purported to have little regard for the state.  The argument is that terrorism, in its 
networked variations, provides different challenges than other types of violence.  The 
focus is on tactics: networked groups use different tactical configurations than 
hierarchical organizations because they developed to counter the strength of the latter.  If 
the theory is correct, a network is likely to succeed against a state or group of states ill-
equipped to oppose it.  This is evident in Jacob Shapiro’s work on the organization of 
terrorist groups.136  He claims that it is the trade-off between the desire to be covert and 
the need to control group members that determines how networked or hierarchical 
terrorist groups are.  This is of interest mainly because of an implicit assumption that the 
structure of terrorist organizations produces different sorts of threats to those combating 
them. 
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The wider IR literature on threat shows similar tend cies.137  Stephen Walt’s 
famous addendum to Waltzian structural theory that t reat matters more than power 
focuses on the intentions and actions of the threatening state.138  Randall Schweller’s 
typology of great powers acts similarly, classifying states by their intentions.139  James 
Fearon contends that threat comes from incomplete information and structural incentives 
to mislead.140  Nuclear deterrence theory melds action (nuclear att ck) with damage as 
they argue that the act itself is uniquely destructive.141  Common themes emerge: action, 
incentive/motivations, and damage.  Only in this literature system structure tends to 
replace group structure.  Psychological theories do add to this list by focusing on the 
threatened.  For instance, prospect theory has the threatened looking at what can be lost 
and gained in divining threat, with loss aversion a key finding.142  Others point to status 
and/or emotion as important determinates of threat.143 
This set of assumptions about terrorism has not gone unchallenged.  Cronin 
advocates a group-based approach as opposed to an event-based one.144  Christine 
Hellmich has argued that the now common focus on the religious, and especially the 
Salafi, origins of al Qaeda has more to do with the researcher than the researched.145  
Mendelsohn, for his part, allows for other types of ideologies to also challenge 
international society, focusing on the difference between trans-state and non-state 
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violence.  Others stress the importance of historical context, such as Ayse Zarakol, who 
places terrorism in the context of the Westphalian st te system.146  Still others argue that 
terrorism is a tactic, so understanding the political goals is important.147  Those 
identifying with critical terrorism studies maintain that terrorism is a word used to 
chastise political enemies, so the use of the term is an interesting puzzle and does not 
intrinsically pertain to the actions of any group.148  Common to all of these critiques is the 
assumption that even if terrorism were an action or set of actions (though one with 
admittedly disputed contents), then we can state that the meaning and consequences of 
that action depend upon the context.  The action itself carries little meaning and it 
certainly does not carry all of the meaning that is imputed to it. 
The idea that terrorism provides different types of threats to states makes it 
difficult to study it as a single phenomenon.  Mendlsohn and Zarakol both make 
variations of this claim.  Mendelsohn argues that tere is a distinction to be made 
between non-state and trans-state terrorism wherein th  latter threatens international 
society.  Zarakol makes a distinction between system threatening and system-affirming 
terrorism, placing al Qaeda in the former group.  Similar claims are also made by Oded 
Lowenheim and Brent J. Steele in their study on great power authority and the GWoT.149  
Elsewhere, Lowenheim broadens the framework to include persistent agents of 
transnational harm, which he splits up into parasitic and predatory harm, the latter 
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causing greater harm to, and provoking a greater response from, great powers.150  This 
allows Lowenheim to make comparisons between the terrorism of al Qaeda and other 
types of actions such as piracy and drug trafficking, getting us closer to a theory of 
violence and threat.151 
None of this is to say that those approaches using the variables listed above are 
‘wrong’.  They all have the potential to provide us with useful knowledge and we as 
scholars would be worse off without them.  However, the relationship between violence 
and the state, and hence the threat posed, cuts acro s these groupings.  Groups of similar 
actions, motivations, internal structures, or damage levels can all pose different threats to 
states.  Because of in-type variation, these ways of thinking about terrorism do not give 
us much analytical leverage on the types of threats violence poses to states. 
Violence, narrative, and threat 
Understanding narratives on the relationship between violence and the state is 
imperative to understanding the different types of threats violence poses.  This statement 
builds upon the work of Zarakol, Mendelsohn, and Lowenheim while making two key 
additions.  First, I posit that it is best to take Lowenheim’s instinct to broaden terrorism 
into transnational harm and go even further to include all violence.  If we want to think 
about how any particular act or episode of violence thr atens the state, it is best not to 
start with violence perpetrated by ‘state’ or ‘non-state’ but instead create a framework 
meant to encapsulate all violence.  This permits the investigation of how violence 
becomes state/non-state, piracy/privateering, terrorism/crime and therefore how it 
constructs, re-inscribes, and threatens the boundaries that produce the state. 
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Second, for the purposes of this study it is best to move beyond frameworks built 
on the ideological motivations of the violent.  Mend lsohn focuses on the ideologies of 
the terrorists, Zarakol on the types of legitimation claims they make, and Lowenheim and 
Richardson are quite explicit that motivation is important in their typologies.152  
However, by framing the situation as transnational vs. great power, the actors themselves 
are given primacy and their motivations put front ad center.  If narratives on their 
relationship constitute the actors, as argued here, we need to move beyond motivation if 
we are to begin to theorize about violence and threa .  Securitization theory and the wider 
threat construction literature provide one way to begin moving past intention or 
motivations by focusing on how actions or situations are turned into different types or 
levels of threats.153  To these scholars, “Threats are not self-evident or easily measurable 
realities, but the outcome of a complex process of social and political construction 
through the means of language”.154  Similarly, “acts of political violence do not 
necessarily 'speak for themselves’; they have to be narrated and interpreted in meaningful 
ways within a particular social, cultural, and historical context”.155  However, this 
literature has a tendency to look at, in Cristopher M yer’s words, “types of events” as 
though they present different challenges.156  Threat construction is also common in the 
critical security studies157 and framing158 literatures as well as the critical terrorism 
studies literature mentioned above.   
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In Chapter 2, I laid out a concept of sovereignty as the practice of drawing 
boundaries around political authority and the state as the polity derived from those 
boundaries.  Practices create the conceptual maps th t we use to navigate the world and 
therefore give us an idea of what is and is not possible.  A practice framework helps us to 
understand both the constitution of order and new possibilities for meaning and action159 
through the ‘shattering’ of habit.160  While actions and activities are a part of practice, t 
is narratives that give those actions meaning161 and therefore constitute them as practices.  
People, singular or collective, are made of stories.  Therefore, narratives are “a central 
component of the organization of practice”162 as they provide meaning to action and 
provide links to the past, present and future, constructing all three.  By creating 
understanding and the meaning of actions and actors, such an approach is relational, 
providing the platform on which actors are constituted.  Violence is a large part of the 
narratives that turn state actions into boundary producing practices.  Looking at the role 
of violence in these narratives allows us to, following Lowenheim, see how some 
violence uphold existing practice and others do not, providing leverage into how threat is 
constituted.  This means looking at how violence is placed in relation to boundary 
producing practices. 
Of course, those using violence have a role in creating the narratives that surround 
their actions – these narratives can come from and be reinforced by any number of 
sources – but it is best to think of justification in this context, not motivation.  
Justifications are the reasons given for violent action, are necessarily context-dependent, 
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and may or may not have anything to do with the intrnal or ideological motivations 
individual actors have for undertaking violence.  Therefore, to the degree that it matters 
what those perpetrating violence say, it is in the context of justification, which is part of 
the narrative, rather than motivation. 
Narratives of violence 
I begin the process of understanding how violence can pose different threats to the 
state by creating a set of ideal typical narratives on the relationship between violence and 
sovereignty: entrant, resource, revisionist, and criminal.  Narratives of Entrant  violence 
characterize violence as constituting a threat to the power of a particular state or set of 
states.  Such threats are either to the existence of a state, the territorial integrity of a state 
or the power/rights structure within a state.  In other words, entrant violence is that used 
to either enter or gain more power within the system.  While some boundaries are 
threatened, entrant violence is made legible by current boundaries, and threats can easily 
be understood using current conceptual maps.  These narratives tend to be used in 
relation to coups or secessionist or revolutionary groups such as the LTTE, IRA, 
HAMAS, and the Pied Noir.  Other examples include episodes of piracy such as the 
corso independente, or independence corsairs, who raided Spanish shipping in the Latin 
American wars of independence in the early 19th century, or the privateers associated 
with Greece’s War of Independence.  Similarly, an invasion of one state by another or 
violence over contested territorial claims fir into this narrative as could violence 
experienced at demonstrations, riots, or upheavals interpreted as gaining greater rights 




Narratives casting violence as a Resource characterize it as something to be used 
by the state.  In this way it is inherently legitimate, though disagreements do arise as to 
whether any particular usage may be legitimate. It is neither an explicit threat to the 
power of a state or to boundaries.  Common examples of violence understood as a 
resource could be police attempting to assert the rule of law, standing armies, or 
mercenaries.  In addition, narratives of resource violence can be built around state 
sponsored terrorism (think Iran and Hezbollah) or any violence perpetrated as part of a 
state’s involvement in illicit trade such as the Talib n’s control over the poppy trade at 
the turn of the 21st century.  Ostensibly, this type of violence is used within and reinforces 
standard practices and norms surrounding violence ad thus is implicit in the drawing of 
boundaries.  Though, it does present certain types of threats to those states, groups, or 
individuals on the receiving end of this violence. 
Revisionist narratives cast violence as an ontological threat, not just to a particular 
state but to the state as a political form.  This type of violence is a threat to the system as 
a whole as it exists in a particular time and place (i.e. those boundaries currently drawn 
through state practice).  It is typified today by the threat that al Qaeda is said to pose to 
the national, territorial state.  The threat is such because it cannot be made sense of within 
the conceptual maps of relevant actors; the violence is, in this sense, illegible.  Other 
examples include the cases in this study: golden ag pirates and the anarchist 
propagandists of the turn of the 20th century.  The Earth Liberation Front could also be 
described in this way.  As a consequence, episodes f r visionist violence have the 




leaving a different breed of states in the wake of successful campaigns to combat such 
threats. 
Narratives of Criminal  violence cast violence as something outside of, but not 
necessarily a challenge to, the sovereign state.  While criminal and revisionist narratives 
both recognize violence as transcending boundaries, epi odes of the former are seen to 
provide tests for boundaries while the latter directly hallenge them.  The presence of 
such narratives point to how ‘criminality’ is due as much to how violence is explained 
and justified as any a priori decision to ‘break the law’.163  In this context, the word 
‘criminal’ seems apt as Mafioso and Drug cartels are examples of this sort of violence.  
Many episodes of piracy fit into this type, such as that currently taking place in the Gulf 
of Aden.  Below is a table provisionally placing selected episodes164 of the two types of 
violent actions covered in the cases that follow – piracy and terrorism – into each of the 
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Table 3.1: Narratives on Historical Episodes of Violence165 
 







Al Qaeda  
Corso Independente  
Piracy in the Gulf of 
Aden 
17th century Buccaneers  
18th wartime century 
Privateers  
Corso Independente  
Algonquin and Iroquois 
tribes during Seven 
Years War  
Hezbollah 
Golden Age of 
Piracy  





19th century Malay 
Piracy 




Table 3.1 demonstrates how similar actions are spread across the four narratives.  
Groups traditionally denoted as terrorist organizations are marked in bold.  What we see 
is that both ‘terrorism’ and ‘piracy’ are spread across multiple boxes and each box tends 
to have more than one type of action.  We could do the same thing by extending the list 
of tactical types or by focusing on religious/ideological classifications or group structure.  
For instance, only one of the episodes with revisioni t narratives listed above is religious 
and two are secular.  Many religious groups fall into the entrant box, but many of those 
groups are also considered secular.  We see groups with networked structures in both the 
revisionist and criminal boxes and it is possible we ill see them in the resource box in 
years to come.  This demonstrates a benefit of the typology; it is not only useful for 
looking at some key distinctions between actors or gr ups within traditional types, but it 
can also provide a larger universe of apt comparisons.  We also see some episodes appear 
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more than once, a reminder that any particular episode can be constructed from multiple 
narratives. 
Significance 
 So what is the significance of this typology?  As argued in Chapter 1, any ideal 
type should be judged on how useful it is and on what it can tell us that we did not know 
before.  We cannot accept or reject it simply because it may or may not match reality in 
some manner, nor is it important simply because it arranges life in a superficially 
appealing way.  This typology is useful because it shines a light on the relationship 
between the state/sovereignty and violence.  Different ideal-typical narratives of this 
relationship signify different threats or challenges to the state.  A narrative of revisionist 
violence signifies different threats to the state than one of resource violence, etc.  In 
addition, we can connect these threats to state responses and the consequences of each 
episode, using this typology as a springboard to a better understanding of historical 
episodes.  The outcomes will not be identical, but the underlying dynamics – what Tilly 
has called ‘mechanisms and processes’ – will be similar.167  What follows is an 
exploration of the threats posed to states by episodes f piracy that can be characterized 
by each of the four narratives outlined above.  Piracy is chosen because it is a single 
action – here defined as robbery at sea – for which we can establish each of the four 
narratives above being used to construct threat. 
Entrant Violence: corsos independente 
Narratives of entrant violence construct any action or episode of violence as a 
threat to the balance of power and rights within the current system.  Such violence is not 
                                                           




thought to challenge the state as a political form but instead upsets who wins and loses 
within it.  This can be demonstrated in a narrative built around the corso independente, or 
independence corsairs: pirates/privateers who fought on the side of the emerging South 
American states during their wars of independence against Spain in the early 19th century.  
The Latin American Wars of Liberation took place largely in the aftermath of the 
Napoleonic Wars.  Starting in 1808 when Napoleon invaded Spain and cut it off from its 
colonies, those same colonies decided to take advantage of a weakened colonial overlord 
to gain independence and statehood for themselves.  The wars grew in intensity after the 
end of the Napoleonic Wars freed Spain to concentrate on the continent.  They lasted for 
nearly two decades, until roughly 1826 when Peru, Chile, and Ecuador joined Mexico, 
Uruguay, Colombia, and others in effectively achieving independence.  Only Cuba 
remained as a significant Spanish colony in the region at the close of the conflict. While 
these wars were largely decided on land, there was also a key maritime component as 
many of these emerging states commissioned privateers o attack Spanish (and 
Portuguese in the case of Brazil) shipping as part of the war effort.  Many of those 
commissioned came from the lower rungs of Caribbean society and fought for ideological 
as well as monetary reasons.  This includes former slaves who valued a chance to fight 
back against colonial oppression and “French West Indian Privateers who combined a 
Jacobin ideology with a consciousness of themselves as ‘les garcons de la cote’, the heirs 
of the flibustier tradition of the seventeenth century, now savaging the Spaniards in a 
more honourable cause”.168  Many also were from the United States and viewed this as an 
                                                           




opportunity to liberate the continent and spread freedom in the wake of the War of 1812 
against their own former colonial oppressor.169   
The crews were multi-national and flew under a variety flags, with many ships 
holding multiple ‘letters of marque’ – privateering commissions.  The corsos and the 
emergent states they took commissions from both used a narrative of entrant violence to 
legitimate their own actions and it even seeped into the understanding of the Spanish 
themselves.  The fight became one over Spanish territory in the region and resulted in 
major changes to physical boundaries and a raft of wh le new states into the system.170  
They played an important role in the liberation of a continent by cutting off Spanish 
access to the colonies even after the Napoleonic wars had drawn to a close and 
significantly shifted the boundaries of the Spanish state while creating new states across 
the continent.  The response by the Spanish was loclized as most other naval powers 
viewed it as a Spanish problem in the early stages.  Similar mechanisms were at play in 
the Eastern Mediterranean during the same period as privateers played an important role 
in winning Greek independence from the Ottomans.  Responses to threats of entrant 
violence tend to be localized or take the form of alliances for or against the threatened 
state. 
Resource violence: buccaneering in the 17th century 
Resource narratives construct violence as a legitimate part of current boundary 
producing practices as they are part and parcel of the construction of these boundaries.  
Therefore, such violence is not always constructed as a threat, though certain problems 
do arise.  The buccaneers were largely privateers whose mission was to attack the ships 
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of rival states, commissioned with a letter of marque signed by a Monarch.  For much of 
this period, colonies were viewed as a sphere of influe ce outside of Europe; they were 
‘beyond the line’, a disputed and imaginary boundary separating Europe from its 
colonies.  What might have been construed as an act of war had it happened nearer 
Europe was not considered such in the colonies becaus  there was ‘no peace beyond the 
line’ as “no other rule is recognized but that of frce”.171  The economic system of the 
Atlantic during this time was built on the extraction of raw materials such as bullion, fish, 
and timber, whose proceeds went directly into state coffers.  Consequently, land not 
deemed valuable for extraction was left alone while the sea became an area of 
contestation over shipping.172  Peacetime privateering was very useful in this economic 
climate as a way to gain access to bullion largely extracted by Spain. 
Buccaneers were viewed as patriotic heroes standing up to enemies in the great 
wilderness of the colonial Atlantic.  They also tend d to stick together with English bases 
in Jamaica, French bases on Tortuga, etc.  As one ct mporary opined, “The privateers 
of these parts…theire bodys are habituated to this country, they knowe each place and 
creeke, know the mode of Spanish fighting, townes being never so well fortified, the 
numbers being never so unequall, if money or good plunder be in the case they will either 
win it manfully or dye coradgiously”.173  If the buccaneers were viewed as a threat it was 
because they were an arm of the state.  In an account by one Spanish engineer who was a 
part of an anti-buccaneering mission, the nationality of the pirates captured was 
constantly repeated: “The number of English dead was six”, “On 10 September an 
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English ship was sighted”, “These English pirates wre taken back to the mainland”, 
etc.174  They were constituted as a threat in the context of interstate competition over 
resources in the Americas. 
 Of course, many privateers went beyond their mandate, p rtaking in unsanctioned 
predation which was tolerated so long as the enterpris  benefitted the state.  As Lauren 
Benton argues, “letters of marque…could be broadly interpreted to permit attacks on a 
wide range of targets”.175  For instance, Henry Morgan strayed beyond his letter to sack 
Panama City.  Alexander Exquemelin, who sailed with Morgan and was present during 
the Panama City incident, commented that Morgan’s men “committed many…cruelties.  
They showed little mercy, even to the monks…Nor did they spare the women, except for 
those who yielded themselves completely”.176  Frustrated, the English appointed Sir 
Thomas Lynch to enforce the Treaty of Madrid – meant to end hostilities between the 
British and the Spanish in the Americas – and clean up privateering in Jamaica.  Morgan 
was captured and sent back to London for punishment but was instead knighted and 
awarded the position of lieutenant governor of Jamaica.  Morgan may have been viewed 
as a morally deficient outlaw but his services were de med a beneficial resource for the 
state and thus not a threat to the English. 
The challenges posed by the buccaneers are common to the resource narrative.  
First, not all states had access to this ‘resource’ which would cause tensions between 
states.  Second, the principle/agent problem is a danger as Henry Morgan’s saga 
confirms.  Third, as the context shifts so can the narrative causing conflict between those 
benefitting from old and new narratives.  This is ba ically what happened with many of 
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the so-called ‘Red Sea Men’, who were active just as privateering was no longer useful, 
such as Captain Kidd and Thomas Tew who took privateering commissions only to be 
proclaimed a pirate while at sea.177  Both were captured and hanged despite not doing 
anything different than they had as privateers. 
Revisionist violence: golden age of piracy178 
 Narratives of revisionist violence cast it as a chllenge to the ontological security 
of the state, its existence and identity.179  This is visible in the dominant narrative of the 
golden age of piracy.  As Chapter 4 will cover in more detail, these pirates ravaged 
Atlantic trade between 1716-1726 as the rise of trade, existence of ‘the line’, and the end 
of the practice of peacetime privateering allowed for ungoverned land, open colonial 
markets, and an influx of slaving ships to attack.  English trade leveled off despite being 
surrounded by long periods of growth.180  In 1720 alone English merchants lost seventy 
slave missions, each valued at £3,000, in attacks while commerce into and out of ports 
such as Charleston and Philadelphia were interrupted for days or even weeks at a time.  
While Morgan was thought cruel, he was also considered a patriot.  Pirates were cast as 
the ‘enemies of all mankind’, the ‘villains of all nations’, and as being against ‘god, 
country, and labor’, and authority itself.  The pirates of this period were ‘against 
authority’ because the crown no longer had a need for them. 
They responded by embracing this characterization.  They called themselves the 
devil’s spawn and challenged how political rule was legitimated at that time, typified by 
Black Sam Bellamy’s self-identification as, “a Free Prince…[with] as much authority to 
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make war…as he who has a hundred sail of ships at sea, and an army of 100,000 men in 
the field”.181  The golden age only came to an end as ‘the line’ was abolished, colonies 
were brought into the domestic sphere, and the process of turning the sea into a truly 
open space was initiated: the redrawing of the boundaries of political authority.182  
Narratives of revisionist violence force change as they recognize and construct crises that 
compel states to come up with creative solutions to defined, pragmatic problems that 
result in new boundaries.183  This is the dynamic under investigation in this study. 
Criminal violence: piracy in the Gulf of Aden 
Narratives of criminal violence aim elsewhere.  The state as a polity is not 
threatened, instead boundaries are challenged with no claim to political power.  Violence 
becomes a question of law and order where ‘criminals’ create ‘zones of exception’ to 
state rule and therefore the peace and security of society.  This can be seen in the 
contemporary narrative on piracy in the Gulf of Aden, a major trade route serving as host 
to “12% of global maritime trade and 30% of the world’s crude oil shipments”184 that in 
2010 cost 12 billion dollars, including 240 million dollars in ransom payments.185  The 
vast majorities of these pirates originate from the coasts of Somalia, especially villages in 
the Puntland region, and use smaller fishing boats to attack fishers, oil tankers, and 
others, usually for ransom payments. 
This narrative views Somali piracy as a criminal enterprise attacking commercial 
shipping and food aid.  In this narrative, piracy is illicit and connected to economic 
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opportunities.186  This is reflected in the questions asked of Somali pirates by reporters 
such as, “Isn’t what you are doing a crime? Holding people at gunpoint?” and “What has 
this Ukrainian ship done that was a crime?”.187  Actions like the capture of U.S.-
registered Maersk Alabama, which led to the kidnapping of Captain Richard Phillips and 
a four-day standoff before the U.S. intervened, have become emblematic of their criminal 
activity.188  This is usually blamed on the domestic situation in Somalia, with the country 
in turmoil since the fall of Mohamed Siad Barre’s regime in 1991.  Pirates have been 
acting in a loophole in international maritime law.  The United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) covers piracy on the high seas while states are responsible 
for their territorial waters.189  However, in cases like Somalia, where the state hs no 
ability to police its waters, there is a gray zone that pirates can exploit. 
There is some disagreement about the severity and level of threat posed by piracy 
in the Gulf of Aden.  British Prime Minister David Cameron invoked language similar to 
that of the golden age, “Frankly, the extent of the hijack and ransom of ships round the 
Horn of Africa is a complete stain on our world”.190  However, the response of the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) has been much more muted in its assessment.  In 
resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838, 1846, and 1851, the UNSC professed itself “gravely 
concerned” about piracy in the region.  That said, typical solutions involve “calls upon 
states interested in the security of maritime activities” to work, “in accordance with 
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international law”.191  While cooperation and multi-lateral efforts are called for, a passive 
voice is used as the UNSC, “Urges states in collaboration with the shipping and insurance 
industries, and the IMO [International Maritime Organization] to continue to develop 
avoidance, evasion, and defensive best practices”.192  Resolution 1838 even goes so far as 
to claim that “this resolution shall not be considered as establishing customary 
international law”.193  This is reflected in the UNCLOS definition of piracy that starts by 
calling it, “any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed 
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a priv te ship or a private aircraft”.194  
Piracy here is both criminal and private, outside of the state.  While the United Nations 
certainly takes piracy as illegitimate and a serious problem, it is seen as a challenge for 
which current law is adequate.  Even the language of universal jurisdiction derived from 
pirates as ‘hostes humani generis’ is standardized. 
The lower level of threat posed by piracy in the Gulf of Aden as opposed to the 
golden age is a question of type, not scale.  This may explain why criminal episodes have 
historically had longer life spans and take longer to provoke responses than revisionist 
episodes.  The danger is cast as areas of the globe wher  state authority is exceptionally 
weak to non-existent, indirectly challenging claims that the state is the most effective and 
legitimate way to order political life.  Responses usually include attempts to extend state 
authority or build state capacity such as the proliferation of boats patrolling the Gulf of 
Aden.  What we see here are four historical episode f a common violent action, piracy, 
in which each case has developed a different threat narrative.  This is meant not only to 
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demonstrate the threats and dynamics of each narrative in greater detail but also to further 
demonstrate that it is not the action undertaken, in this case piracy, that determines threat 
but instead the narrative built around that action.  A summary of the threats posed by all 
four narratives is provided below in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Threats and Dynamics Involved in Each Narrative  
Entrant Resource Revisionist Criminal 
Violence challenges a 
particular state or a 
set of states as a 
means of making a 
claim within the 
system.  Potential to 
change the borders of 
existing states and/or 
the rights structure of 
any particular state. 
Responses localized. 
Part of the drawing of 
boundaries. Can 
strain the relationship 
between states as 
some make use of the 
resource and some do 
not.  Also provides a 
principal-agent 
problem and the 
question of how to 
stop using this 
‘resource’ when it is 
no longer useful.   
Threatens the 
existence of current 
boundaries by using 
them against the state. 
High potential for 
forcing states to 
redraw boundaries 




Threatens states by 
attempting to create 
de facto areas of 
exception.  Uses 
current boundaries of 
state authority for its 
own interests, 
irrespective of the 
state. 





Of course, no episode of violence is limited to a single narrative, many if not most 
are characterized by multiple narratives.  We can think of these narratives as 
complementary, competing or parallel.  Narratives are complementary when multiple 
actors agree on the basic narrative.  This dynamic is apparent in the struggles of 
secessionist and rebel groups.  While the state and the rebel group are unlikely to agree 
on many things, they do agree that the violence used by the rebel group contests the 
balance of power and rights within the state.  Each of t e cases in this study has 
complementary narratives.  Narratives compete when different sides have different ways 
of understanding and justifying the same act(s) of vi lence.  As demonstrated by 




On the one hand we see the pirates partaking in a ‘useful fiction’ of themselves as the de 
facto protectors of local (if not state) interests in the gulf.  One pirate was quoted in the 
New York Times aying, “We don’t consider ourselves sea bandits. We consider sea 
bandits those who illegally fish in our seas, dump waste in our seas, and carry weapons in 
our seas.  We are simply patrolling our seas.  Think of us like a coast guard.”195  This 
narrative has been used in legal defenses of pirates and has constructed a community of 
practice in the region built around piracy.  On the other hand, this narrative is in direct 
competition with the narrative given by the world’s naval powers outlined above that 
paints these men as criminals. 
Parallel narratives are at play when we can see multiple narratives at work side by 
side.  For instance, in addition to the narratives of entrant violence used to characterize 
the corso independente, we also see narratives of the corso independente as an example 
of an illegitimate use of an accepted resource.  Many of these corsairs strayed beyond 
their letters of marque to attack ships from the world’s ‘neutral’ naval powers.196  One 
corsair named Jean Michel Alury even managed to annex a  entire island in the Gulf of 
Mexico and turn it into his own private pirate paradise before the U.S. intervened.  These 
actions, in addition to similar problems off the Barb ry Coast and in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, ultimately led to the ban on privateering in the Treaty of Paris in 1856.197  
So in addition to a narrative of entrant violence th ir story includes a narrative of 
resource violence: what was once a major resource fo  states, wartime privateering, came 
to be seen as illegitimate as it became available to a wider group of actors.  Of course, 
                                                           
195 Gettleman, “Q. & A. With a Pirate: ‘We Just Want the Money.’” 
196 White, “The Marshall Court and International Law.” 
197 Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns; White, “The Marshall Court and International Law”; 




combinations of these dynamics are likely to be present in any single case.  In the 
narratives creating the GWoT, there is convergence between al Qaeda and the U.S. on 
threats to the state system as well as parallel narratives that portray al Qaeda as trying to 
force the West out of the Middle East, overthrow secular dictators in Iraq or Syria,198 or 
partake in the Afghan poppy trade.  These come with competing narratives themselves.  
Therefore, it is useful to remember that the narrative sketches above are only ideal-
typical.  When looking to understand a particular episode it is advised to look at narrative 
configurations. 
Revisionist violence and sovereign boundaries 
In Chapter 2, I posited that the state can be viewed as a polity constructed and 
demarcated by boundaries while sovereignty is the practice of drawing, redrawing, and 
maintaining those boundaries.  In this Chapter, I have argued that we can only understand 
the challenge or threat that violence can pose to sta es, and in connection state reaction to 
violence, by focusing on narratives on the relationship between an episode of violence 
and the state as a boundary producing entity.  I would like to conclude this chapter by 
explaining how revisionist violence and sovereignty i eract to create sites where 
boundaries are drawn and redrawn.  I will do this by emphasizing the practice element of 
sovereignty, especially a pragmatist conception of practice, and develop a series of 
mechanisms that can help us to understand how revisionist violence threatens the state 
and forces states to redraw the boundaries of sovereign authority. 
So how can practices help us to theorize change?  This constitutes a developing 
split in the ‘practice turn’ literature in IR.  Adler and Pouliot, among others,199 focus on 
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how practices can explain and even bring about change d progress while Ted Hopf, 
drawing on the works of Bourdieu, Dewey, and Theodor Adorno, focuses on how 
practice explains continuity and the challenges of bringing about meaningful change.200  
In many ways this could be seen as a reproduction of the realist/liberal split that has 
defined the field since its inception manifest in the practice turn.  However, this debate is 
a false one.  Hopf talks about the skepticism towards social change of someone like 
Theodor Adorno following the horrors of the Holocaust.  Hopf is referring to large scale 
change on par with something like the French Revolution or the Civil Rights Movement 
as the only meaningful type of change.  Hopf is correct that this type of change is not 
only rare but also very hard to bring about in part for the very reasons of habit that the 
practice turn highlights and this is a worthwhile empirical critique of Adler and Pouliot’s 
attempts to use ‘practice’ to create a better world. 
Because practices are about the unthinking, they ar fundamentally unchanging.  
What we are not thinking about we cannot change.  However, they also give us many 
sites of potential change as these habits are ‘shattered’.  In a world made up of a nearly 
infinite number of practices, meaningful change is always possible without grand 
structural change.  This is the type of change focused on in this study: the meaningful 
change of boundaries that construct the state even if they do not result in the type of 
grand systemic change many IR theorists talk about or the types of social change that are 
Hopf’s focus.  Here the debate about practices and change dissolves.  This is where the 
claim in Chapter 1 that this is both a study of change and continuity comes from.  These 
                                                           




changes in practices that construct borders are also simultaneously a reproduction of the 
state itself.  Hence, meaningful change andcontinuity can exist simultaneously. 
Practice theory may not be a theory of change, learning the practices of a group, entity, or 
individual does not necessarily give us leverage in tryi g to change their actions.  But 
what practice can do is give us a theory of how change can happen, how habit is thrown 
into flux.  Pragmatist social theorist Hans Joas put  forward the following model of 
creativity and change: 
…belief, and the routines of action based upon it, are repeatedly shattered; what has 
previously been a habitual, apparently automatic procedure of action is interrupted…our 
habitual actions meet with resistance from the world and rebound back on us.  This is the 
phase of real doubt.  And the only way out of this phase is a reconstruction of the 
interrupted context…  If [the actor] succeeds in reori nting the action on the basis of his 
changed perception and thus continuing with it, then something new enters the world: a 
new mode of action, which can gradually take root and thus itself become an unreflected 
routine.  The pragmatists therefore maintain that all human action is caught in the tension 
between unreflected habitual action and acts of creativity.  This also means that creativity 
here is seen as something which is performed within situations which call for solutions, 
and not as an unconstrained production of something new without any constitutive 
background in unreflected habits.201 
 
If we interpret Joas’ ‘unreflected habit’ as practices, we see a pattern that can help 
us to understand social change.  Habit/practice  Shattering of habit  Creativity in 
solving to problem  New Habit/practice.  However, we should also be car ful not to 
mistake the shattering of habit and the ensuing problem situation as a brute fact, obvious 
to anyone looking at the situation.  Joas credits Dewey with adding a wrinkle to 
pragmatism’s underlying model: 
He [Dewey] takes as his point of departure not a simple collision between habitual action 
and reality, but rather the diffusely problematic quality of an action situation as a whole, 
which must first be recognized as problematic by the actor himself…  And it is this 
definition of the problem that determines the direction in which the actor will look in 
order to find solutions.202 
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In other words, any crisis or problem that arises in the practice of drawing conceptual 
boundaries cannot be defined a priori as would be the custom in a rationalist explanation.  
It can only be defined in the situation by the actor(s) involved.  Until it is defined as such 
it does not exist.  Therefore, it is possible that in an identical situation happening to a 
different set of actors the problem would not be identified as a problem at all, a new 
problem would be focused on, or the problem would be identified in a similar but still 
divergent manner.  As a consequence, the future courses of action would be different and 
the ‘solution’ or ‘adjustment’ would end up being different.  There is no single answer to 
piracy or even to golden age piracy.  It depends on how the problem or crisis is 
recognized and defined in the situation.  This is especially true when problems are 
defined by aggregates like societies or states; there is always room to frame the problem 
and therefore create possibilities for solutions.  This is why we need to focus on the role 
of narratives in divining how violence produces threat.  It is only through the 
understanding of those whose habits have been shattered that we can tell a) if habits have 
been shattered, b) in what ways they have been shattered, and c) the meaning of this 
shattering.  All of this is only intelligible by looking at narratives. 
Here, it is important to spend a bit of time differentiating this approach from a 
rationalist one.  Is this not simply a case of adaptation and instrumentality?  Of actors 
choosing the best possible solution when faced witha problem?  The answer is that to a 
certain degree there are elements of each but they by no means fully or even accurately 
describe the ‘model’ presented here.  Two reasons are covered in the discussion above: 
creativity and the contextual nature of the crisis.  The options chosen are not selected 




instead cases of true agency, creative selection of new things being brought into the 
world.  Rational choice models that select a few options for actors (cooperate/defect, 
yes/no/abstain, etc.) can be useful in certain situations but they do nothing to further 
studies where the payoff is novelty.  Similarly, in most rationalist models the ‘crisis’ or 
problem is one that can be outlined ‘objectively’ from outside the situation.  However, as 
discussed above, such an assumption does not hold in this model and may not be useful 
in most instances.203 
However, the real difference is in the focus on a situation.  While this may make it 
look similar to the ‘game’ metaphor commonly used in rational choice models, in fact 
this is what makes it so different.  Here ‘situation’ can be seen as ‘situated’.  This is why 
creativity and crisis recognition are so important because one can only see the crisis if 
one is immersed in the situation, the broader context.  Context creates the actors as they 
exist in a specific time and place.  It helps us to understand action, its consequences, and 
its meanings.  This is why such an emphasis is placed on narrative in this chapter, any 
violent action whether terrorism, murder, rape, or piracy is best placed into a ‘situation’ if 
we as social scientists want to understand its consequences and causes.  Rationalist 
models, on the other hand, presume generalized situations and they are not context 
dependent.  The approach in this study is not about ‘interaction’ between preconceived 
actors but instead ‘transaction’ between continually recreated and re-inscribed actors.204 
This can be seen in Dewey’s claims about the goals th t actors have.  Across 
numerous works, Dewey puts forth a theory that means and ends are not as self-evident 
as they may appear to be, with the exception of situations he refers to as “work”, where 
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goals are externally set.  Typically, he states that go ls are not set when action begins but 
become more clear only as we choose the means of our actions.  In the words of Hans 
Joas, “Only when we recognize that certain means are available to use do we discover 
goals which had not occurred to us before”.205  In other words, goals are not something 
pre-set; they come about as we discover the means of acti n that are available to us in 
any particular situation.  Human action can only partially be understood in conditions 
with externally set goals, as it tends to be in rational choice models.  There are situations 
where the goals themselves develop depending upon what the actor is experiencing in 
that situation.  While Dewey calls these situations “play”, they happen to form the 
backbone of many of the most important political actions and processes, including the 
perpetuation of the state in moments when it is threatened.206 
In the empirical chapters ahead we will see this process in action.  For instance, in 
the case of propagandists in Chapter 5, it is hard to argue that instituting passports was 
the goal of state response to the threat.  It was not a  option that could be chosen from a 
list.  Instead it is something that became available as the situation played itself out.  This 
is the creativity of the process.  It is not that pssports had never been thought of.  They 
had been used in the past and were currently being used in Russia and the Ottoman 
empire, but their universal use for the purpose of cl sing off borders in early 20th Europe 
was something entirely new.  The goal develops as the ituation unfolds, giving creative 
action its impetus.  The same can be said of the solutions currently being worked out for 
the GWoT.  The idea of collecting bulk data to track nd identify terrorists had been 
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thought of in the 1980s and experimented with in the 1990s.207  However, it was not until 
after 9/11 and the introduction of the GWoT that this became a major part of counter-
terrorism policy and the boundaries it is drawing as a result are new. 
To this point, I have spoken rather abstractly about the relationship between 
sovereignty and revisionist violence through the lens of a pragmatist view of action.  
However, in order to begin putting together the histor cal narratives that form the 
empirical portion of this study, we need to start ideal typifying the ‘mechanisms’ that can 
help us to identify and understand this phenomenon.  They are split up into two 
processes.  The first of these processes is called ‘shattering’; it includes the mechanisms 
‘legibility/illegibility’, ‘crisis production’, and ‘retrenchment’.  The second process is 
called ‘re-inscribing’; it includes the mechanisms ‘creative action’, ‘boundary drawing’, 
and ‘authority swap’.  It should be noted that there is no necessary chronological order to 
these mechanisms within each process as many are happ ning simultaneously.  Creative 
action can draw boundaries as part of an authority swap; there is no reason why these 
must be viewed as steps with one happening after the other.  Instead they are analytically 
distinct, capturing discrete parts of action that are separated because of their ‘situated’ 
meaning, allowing us to gain analytical leverage on a messy reality. 
Shattering 
Each of these mechanisms will be taken in turn, starting with the three 
mechanisms contained within the process of ‘shattering’, a process through which the 
unreflected habits, or practices, of political actors are thrown into flux.  This process 
                                                           




helps us to understand the context in which the creativ  action that redraws boundaries is 
made possible. 
Legibility/illegibility 
In many ways, the onset of the crisis (see the nextmechanism) starts with a lack 
of understanding and recognition.  In Chapter 2, I briefly introduced James Scott’s 
concept of ‘legibility’ in arguing that attempts to make citizens and society legible in the 
modern era meant drawing boundaries.  Scott operationalizes this concept of legibility as 
attempts, “to arrange the population in ways that simplified the classic state functions.”208  
In other words, actions, people, and processes are legible when they can be made sense of 
within a particular conceptual map.  Legibility, however, was not simply the process of 
the state learning more about its citizens and territory in the form of accumulated 
knowledge.  To Scott, these attempts “represented only that slice of it [society] that 
interested the official observer.”209  Since legibility is dependent upon the interests and
goals of those making society legible, there must also be actions, people, and processes 
that are then illegible.  Thus we have the dying of German forests after their 
reconstruction for timber productions, the misery of Mao’s Great Leap Forward, and the 
problems with geometric cities.  Actions, people, and processes that are illegible are those 
that make little sense within the current conceptual maps of those acting in the world. 
The actions in each of the cases in this study were ill gible to states due to the 
contemporary boundaries of the state in that time and place.  This can happen in 
numerous ways but two patterns are worth highlighting.  First, contemporary boundaries 
can be used against the state, denying them necessary tools and even facilitating the 
                                                           
208 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 2. 




actions of those perpetrating violence. 210  For instance, golden age pirates were able to 
take advantage of boundaries that left Atlantic colonies outside of the state by exploiting 
local markets for pirated goods and basing themselve  on ungoverned land.  So long as 
this boundary existed pirates would always have these advantages.  In this manner, 
contemporary boundaries are complicit not only in the violence but also in the threat 
being perceived. 
Second, contemporary boundaries can make the claims and narratives of those 
perpetrating violence illegible.  This can be clearly ticulated in the case of al Qaeda.  I 
argue in Chapter 6 that al Qaeda’s mission is one of metaphysical politics; a plane where 
Muslims, Christians, Jews, and others reside divorced from materiality and geographical 
locale.211  This is a form of politics which makes little to n  sense in a world of 
geographically bounded entities, hence the debates ov r what exactly al Qaeda is after 
following 9/11.  Both of these manifestations of illegibility work to create a crisis and 
frame violence as revisionist.  Contemporary boundaries deny tools to states in these 
cases and reinforcing them may even prove counterproductive.  They also obscure the 
claims and narratives of those perpetrating violence, making it harder to figure out what 
is going on.  Finally, it should be noted that there is no reason why this mechanism must 
be tied to revisionist violence.  Illegibility need not create a crisis and other types of 
narratives may also be solved with new boundaries, for instance when the drawing of a 
border creating a new state leads to the end of a seces ionist movement.  However, one 
could characterize this entire process as an attemp to make illegible violence legible so 
that it can be dealt with.  In fact, it could be argued that success in each case below 
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revolved around making the threat legible, albeit in different ways.  Piracy did not go 
away after the end of the golden age of piracy – it just became a manageable criminal 
problem.  Neither assassinations nor anarchism disappeared after the bombings stopped 
but they became decoupled.  It is highly unlikely that terrorism will ever disappear and 
ridding the world of all jihadists is implausible.  But in each case, the threat became (or in 
the case of al Qaeda is on the way to becoming) something that can be made sense of 
within the system, i.e. legible. 
Crisis production  
Violence characterized by illegibility tends to creat  crises for states.  If violence 
cannot be made sense of there is no way for the stat  to control, repurpose, or defeat it.  
Since this illegibility is dependent upon those boundaries that construct the state, 
illegibility goes a long way to determining a crisis.  However, exactly what this crisis 
entails can only be decided in case by the narratives developing around that particular 
episode of violence.  This is because each one attacks a different part of the state and the 
state system, something that is important in that time and place but is not timeless.  For 
instance, piracy’s attack on the slave trade acted as an attack on the mercantilist system of 
early 18th century in a time when the state legitimated itself through the fostering and 
production of trade.  It would be a fallacy to conclude that episodes of violence that 
disrupt trade lead to the type of crises triggered by the golden age pirates.  This attack 
only creates this type of crisis for the state as it was manifest in the early 18th century 
Atlantic.  We can observe the onset of a crisis through state reaction and the 
correspondence of state leaders and how they are casting the dangers of a particular 




Dewey’s claim that the problem situation is only created by those experiencing it; crises 
cannot be determined outside the situation in which they develop.  As mentioned above, 
boundaries can be important for violence and yet still not create a crisis.  This is, 
therefore, an important mechanism in understanding how violence can shatter boundaries 
and force states to redraw them. 
Retrenchment212 
This is not an absolutely vital step.  It is entirely possible for the two previous 
steps to ‘shatter’ a boundary and lead to the creative ction of drawing a new boundary.  
However, this step is observed in all three cases below and may be a signal as to the 
importance and habitual nature of a particular boundary.  Retrenchment is a mechanism 
through which states immediately respond to the typs of crisis listed above by 
attempting to reinforce or ‘double down’ on a current boundary.  In the early 18th century, 
this meant the issuing of pardons which mirror the letters of marqueof the 17th century 
and using convoys and large men of war to attempt to drive pirates out of the sea.  At the 
turn of the 20th century this meant trying to clamp down on all anarchist activity, no 
matter the intent, in the hope of crushing the entir  strain of thought.  In the early 21st 
century this meant responding to al Qaeda by invading two states, one of which had a 
very tenuous connection to the aforementioned group.  In each case, the early response 
was to double down on a boundary which is making violence illegible.  This is a sign that 
it is hard for states to begin thinking about new boundaries because they are part of the 
‘conceptual maps’ of those governing the state.  Many times, there is recognition of the 
situation as something new and yet retrenchment is still the response.  In all three cases, it 
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is only after reinforcing the failing boundary that it is truly shattering to those whose 
actions draw and maintain it. 
Re-inscribing 
 This is the process through which states come to grips with the threat and form 
creative solutions to pragmatic problems.  Essentially his is the back end of Joas’ 
pragmatist model for social action.  It is how states make revisionist violence legible.  It 
includes three mechanisms: Creative Action, Boundary Drawing, and Authority Swap.  
While the mechanisms in the first process above tend o appear chronologically with 
some overlaps, each of the mechanisms in this process are best understood as analytically 
distinct parts of simultaneous actions.  However, it is important to retain these analytical 
distinctions as they each capture aspects of state action with different consequences. 
Creative action 
Since the boundaries that constitute the state are constructed through practice, the 
shattering of a boundary has the potential to lead to creative action, to, in the words of 
Hans Joas, ‘bring something new into the world’.  Since a shattering of a boundary means 
that a particular conceptual map no longer helps its holders navigate the world, a new one 
must be drawn up.  In order to be ‘new’ this map must include boundaries that had, up 
until this point, been unthought-of.  This does not mean that every part of the actions 
taken to defeat revisionist violence have no historical antecedents.  In fact, solutions 
depend heavily upon both the constraints and possibilities of previous experience and 
concurrent habits.  Rather, they create realms of state action that, prior to the shattering, 




That the Atlantic Colonies were a part of the state, s opposed to international 
holdings of the crown, was new and creative even if some aspects of the policies had 
historical antecedents.  There were passports in the past, but the idea that the state would 
be able to give everyone who traveled a passport and herefore be able to control who and 
what entered and left their borders was unthought-of in the late 19th century.  That the 
state today would have the ability to track people across their own borders and sift 
through large amounts of metadata without specific ourt orders was not thought possible 
and therefore it was not something where the state h d an authority claim.  Each action is 
creative, not because its components are new, but instead because the context and use of 
those elements are new as the state creates novel realms for its authority even as old ones 
die. 
It is important here to take some time to discuss how these actions are undertaken.  
It is argued here that this creativity is unlikely to be centrally planned or discussed.  After 
boundaries are shattered there is a period of trial and error where those combatting the 
threat search for what fits into an ever-changing definition of success.  This is the 
environment from which creativity springs, not a centrally planned process where a new 
strategy is implemented and meets pre-determined measur s of success.  This follows the 
definition of the state as a practice constituted out of nothing more than the boundary-
drawing actions undertaken by particular actors.  If the state is no more than a practice, 
then it is actions from a variety of actors that comp se it not always a center undertaken 
carefully sorted out plans. In fact, these actions can change the composition of elites 
whose actions draw boundaries and therefore hold power within a state.  However, it 




(UK, US) to denote what is actually a less centralized action.  This is done for expediency 
necessary from the contrast behind a relational ontol gy and a language that doesn’t 
naturally incorporate such ontology.  
This can be demonstrated in each case.  Colonial correspondence shows that the 
fight against golden age piracy was conducted largey by colonial governors, merchants, 
and others in the colonies as it was in London even if certain actions, such increased 
control over colonial governance, were undertaken centrally.  While passports needed to 
be centrally instituted and there is a record of inter ational deliberations on this topic, the 
databases that made it possible were created by police departments trying different tactics 
to see what worked.  There many tactics, ranging from ineffective data collection 
techniques to brutality that did not find success during this time. Allowing the anarchist 
idea in the public sphere only occurred to France, for instance, following the failure of 
the Trial of Thirty, certainly not a planned event.  Finally, while the use of drones and the 
collection of bulk data have been conducted centrally, they were first undertaken by 
particular sections of a large government bureaucracy alongside other policies that have 
since fallen by the wayside.  Both innovations were undertaken not by central directive 
but instead by particular parts of the government given the leeway to innovate in response 
to the threat.  It was only with the success of targeted killing and a particular data 
collection and analysis system (it wasn’t the only one) that they became standard. 
Boundary drawing 
 In many ways it is hard to make an empirical distinction between boundary 
drawing and creative action for the cases that follow.  In each case, the creative action has 




the same.  But there is an analytical distinction here.  Of course, there are certainly 
situations where creative action will not draw boundaries.  This is important in the 
development of mechanisms that can provide us with analytical generality, enabling us to 
travel from case to case, project to project.  Similarly, the drawing of a boundary is in 
many ways not purposeful in that those drawing saidboundary are not undertaking 
creative action with boundary drawing in mind. They are undertaking an action to relieve 
themselves of a threat, but they are put into a situation in which doing so draws a new 
boundary.  Therefore, we should be utilizing an analytically distinct mechanism of 
‘boundary drawing’ in order to fully understand and make sense of the cases that follow 
in this project. Creative actions become boundaries when they meet success and are 
habituated.  Therefore, success is an important part of each story but it is important to 
stress that success is something that has a tendency to be a moving target in such 
instances.  I will revisit the idea of success in each case and how it was not simply getting 
rid of pirates, anarchists and terrorists – these goals were not reached – in the conclusion.  
Since the boundary is still being drawn, I also discuss success in the GWoT in some 
depth in Chapter 6.   
Authority swap 
By ‘authority swap’, what is meant here is that in each case states not only gain 
new authority claims, say over big data, their own colonies, or their borders but they 
relinquish effective control over something as well.  For instance, the pirate case in 
Chapter 4 is not simply the story of the state gaining more control over colonial territory 
but also how it gave up direct control over the sea, b ginning the process of moving it to 




no authority is claimed.  As described in Chapter 2, they create inside and outside, 
foreign and domestic, public and private, etc.  While new boundaries mean new areas of 
control, they are also very likely to include old are s of control that are now outside of 
the purview of the state.  Since boundaries demarcate outside as much as inside, the 
process of redrawing boundaries and re-inscribing the s ate necessitates authority claims 
that are abandoned as much as it necessitates those that are gained.  Much of this means 
coming to grips with new realities such as the disjuncture between public brutality and a 
mass media able to cross boundaries in the late 19th century or the ability for people, 
goods, and ideas to cross boundaries in the 21st century.   
Conclusion 
 After building a theory of sovereignty as practice of drawing, redrawing, and 
maintaining boundaries around political authority and the state as the polity that results 
from these practices, we move in this chapter to the way(s) in which violence interacts 
with these boundaries.  Taking a relational approach that focuses on the narratives that 
develop around episodes of violence, it is argued that different narratives are how 
challenges, threats, and opportunities are constructed.  In this chapter, I have created four 
ideal-typical narratives between violence and sovereignty: entrant, resource, criminal, and 
revisionist.  It is the last of these that is the focus of this study, because it helps us to 
understand how the states draw and redraw boundaries and pushes us into thinking about 
the future of the state in a world of increasing global processes.  Revisionist violence 
provides a direct challenge to states, many times op nly challenging their authority and 
existence.  However, it is only through the recognitio  of these challenges as such that 




propagandists, and al Qaeda, all take advantage of existing boundaries and force states to 
redraw them if they wish to alleviate the threat. 
 The second part of this chapter attempts to create ideal typical mechanisms 
through which we can understand this process.  Here, I talked briefly about the 
importance of practice and habit, drawing on practice heorists both inside and outside of 
IR.  Drawing on the work of social theorist Hans Joas, I develop a process of 
Habit/practice  Crisis/Shattering of habit  Creativity in solving problem  New 
Habit.  In the context of understanding threats to the existence of the state through 
violence, I develop two processes, each with three m chanisms.  The first process is 
‘shattering’ and includes the mechanisms legibility/ legibility, crisis production, and 
retrenchment.  It helps us to understand how habit is shattered and the space is created for 
the drawing of new boundaries.  The second process, ‘r -inscribing’, includes the 
mechanisms of creative action, boundary drawing, and authority swap.  It can help us to 
understand how boundaries are redrawn in each case in order to perpetuate the state, 
albeit in a revised form. 
 These ideal typical instruments – sovereignty as the practice of drawing 
boundaries, the state as the polity constructed by these boundaries; narratives of 
revisionist violence; the processes of shattering and re-inscribing – will be used to 
structure the cases that follow.  The chapters are written as narratives and are largely 
chronological.  They are structured using the two processes outlined in this chapter.  
Further exploration of the relevant boundaries and evi ence of narratives of revisionist 
violence are folded into the story.  We start with the golden age of piracy, which took 





The Golden Age of Piracy and the Creation of an ‘Atlantic World’  
  
This chapter is the first of three historical narratives meant to demonstrate how a 
boundary was redrawn in the process of combatting revisionist violence.  In this case, the 
ideal typical boundary to be interrogated is one created in the early modern colonial 
period that marked ‘Europe’ or the ‘domestic’ off from the ‘Atlantic colonies’ or the 
‘international’.  This boundary was drawn through a configuration of six practices: 1) 
direct protection of ships on trading lanes claimed by a state, 2) warfare over trading 
lanes, 3) the use of privateers to attack rivals during nominal times of ‘peace’ in Europe 
without warfare ensuing, 4) economic patterns of extraction, 5) the enforcement of ‘no 
peace beyond the line’, and 6) low levels of involvement in colonial governance.  There 
are, of course, many other things that went into col nial governance during the period 
which remained static, but those above drew a distinct boundary between different types 
of political authority that can be used to explain what was happening in colonial America 
up until the end of the 17th century.  By the middle of the 18th century, this ideal typical 
boundary no longer helps us to understand what is going on. 
This is where the argument of this chapter, and indeed the entire project, lies.  The 
golden age of piracy acted as a site for the drawing of a new boundary through new 
practices.  Each of the next three chapters is structured in the manner shown here.  The 
rise of mercantilist trade, in place of extraction, as the chief economic value of the 
Atlantic colonies towards the end of the 17th century ended some of the practices listed 
above while others persisted, leaving the line largely intact but creating tensions in 




trade and state legitimacy (crisis production).  Early in this process colonial states 
attempted solutions that only reinforced the current boundary (retrenchment, completing 
the process of shattering), however they soon either c anged or abandoned each of the six 
practices listed above for new ones (creative action).  This had the effect of redrawing the 
international/domestic boundary (boundary drawing) so that the Atlantic colonies were 
brought into the domestic sphere while the sea was left outside (authority swap, 
completing the process of re-inscribing). 
What follows is focused largely on the threats to, and response of, England.  This 
makes sense in this case for two reasons.  First, England had become the dominant actor 
in the Atlantic by this time and therefore had the most to lose from piracy and the most to 
gain by its demise.  This is especially true as the center of the Atlantic shifted north at the 
outset of this period because much of the economic value lay in English hands as 
opposed to French or Spanish.  Second, most of the pirates of this period were English 
and most used the English government as their rhetorical bogeyman.  None of this means 
that piracy was not a major problem for the French, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, or any 
other European power with colonial holdings in the Atlantic.  It most certainly was and 
all will be mentioned along the way as there is no attempt to exclude the experience or 
response of these colonial powers.  However, due to its prime position, England gives us 
the best demonstration of what happened. 
Who Were the Golden Age Pirates? 
 Before getting into the narrative, I want to take some time to define the golden 
age of piracy.  What and when was the golden age?  What are its characteristics?  What 




any vessel with intent to commit theft or any other crime, and with an intent or capacity 
to use force in furtherance of that act”213 then it has undoubtedly existed since the 
beginning of maritime trade, if not before.  Piracy as sea robbery was a real threat to 
merchant and naval ships throughout the early modern era.  However, I claim that the 
golden age pirates created an unparalleled crisis for tates because they were different 
from previous (and subsequent) waves of piracy.  This distinct character is what makes 
them so significant and is something that much of the piracy literature in IR does not 
recognize.  Heretofore, the literature has tended to collapse piracy and privateering, 
focusing on method or action (i.e. seaborne robbery) as opposed to the context in which 
that action takes place.214 
In addition to the buccaneers, corso independente, a d Somali pirates – covered in 
Chapter 3 – the golden age can be differentiated from still more waves of piracy.  In the 
18th century, wartime privateering was very common but peacetime privateering and 
piracy were rare.  The Barbary corsairs of the early 19th century claimed to be working 
for the principalities of North Africa but were cast as criminals by Europeans.215  They 
effectively lasted as a serious threat until about 1820, when France invaded and colonized 
Algeria.  Piracy was also rampant in Asia well into the 19th century.  Large pirate 
confederations, such as those led by Koxinga, Cheng Yi and his wife Cheng Yi Sao, and 
Shap Ng Tsai, occasionally rose to prominence in the 18th and 19th century in the South 
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China Sea216 while the entire period was also marked by petty piracy both in China and 
the Malay world.217The Malay pirates, similar to those in Somalia, in particular combine 
elements of criminal and entrant narratives where they were the defenders of local 
interests from foreign intrusion (in this case the British) while they were cast as 
criminals. 
The golden age of piracy lasted from roughly 1690 to 1730, peaking between the 
years 1716 to 1726.218  The pirates of the golden age differed from the previous and 
successive waves of piracy in more than just volume of plunder, because in some cases 
they were no more prolific.  Golden age pirates were in no way beholden to the state; 
they did not act on its behalf.  In fact the narratives of both the pirates and the English 
cast them as rebelling against it.  Not only did they rebel against A state like the corsos 
independente did against Spain or Portugal but they rebelled against THE state, the form 
of governance itself and the type of control it engders.  They were not simply criminals 
looking for economic gain.  They were social rebels arrayed against their society and the 
forms of power therein.  This is what makes them so important and unlike previous or 
subsequent waves of pirates because other waves of pirates were not estranged from the 
state; in various ways, they were a part of the its fabric.. 
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“No Peace Beyond the Line” 
The purpose of Chapter 2 was to outline ideal typical conceptions of the state as a 
boundary-drawing polity and sovereignty as the bundle of practices that draw, redraw, 
and maintain boundaries of political authority.  This is, admittedly, a vague definition 
bereft of specifics but it is designed to be this way.  We should recall Dewey’s 
conception of the state and his statement that specifics are “things we have to go to 
history to discover”.219  The exact nature of the ideal typical boundary that is interrogated 
in each case is something to be outlined in the context of that case. 
The dynastic sovereigns of the 17th century treated Atlantic colonies as an 
international holding of the crown.  This relationship developed in part due to the type of 
economic goods that the colonies provided.220  For the 16th century and much of the 17th 
century, the major value of colonies lay in their ability to fill the coffers of states with 
precious metals as directly as possible.  Gold and silver were the most sought after 
property, prompting Spain’s incursions into South America and Mexico, where there was 
gold, rather than North America, where there was little.  In order to protect the 
commodity chain from mine to court, states attempted to gain control over the seas 
directly by laying claim to trading lanes to and from colonial holdings.  In turn, they 
tended not to be very involved in the everyday governance of their colonies, focusing 
more on those areas that were necessary for extraction.  As a result colonial governors 
were given wide latitude of action, with control over non-trade policy in a colony, 
colonial courts which were not directly supervised by the imperial center, and the ability 
to commission privateers on their own authority.  To some degree this makes sense since 
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the colonists were often religious exiles.  This does not mean they were independent as 
there was loose state control.  However, governance over the day to day happenings of a 
colony (especially one without gold, silver or other valuable raw materials) was not of 
major concern to colonial states. 
Sovereignty was being practiced, and was recognized, over the sea as if it could 
be expropriated as land had been, with states claiming and fighting over discreet sections 
of it.  While there was still a distinction between sea and land, there were attempts to 
claim parts of the former vis a vis one’s rivals as if it was the latter.  Even those arguing 
for a ‘freedom of the seas’, such as Hugo Grotius, recognized that states could have 
jurisdiction over the sea.  While Grotius argues against ownership of the seas for reasons 
of natural law in Mare Liberum, in De Iure Belli ac Pacis he argues that states had the 
ability, “to take Possession or Jurisdiction only over some Part of the Sea”.221  In other 
words, Grotius’ arguments for free navigation of the seas were against ownership of and 
against jurisdiction over the entire sea, not against jurisdiction over some part of the sea.  
He was actually reinforcing standard practice through attempts to reform .222  Since the 
major threats to states at sea were the activities of rival states, this situation, whereby the 
sea was split up into sections, made sense and became p rt of standard practice.  It made 
so much sense, in fact, that fights over trading laes proved to be a legitimate casus belli. 
Warfare over trading lanes and extracted goods suchas gold and silver was 
carried out in large part by privateers.  At a time when states were not necessarily able to 
completely internalize violence in the form of standing armies, they “preferred to conduct 
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foreign policy using private means”.223  The most famous pirates or buccaneers224 of this 
age were considered patriots.  As mentioned in Chapter 3, Henry Morgan went beyond 
his ‘letter of marque’ to sack Panama City in a gruesome fashion.  However, upon being 
captured and sent back to London for punishment, he was knighted and made lieutenant 
governor of Jamaica.  It was common for privateers to go beyond their mandate to 
undertake unsanctioned actions, blurring the line between pirate and privateer.  
Buccaneers tended to raid with their fellow countrymen; in this period, a French pirate 
was based on Tortuga and an English one on Port Royal, Jamaica, etc.  The general 
pattern was that privateers with the sponsorship of England would attack French, 
Spanish, and Dutch trading ships while privateers with French sponsorship would attack 
English, Spanish, and Dutch trading ships, etc. 
This competition went beyond times of war, though it was expanded during 
periods of official hostility, to include times of peace.  The use of privateers during 
peacetime was legitimized by the idea that, ‘there is no peace beyond the line’, i.e. peace 
agreed upon by states after wars on the continent did not apply to the colonial, 
international sphere.  The New World was demarcated s an area separate from Europe, 
part of a ‘layered sovereignty’.225  The origins of the ‘line’ date back to the 15th century 
disputes over New World jurisdiction between the Portuguese and the Spanish.  
However, the identity and position of the line was and remains quite vague.  It has been 
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argued that it is simply the Tropic of Cancer,226 the Tropic and a “prime meridian passing 
through Ferro in the Canaries” set at the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis in 1559,227 and the 
Equator, among others.228  While there tended to be little official recognition about the 
placement of the line, its function was clear: what ppened beyond the line was 
recognized to be “behind God’s back”.229 
On one side of the line were the affairs of Europe, on the other were colonial 
affairs.  In this situation, warfare could happen in the colonies without breaking out in 
Europe and vice versa.  Despite being claimed by the same monarchs, what we see here 
are separate realms.  These realms are conceptual and were not drawn consciously but 
evolved over time due to a series of practices.  Competition over trading lanes, economic 
patterns of extraction, direct protection of ships carrying extracted goods, the use of 
privateers, enforcement of ‘no peace’, and low involvement in colonial affairs created 
this line.  It was ‘the line’ that made piracy’s golden age so explosive and it was ‘the line’ 
that needed to be addressed in order to bring about the end of this golden age, 
transforming the state in the process. 
The economic patterns of 16th and 17th century colonies facilitated a competition 
for raw materials in the colonies in the form of seizing, finding, and developing trade 
routes, ports, ships, and/or mines.  However, as the 17th century progressed, colonies 
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came to be able to provide agricultural goods and even some manufactured ones.230  This 
created a demand for workers which was filled by the rising number of slaves available 
from Western Africa.  Trade, not simply extraction, became the chief source of colonial 
value and, in many ways, the chief source of wealth out of the growing mercantilist 
economic system.  Additionally, England’s rise as a naval superpower meant that new 
colonies also came to the fore with North American tobacco and cotton, West Indian 
sugar, and West African slaves replacing Central and South American gold and silver as 
the goods of choice.  This system was vital to the patterns of rule, warfare, and 
competition that characterize the 18th century territorial state. 
However, as economic and colonial interests changed, patterns of colonial rule 
were slow to adapt.  There is little reason to assume that, in a vacuum, 17th century 
boundaries would have had to change, or change in the manner that they did, simply 
because of new economic patterns.  While the mix of new economic patterns and old 
patterns of colonial rule created the structural conditions needed to spark change, it did 
not determine the change to come.  However, it created tensions that were critical to 
piracy’s golden age.  A change in the colonial economy from extraction to trade 
combined with patterns of colonial rule during this period created space for pirates to 
thrive, making their actions and demands illegible to colonial states.  This becomes 
important as colonial governors and those in London tried to look for ways to make sense 
of this wave of piracy.  As will be seen later it was not until the pirates could be made 
legible, until their demands and their actions made sense within the boundaries of 
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sovereign authority that colonial states were able to defeat them.  This will be covered in 
subsequent sections. 
Trade functioned best in peace and it became harder nd harder for states to 
justify continued warfare ‘beyond the line’ to other states, to merchants who brought 
wealth, and to their own treasurers.  Attempts to enf rce peace beyond the line started in 
the middle of the 17th century with states allowing for a grace period of enmity of nine 
months after a peace treaty had been signed (which did not stop Morgan’s sacking of 
Panama).  However, it was not until the 1670s that England began to tell colonial 
governors that they could not undertake measures of war without London’s blessing and 
until 1689 for all West Indian governors to be barred from issuing ‘letters of marque’, 
though the practice continued.231  Of course, privateering was still used extensively by 
European states in wartime well into the nineteenth century.232 
These attempts created nearly perfect working conditi s for pirates.  A lack of 
even attempted control over much of what was claimed as colonial land gave pirates a 
series of bases from which to work in Madagascar, the Bahamas and other small 
Caribbean islands, and the many capes on the Carolin  shore.  As Rediker puts it, “The 
sailor knew…the Atlantic was a big place, that the empires were overstretched…these 
circumstances created openings from below”.233  It also provided pirates with markets for 
their goods.  Throughout the 17th century, pirates and privateers alike found welcome 
buyers in Atlantic colonies, especially in North America.  One English official remarked 
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that, “The Pirates themselves have often told me that if they had not been supported from 
the traders from thence [New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island] with ammunition 
and provisions according to their directions, they would never become so formidable, nor 
arrived to that degree that they have”.234  This was not a major problem to colonial states 
so long as these privateers were serving their intees s.  Once peacetime privateering was 
no longer useful, the openness of colonial markets to pirate goods became a problem as it 
gave these pirates an outlet to get rich off what ws now illegal plunder. 
A common reason given in the historiography for the ris  of golden age piracy 
was the end of the War of Spanish Succession in 1714 and the drawdown of naval forces 
following the Treaty of Utrecht.  This follows with an economic view of piracy as being 
determined by supply and demand.  After the war, the English navy went from roughly 
50,000 sailors to around 15,000, creating a large goup of men with sailing experience 
and no work.  A number of early pirate captains such as Henry Jennings and Benjamin 
Hornigold were former privateers, who, while willing to attack French and Spanish ships 
illegally, refused to attack English ships.  This has led some IR scholars who have dealt 
with piracy to focus on the link between privateering and piracy as a major causal 
claim.235 
That said, however dire the employment situation was among those with sailing 
experience, many pirates were not involved in the war.  While the numbers above show 
an influx of 35,000 unemployed sailors, Rediker estima es that only about 4,000 or 5,000 
men went ‘upon the account’ during the entire period, and only 1,500-2,000 in the years 
1716-1718, which is when one would expect the influx of unemployed from the recent 
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war to be at its highest.  Pirates tended to derive f om two different sources.  One early 
source of pirates was a group of ‘freebooters’ who started diving for sunken Spanish gold 
ships off the coast of Florida in 1714-1715.  In fact, Jennings and Hornigold used 
Jamaican commissions as a cover to dive on the wrecks.236  When the gold dried up, they 
found themselves outside of society and willing to start attacking ships.237  As the golden 
age wore on, pirates also tended to come from captured or mutinied ships.  With these 
two facts in mind it becomes hard to justify that it was the end of the War of Spanish 
Succession and the use of privateers therein which caused the golden age of piracy.  
Where the war does seem to have causal power is in its importance to the sequencing of 
events.  First, the understanding at Utretcht was th t i  would set up a “lasting peace in 
America”, making it safe for trade.238  Pirates stood in the way of this goal.  Second, 
without the war, piracy would have been squelched earlier with the lessons of Captain 
Kidd (see below) and others fresh in the minds of th se in authority.  The war gave a kick 
start to the age, but it did not define it. 
While the war of Spanish Succession and the use of privateers therein played a 
small role, the major causes of the golden age of piracy were the change to a mercantilist 
economy in the Atlantic and patterns of rule that had yet to catch up with this new reality.  
The combination of the growing importance of trade nd methods of colonial governance 
created for the era of bullion produced favorable structural conditions for piracy.  Pirates 
of the golden age rebelled against their society as political actors while using common 
practices of that society against it: as long as the line itself existed so would the pirates.  
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The line gave them shelter, open markets, and made them illegible to the point that 
attempts to defeat them were futile.  This is important as we will see below how attempts 
to defeat piracy by using tools provided by a world demarcated by ‘the line’ only made 
the problem worse. 
“Committing Depredations and Acts of Hostility”  
The construction and recognition of piracy as a crisis began in the East Indies at 
the turn of the 18th century and grew out of the practice of privateering.  The saga of 
Captain William Kidd demonstrates this transition and the competing narratives over 
piracy at the turn of the 18th century.  Kidd, a renowned privateer from King William’s 
War,239 was a captain who took a commission from the English k ng to capture pirates 
and attack French shipping in 1696.240  While on his mission, he performed largely the 
same actions he had on previous commissions, even going beyond his ‘letter of marque’ 
to attack merchant shipping.  He soon discovered that his actions had been termed 
‘piracy’ while he was at sea.  One of the ships he captured, the Quedah Merchant, was 
owned by Abd-ul-Ghaffur, an important figure at Indian Mughal Aurangzeb’s court and 
therefore a powerful man with the East India Company (EIC).  Kidd soon became the 
unsuspecting poster boy of the EIC’s campaign against piracy.  Kidd learned of his 
predicament while still at sea and decided to return o New York, where his former 
financier Richard Coote, Earl of Bellomont, had been made governor. 
However, upon Kidd’s return, Bellomont, whose faction n London had fallen out 
of favor, turned him in as part of his new anti-pirate mandate.  Bellomont told Kidd, “I 
set myself a rule never to grant a pardon without the King’s express leave or 
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command.”241  Kidd left London as a respected privateer and return d five years later as a 
pirate who was destined to hang in chains.  The actions which had been undertaken to 
gain rival specie in the late 17th century had come to be seen as detrimental to trade an  
English interests by the early 18th century.242  Henry Morgan strayed from his letter of 
marque and was knighted.  Just a few decades later Kidd did the same and was hanged.  
The buccaneer narrative of the 17th century no longer defined these actions and was being 
replaced by a new narrative where the pirate was ‘ho tes humani generis’. 
Kidd’s successors in the Atlantic accepted this framing and created a crisis in 
colonial governance and trade in the first quarter of the 18th century.  The presence of 
pirates was not itself the crisis; the crisis or problem must be defined as such by the actor 
or actors experiencing the ‘shattering’.  Piracy proved a test to state authority and 
economic well-being, challenging the rights of property that underpinned the emerging 
system of mercantilist trade.  If the state could not protect property rights, its utility to 
those it claimed to rule would dwindle significantly.  The disruption to trade took money 
directly out of state coffers in the form of stolen treasure.  It is estimated that roughly 
2,400 English ships were taken between the years 1716- 26 by pirates, more than the 
privateering ventures of any state during the recent war without the concurrent gain in 
privateering booty as an offset.  The triangular slve trade, crucial to colonial agriculture 
and state power,243 was interrupted repeatedly by pirates to the tune of ₤204,000 worth of 
damage to the English slave trade in 1720 alone at a time when the average outlay of a 
venture was ₤3,000.244 
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These losses were not offset by compensating captures which was the case during 
the war or during the 17th century, nor do these numbers reflect losses to French or 
Spanish shipping.  On top of this, pirates proved apt at concentrating their attacks.  
Blackbeard halted shipping to and from Charleston for more than a week in 1718 in 
response to the capture of his former shipmate Stede Bonnet;245 Black Bart Roberts 
paralyzed trade to the West Indies in 1721 and tookan ₤80,000 prize off the coast of 
Brazil.246  The Grand Banks Fisheries off the coast of Newfoundland were assailed, 
losing more than 50 English and French fishing boats in 1720.247  Philadelphia had its 
entire trade halted for a week in 1722.  Virginia and Maryland merchants complained that 
in 1717 pirates had cost them ₤300,000.248  At the very least, golden age pirates proved 
adept at paralyzing trade into or out of any particular port, creating a sense of terror 
among the authorities. 
This contributed to a period of stagnation in trade.  1720 had the lowest volume of 
slaves shipped during a year of peace.  Historian Mrcus Rediker points out, “there was 
zero growth in English Shipping between 1715 and 1728, a prolonged period of 
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English Trade (000 Tons) 
Entries and Clearances 1686-1779 
 Entries Clearances 
Year Total England Foreign Total England Foreign 
1692-3 177 70 107 181 89 92 
1693-4 201 95 106 143 74 69 
1696    175 92 83 
1697    245 144 101 
1699-
1701 
   338 294 44 
1700-
1702 
   290 244 67 
1709    318 274 44 
1710    311 244 67 
1711    324 266 58 
1712    356 327 29 
1713    438 412 26 
1714    479 445 34 
1715    426 406 20 
1716 349   456 439 17 
1717 347   429 414 15 
1718 369 354 15 445 428 17 
1723 393   420 393 27 
1726-8 421   457 433 24 
1730  422     
1737  404     
1744  269     
1751 480 421 59 694 648 46 
1758 413 283 130 526 427 99 
1765 693 568 125 758 690 68 
1772 780 652 128 888 815 73 
1779 710 482 228 720 581 139 
 
While the data above is admittedly spotty some trends can be discerned.  First, we see 
that the trade numbers in each column tend to grow or decline in correlation with the 
others, years with high entries tend to be years with high clearances, etc.  Second, looking 
at total clearances, we see a small boom in 1713 as the War of Spanish Succession was 
winding down.  However, from about 1715 until the data fades away in 1726-28, we see 
a leveling off, then much higher numbers in the middle of the century.  Finally, if we look 
at English Entries, we see growth between 1718 and 1730/1737.  Putting these three 
trends together it stands to reason that trade leveled off during the golden age of piracy.  
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While certainly piracy was not the only cause of this lack of trade growth, the evidence 
mentioned above would seem to argue that it played its part.  However, even if it was not 
the case that piracy played a role in the stagnatio of trade, the lack of trade growth itself 
may have deepened a sense of crisis which, combined with the aforementioned 
widespread piratical activity, forced the state to define piracy as a crisis and take action 
accordingly. 
 Piracy also threatened to tear apart the peace that was recently agreed to at 
Utrecht.  For this reason, Hornigold and Jennings ‘patriotic’ decision to only attack 
Spanish and French ships was actually a major problem for the English.251  The problem 
got bad enough that the Lt. Gov. of Virginia, Alexander Spottswood, complained that 
pirates were “committing depredations and acts of hostility upon the Spaniards and other 
nations in amity with his Majesty,”252 while one Spanish official claimed that such acts 
were “deviating from the publick faith”.253  These attacks took place at  a time when the 
Spanish were seen as a major problem in the Bahamas nd elsewhere,254 eventually 
leading the English into the War of the Quadruple Alliance in 1719.255 
 Pirates were not simply an economic problem; trade was viewed as a major arm 
of statecraft.  It became a major area of competition and was used to fill state coffers and 
pay off the debts incurred during almost constant warfare.  Colonies, especially in the 
Atlantic, had become prized for trade.  This is an era in which the state and the economy 
were intertwined and had yet to be separated as they would be after the rise of free-trade 
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capitalism a century later.  In addition, pirates proved a challenge to state authority.  They 
developed an egalitarian society full of adventure, riches, and merriment.  The next 
section demonstrates how they proclaimed themselves not only against the state but also 
against god and labor or property, the underpinnings of society.  Allowing them to exist 
challenged state claims to legitimacy and authority in their colonies, especially in an era 
of mercantilist trade. 
“Hostes Humani Generis” 
The contemporary narratives that developed around the golden age of piracy 
demonstrate the high level of threat and the depth of e crisis.  Both the counter-piracy 
narratives developed by the English and the narratives that the pirates themselves worked 
to build pitted the pirates against the state and the whole of society.  The rise in pirate 
attacks scared local officials, shattering contemporary conceptual maps.  Many calls 
came into London asking for more men and ships. Virginia governor Alexander 
Spottswood wrote that “the number of pirates has increased since and there is now no 
conceivable force that will serve to reduce them”.256  Another complained that they had 
become “so formidable” that it would be hard to combat them. 257  The Boston News 
Letter reported that they “so intimidate our sailors that they refuse to fight when the 
pirates attack them”.258  One admiral complained that for all ships going ito the capes of 
Virginia, “it goes for granted they were chased by pirates, I see daily instances of it”.259  
Piracy was not simply a nuisance or a set of romantic tales; it had real world 
consequences for the statesmen, sailors and merchants of the day. 
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In response, the English tried to paint the pirates s the ‘enemies of mankind’, the 
‘villains of all nations’.  Colonists were told that everything that they did was a ‘sin’.260  
They were the “dregs of mankind, and then they will appear blaspheming their creator, 
coining of oaths, embrewing their hands in innocent blood, and racking their hellish 
invention for unheard of barbarities”.261  Famed colonial puritan minister Cotton Mather 
called them, “Sea Monsters”. 262  One judge remarked that pirates acted, “without any 
pretense of authority other than that of their own private depraved wills…[they were] 
robbers, opposers, and violators of all laws humane and divine”.263  The part about 
authority here is important; legitimate authority la only in either god or, especially, the 
crown.  Claiming authority from another source was not only blasphemy but dangerous 
and illegible to colonial officials.  However, foremost they were ‘hostes humani generis’, 
common enemies of all mankind.  In 1699, the British Parliament passed the first An Act 
for the More Effectual Suppression of Piracy – prior to this, piracy law was still governed 
by the Offenses at Sea Act, passed in 1536 by Henry VIII – calling pirates ‘hostes humani 
generis’ and setting the pirates outside of society and the state. 
Pirates were against the cornerstones of rule: labor (or in actuality property), god, 
and country.  Colonial correspondence repeatedly uses the protection of trade and 
mercantile property as the reason why resources should be used to defeat piracy.264  For 
instance, one man of war was commanded to cruise for pirates because, “the pirates do 
very much interrupt and prejudice his majesties subjects trading to Virginia… it is a great 
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importance to this nation that the utmost endeavours should be used to secure so 
necessary & valuable a trade”.265  The bills passed in parliament to suppress piracy also 
recognized the threat to trade.266  During the era of mercantilism, property and trade were 
as much a part of the state as they were the private sector, comprising a part of the 
‘Sinews of Power’ of the age.267  Peter Earle claims that pirates “liked to burn ship  for 
the sheer joy of seeing these mercantile symbols of the world they had left behind go up 
in flames”.268  Attacks on private wealth for economic gain that would probably lead to 
narratives of criminal violence today were given expressly political tones in the early 18th 
century. 
The pirates used similar narratives to justify and explain themselves.  While all 
pirates in all eras are concerned with economic gain through plunder,269 these pirates also 
had political claims.  They fought for a way of life that they could not enjoy within 
society and openly rebelled against the idea of state control.270  In the words of pirate 
captain Sam Bellamy, “I am a free prince, and I have s much authority to make war on 
the whole world, as he who has a hundred sail of ships at sea, and an army of 100,000 
men in the field”.271  Bart Roberts claimed that raising the black flag meant that one 
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declares, “war against the whole world”.272  One of Bellamy’s men claimed that they 
were acting as “Robin Hood’s men”273 at his trial.  William Fly claimed before his 
execution that the state had hung many “honest fellows”,274 and Charles Vane’s crew 
regularly drank to the “Damnation of King George”.275  Contrary to the beliefs of 
contemporary English society, Power and God did not determine legitimate authority in 
their eyes; the true criminals were the state, the navy, and the merchants.  For this reason 
pirates claimed to have come ‘from the seas’ and to have ‘sold their nation’.276 
Pirates of the golden age were networked, tended to stick together, and, were, in 
some ways, progressive in how they organized themselves.  This can be illustrated in the 
likely apocryphal tales of the pirate island Libertalia, located near Madagascar, where 
each man had an equal share of all plunder and an egalitarian peace reigned.277  One 
English official observed that pirates “already este m themselves a community, and to 
have one common interest”.278  In addition, this ‘community’ also tended to be multi-
racial279 and accepting of homosexuality.280  The articles of Black Bart Roberts’ crew 
read: “Every man has a vote in the affairs of moment; has equal title to the fresh 
provisions, or strong liquors, at any times seized, and may use them at pleasure, unless a 
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scarcity make it necessary, for the good of all, to vote a retrenchment”.281  While pirate 
captains may receive a slightly higher share of plunder than others on the ship, the exact 
amount was open to vote while many privileges, such as use of the cabin, were shared.282  
Pirates, especially early in the era, had a vision of a better world they began to create 
aboard ship. 
The choice to ‘go a pyrating’ was made easier by the place that these men, and in 
a few cases women,283 held in society.  In particular, piracy was a response to the 
execrable treatment of sailors on merchant and naval ships.  Many of these sailors were 
impressed into duty and conditions aboard these ships were cruel.  They ate little and 
what they did eat was usually rotten.  They were whipped and punished repeatedly, 
disease was rampant, and, after all of this, many went unpaid.  In the words of 
contemporary essayist Samuel Johnson, “No man will be a sailor who has contrivance 
enough to get himself into a jail; for being in a ship is being in a jail, with the chance of 
being drowned…A man in jail has more room, better food, and commonly better 
company”.284  To many, the life of a pirate, while short, was certainly preferable to that of 
a merchant seaman.  At his execution, Daniel Macarty claimed the “Pyrate’s life to be the 
only life for a man of any spirit”.285  Bart Roberts rejected the life of a sailor claiming 
that, “a merry life and a short one shall be my motto”.286  Indeed, when pirates attacked a 
ship, it was the captain who faced their wrath, unless his crew was able to speak well of 
him.  Attacks also did not lead to impressment.  Only those willing to go along were 
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collected for future missions.  Bart Roberts was know  for asking, “who was willing to 
go, and who not, for he would force nobody”.287 
To make it even harder for the state to make sense of golden age piracy, they were 
defiant towards death.  One observer was astonished w n told that instead of being 
captured, pirates would “all go merrily to Hell together”.  Another bragged to William 
Snelgrave of not being afraid of “going to the devil by a great shot”.  Many attempted to 
blow up their own ships when all looked lost, hoping for “a brave blast to go to Hell 
with” while cheering their own destruction.  Of course, many were captured and still 
proved defiant.  Thomas Morris’ only regret upon the gallows was that he “was not a 
greater plague to” the Bahamas.  John Gow broke the rope at his hanging and 
immediately climbed back up the gallows to be hung a second time.  Reports of the trial 
of Roberts’ men in 1722 described their walk to the gallows: “none of them, it was 
observed, appeared to be the least dejected”.  Indeed, William Fly “walk’d to the gallows 
without a tear”.288  It was also popular among those pirates who were still free to play a 
“Mock-court of judicature to try one another for pyracy”.289  All this would have 
consequences for the fight against piracy. 
The narratives developed by both the English and the pirates cast the pirates as 
being against the state itself.  They were outside of society, against authority, and made 
claims which were rendered illegible in the colonial/st te system of the 18th century 
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Atlantic.  They had their own ideas about the nature of the good life and how to achieve 
it.  In this way, they are similar to Hobsbawm’s ‘social bandits’ and are as akin to Al 
Qaeda as they are to contemporary piracy.290  The pirates of the golden age created a 
crisis that went beyond numbers of ships taken and losses in trade; it struck at the heart of 
the state.  Who they were, how they were defined by self and other, and how they 
differed from other waves of piracy all play a role in their rise and decline, altering how 
states bounded authority in the Atlantic. 
“How Little Acts of Grace and Mercy Work on these Vermine” 
The earliest attempts to defeat piracy involved placing many naval ships in the 
sea; a policy a number of historians have argued was decisive.291  To them, the colonial 
powers finally got serious and put enough ships in the water to put an end to piracy.  
While state power was certainly a factor in piracy’s downfall, it does not play nearly the 
role that these historians claim.  For instance, in 1700, during a time of peace, England 
had more naval sailors in the Caribbean and Atlantic than there were pirates, yet the heart 
of the golden age was still to come.  Non-English states, especially the French, found that 
the ships they sent to combat piracy during the golden age were no longer in good enough 
shape to do the job by the time they reached the Caribbean.  By the 1730s there was little 
in the way of armed ships off the North American coast f any kind and yet piracy did not 
return.292  Nor did it return off the coast of Newfoundland despite a twenty-year period 
beginning in 1725 where the coasts were not patrolled.293  However, this was certainly the 
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favored strategy of colonial governors and officers arly in the golden age.294  While 
naval strength did prove decisive at times – it wasa naval mission that attacked and killed 
the prolific Roberts295 – it was not specifically a show of force that was critical but how 
that force was used.  Naval power in the earlier parts of the golden age tended to be used 
to guard ships directly or to simply flood the sea.  This reflects the idea that the Atlantic 
Ocean was a space that could be controlled by states, or at least open to contestation.  
This was ineffective against piracy, not least because naval ships tended to be quite 
cumbersome and unable to chase pirates into shallow waters.296  Essentially, it was a 
continuation of existing practices and it predictably failed.  Control needed to be taken 
over land to ensure the safety of merchant ships.  Without control of land, piracy could 
flourish but with it, naval ships eventually became unnecessary to protect trade during 
peacetime. 
Another common approach adopted by colonial states early in this period was the 
giving of crown-approved pardons.297  This was part of official policy early in the period 
as the King issued a pardon for all pirates who would accept in 1717.  This proved 
unsuccessful as most pirates either ignored the pardons or accepted them and continued 
looting.  Blackbeard accepted a pardon that came with land in North Carolina, a title, and 
the hand of a local aristocrat’s daughter only to go back ‘upon the account’ a few months 
later.298  Charles Vane accepted a pardon after an unsuccessful attack and then proceeded 
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to continue attacking ships within the week.299  Many pirates even mocked the 
government and ripped their pardons to pieces upon receiving them.300  The failure of this 
policy makes a certain amount of sense.  When men are rebelling against the state and 
dynastic authority, why would they tie their fate to these forces by accepting a pardon?  
Pardons were the mirror image of the ‘letter of marque’.  In the latter, the monarch gave 
the pirate the opportunity to pursue future plunders; in the former, the monarch gave him 
the opportunity to be forgiven of past plunders.  Either way, plunder is sanctioned by the 
state.  This policy was merely a continuation of the existing pattern of colonial rule where 
connection to the monarch was paramount.  It was doomed to fail because it did not 
change the conceptual maps of state leaders which made possible the practices of colonial 
governance which allowed piracy to flourish in the first place. 
There were of course some success stories.  For instance, Benjamin Hornigold 
accepted a pardon and became a useful weapon against pirates sailing in and around the 
Bahamas, much to Governor Woodes Rogers’ “great satisfaction”.301  However, despite 
early optimism about the strategy, the failure of the pardons became apparent to those 
governing the colonies.302  Governor Hunter of New York remarked that “we have found 
by experience that their money spent and no merchant willing to employ them, they 
generally return to their former course of life”.303  Similarly Walter Hamilton, governor of 
the Leeward Islands, remarked to the Council of Trade nd Plantation, “your lordships 
may now plainly perceive how little acts of grace and mercy work on these vermine”.304 
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The use of both naval power and pardons were ineffective in large part because 
they were part of how ‘the line’, as a boundary separating Europe from its Atlantic 
colonies, was drawn.  They demonstrate the trend toward retrenchment, attempts to 
reinforce contemporary boundaries, in such situations.  Therefore we should expect these 
policies to fail.  However, even more important areth  consequences of such failure.  
This is when the ‘shattering’ is complete.  It is not that a situation is classified as a crisis 
for those wielding state power but is instead when they realize that the way in which they 
habitually exercise authority is insufficient to quell that crisis.  Here the boundary is 
shattered and space opens up for creative solutions to the concrete problem of golden age 
piracy. 
“More Effectually Contribute Towards the Suppressing of Them” 
For all of the damage that pirates did to trade, th golden age of piracy ground to a 
halt in the years from 1726 to 1730.  Its end is usually dated either with the English 
capture of Captain William Fly in Boston in 1726 or with the French capture of Olivier 
La Buse in Southeast Asia in 1730.305  Pirate attacks between 1726 and 1730 were few 
when compared to the previous decade, and after 1730 attacks dropped even further.  
Maybe even more important was that the pirates of the later stages of the golden age, men 
such as WilliamFly and Ned Low, did not hold the idals of their predecessors.  They had 
become something much closer to criminals, something t at made sense within the 
contemporary conceptual maps of state elites. 
How did this happen?  It was the creative action of changing the patterns of 
colonial rule, effectively moving the domestic/international boundary, i.e ‘the line’, to 
                                                           




include the colonies and creating an ‘Atlantic world’ that brought about the end of 
piracy’s golden age.  First, there was a change in the criminal code both in substance and 
procedure.  Second, we see attempts to direct colonial policy toward pirates.  Third, a 
propaganda campaign against pirates in the colonies was undertaken.  All were actions 
that could be called ‘creative’ in that they brought ‘something new into the world’ and 
played a role in solving the crisis caused by golden age piracy.  All had the effect of 
transforming the line between the domestic and the international, with the Atlantic 
colonies effectively becoming a part of the state.  Finally, as discussed in Chapter 3, all of 
the successful actions taken below were not centrally planned and implemented, they 
were part of a trial and error phase and undertaken in concert with or response to colonial 
administrators working in their own interests.   
As mentioned above, English law defined pirates as ‘ho tes humani generis’.  
However, despite the ancient roots of this term, – it dates back to Cicero’s condemnation 
of Mithradates II’s Cillician privateers in a war against the Romans306 – it was put to use 
in new ways.  First, its connotation as something that comes from outside the state or 
society was not common, as evidenced by the Medieval usage of the term to describe 
tyrants.  Second, if pirates are the enemies of all m nkind, then one would have to think 
that any state could try any pirate.  However, universal jurisdiction only took hold during 
the golden age.  There is evidence that the term was used in connection to piracy in the 
Caribbean as early as 1676, just as privateering was becoming a problem but this was not 
the dominant practice.307  It was not until the late 17th century that it began to become 
standard.  Rubin argues that this was pivotal in the fight against piracy and the 
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development of piracy law in general.308  The fact that we have had rather settled piracy 
law for centuries means that piracy became, after the golden age, a problem that was 
‘legible’ to the state.  Of course the actions of the pirate did not change, but he,309 
exemplified by Captain Kidd, went from state-sponsored and legitimate to an enemy of 
all mankind.  This was partly due to pirate rhetoric, partly due to shifting political 
context, and partly due to a reclassification by states in light of new interests and ideas.  
Universal jurisdiction meant that any state could try and execute any pirate.  Pirates were 
legally extricated from the state and citizenry, an effective declaration that England 
would not be offended if an English pirate met justice in France.  Indeed, it was France 
who caught one of the greatest pirates of the laterstages of the golden age, Ned Low, and 
sentenced him to death in French courts despite his English ancestry.  This brought no 
rebuke from England.  A line was drawn around citizenship that left pirates outside of 
state protection.310 
The original intent of the 1699 act and its harsh punishments for piracy was to 
scare potential pirates away from a life of sea robbery.  However, given the defiance and 
black humor with which many, though not all, pirates reated death, it is unlikely that this 
happened.  Where this change did prove effective was in taking pirates out of the sea.  In 
addition to finding other ways to dry up the supply of pirates, expanded capital crimes led 
to hundreds of hangings in the later years of this period.311 
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Despite the near constant warfare of the period, cooperation between states was 
another feature of the legal fight against piracy.  A willingness among European powers 
to work together to rid the seas of piracy was signaled early; Article 2 of the Treaty of 
Utrecht in 1714 contained a clause to combat piracy.312  This came from recognition that 
the enemies to trade were no longer other states, as had been the case in the 17th century, 
but were instead non-state actors like pirates.  It was in every trading state’s interest to 
eradicate piracy and protect trade.  Still, there were problems.  After England’s 
unsuccessful dalliance with pardons, France continued to give pardons to pirates for 
years, undermining English attempts to ostracize them.  A lot of cooperation happened at 
lower levels of interaction.  For instance, French and English colonies banded together to 
fight piracy.313  Similarly, Admiral Channeler Ogle was given the following instructions, 
“in case you should meet with on the coast of Africa any ships of war fitted out from 
France against the pirates, and you find that the joining them may more effectually 
contribute towards the suppressing of them, you are in such case to do the same, and to 
act in concert with them”.314 
While changes in the laws against piracy may have helped, they were not as 
important as changes to how the law was carried out. The “Act” was renewed in 1701, 
1715 and again in 1719, even as pardons were given out.   If the law had been effective, 
why continue to renew it?  These policies in many wa s competed with the more 
successful ones and were certainly more centrally planned. The problem was not the law 
itself, but instead ineffectiveness in its implementation.  The law became much more 
effective when England allowed Vice-Admiralty courts to be established in its Caribbean, 
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Western African, and the North American colonies to try pirates.  Before this period, all 
pirates were tried in London or in local colonial courts.  The former meant transporting 
pirates back across the Atlantic, an expensive, slow, and arduous process.  The latter were 
designed to try colonial crimes, not those, such as piracy, that were against England and 
English shipping.315  When pirates were tried by colonial courts, they tended to be 
acquitted due to friendly juries, many of whose memb rs profited from trade with the 
pirates.  Fearing an insurrection, Governor Rogers of the Bahamas mentioned that he was 
“too weak to bring them to a trial for most of the p ople here having led the same course 
of life”. 316 
The extension of Vice Admiralty courts – presided over by English judges and 
under the aegis of England’s court system – into the colonies meant the choice between a 
long, expensive journey to London and the risk of acquittal at the hands of a friendly jury 
disappeared.  The problem of how to try pirates was recognized as early as ‘piracy’ 
became a problem distinct from privateering in the 1670s.  There were early attempts to 
establish admiralty courts in Jamaica in the 1670s and 80s317 because local courts felt that 
they could not claim jurisdiction over the sea318 nd frustrations with having to ship 
pirates to England were common in the 1690s in the East Indies.319  However, this 
process was not uniform by any means and there were still many problems and 
uncertainties.  Kidd was shipped to London from New York for his trial.  There is 
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evidence of regulations about which pirates ought to be sent to England in the 1690s320 
and a number of times when colonial governors were unsure of how to proceed.  The 
Council of Nevis complained, “of pirates, that we have not any power of jurisdiction 
whereby we might proceed to trye them”.321  All in all this was a process that was started 
just as the first rumblings of the golden age began but was not fully implemented until its 
apex in the years following the War of Spanish Succession. 
One reason for this ‘delay’ was the fact that placing admiralty courts all over the 
colonies (or allowing one to travel and set up anywhere) was a creative act not a part of 
the conceptual map of late 17th century England, as evidenced by the lack of uniformity 
and the continued shipping of pirates to London.  Aother reason was colonial resistance, 
as colonial councils did not want their courts subverted.322  However the shift came with 
benefits to, and responsibilities for, England as well.  First, the use of English judges 
meant that England had taken greater control over colonial policy in a way that it had not 
done previously.  Now, there was an enforced uniformity of law on pirates.  Second, 
trying them in the colonies led to the spectacle of hanging pirates in the colonies, whence 
many pirates originated and where pirates were held in much higher esteem.323 
If English courts could be set up, this means that England began to treat the 
colonies more and more like an extension of the home state and not simply an overseas 
holding or trading post.  It reflects a deeper change to control colonial policy toward 
pirates.  Of course, the colonies were still treated differently, but they went from having a 
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lot of autonomy in this matter to having very little.  Taking over colonial policy meant 
that the ‘line’ was blurred even further.  Governors were appointed who complied with 
British policy on piracy and if they did not they were replaced.  This happened in New 
York with Benjamin Fletcher,324 during the Captain Kidd affair, in Jamaica in 1716,325 
and probably most effectively with the appointment of Woodes Rogers as governor of the 
Bahamas in 1718, a largely ungoverned set of island following the destruction wrought 
by the recent war.  The port of New Providence in the Bahamas had been the major pirate 
base of the golden age’s early years and the sorry tate of the island became an issue for 
other colonies during this time.326  It had housed famous pirate captains such as Benjami  
Hornigold, Henry Jennings, Stede Bonnet, Sam Bellamy, and Blackbeard.  Rogers not 
only found 700 pirates there upon his arrival327 but also ran into trouble as many of the 
inhabitants were more sympathetic to the pirates than o the British government.328  
However, he was able to clean up the colony and scatter the pirates within a year by 
taking responsibility not only for New Providence but also for the many small islands and 
coves that pirates had previously found to be safe h v ns.329 
Colonial charters, a relic of the previous era which gave permission to found a 
colony under the power of the crown, were threatened or even revoked if policy was not 
adhered to.  This is essentially what happened in the Bahamas as the lords proprietor of 
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the island forfeited their claim because they “had not 20 years then past [passed] taken 
any care for the security of the said islands”.330  Defeating piracy meant more than 
applying force and a stern judicial hand.  It meant giving the pirate nowhere to go.  All 
British colonies had some form of governor and government that was accountable to 
Britain for a growing set of standard policies toward pirates.  The governor of New York 
could no longer be friendly to pirates as the governor of Virginia attempted to eradicate 
them.  The same thing held in French colonies in Caad  and the Caribbean and Spanish 
colonies as well.331  There were still, of course, largely ungoverned areas, but these areas 
became fewer and harder to live in as time went by.  The idea that a colony such as the 
Bahamas would be claimed by the British crown but left ungoverned because it did not 
provide any tangible economic benefit, would have se med strange in this new system 
even as it was reality a mere decade before.  While the Bahamas would have been 
defended if the French tried to claim it, but its lack of economic value meant that what 
happened on the island did not matter to the English crown. 
By the 18th century, ungoverned land meant pirates and pirates disrupted trade, 
the raison d’être of colonies and the ‘fiscal-military’ state.  If, as was becoming apparent, 
the sea could not be controlled directly in order to protect shipping lanes, the pirate could 
not be given a safe haven on land as a man cannot live entirely on the sea.  As it took 
more control over colonial governance and all colonial lands, the relationship between 
the sea and the state changed as well.  As Gabriel Kuhn has argued, policies against 
pirates turned the sea from a smooth space, i.e. open, contested, and ungovernable, to a 
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striated space, i.e. one that is ordered, regulated, nd controlled.332  In order for the sea to 
be controlled by the state and in order for it to be safe for trade, the state had to control 
the land that surrounds it.  The pirates of the golden age drove this lesson home for those 
conducting colonial policy.  Essentially, the Atlantic became a ‘European lake’. 
The third prong in this ‘war on piracy’ was a propaganda campaign leveled 
against pirates in which they were depicted as the low st sort of human.  We have already 
looked at the rhetoric used, but in this case the rhetorical campaign against piracy held 
particular importance as it took place in the colonies where, in the 17th and early 18th 
centuries, pirates were not recognized as evil or menacing.  In fact, pirates became 
engines of economic well-being in the colonies as they provided cheap goods and/or 
treasure for the colonial economy.  In previous deca s, they even acted as protection 
against enemy navies.  Merchants and inhabitants of the ports in these colonies had a 
rather favorable view of pirates.  Since piracy existed in some measure because it had 
access to markets, that access had to be closed.333  This was done partly by taking control 
of colonial policy. 
Another major piece of this strategy was portraying pirates as being “instigated by 
the devil”.  It was remarked of Ned Low’s crew that they were “Devils in 
carnate…[providing] the liveliest picture of Hell”.  In a Christian society, this was meant 
to taint pirate goods and turn public opinion.  Of course, it must be said that the pirates 
themselves were complicit in this with Blackbeard claiming that he “came from Hell”.334  
Not only did they embrace their image as hell-bound demons, but as we get closer to the 
end of the golden age, ever desperate pirate captains began to attack colonial ports and 
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moved away from their egalitarian, progressive views, inching ever closer to the savages 
they were portrayed to be.335  This made the British propaganda campaign much easier. 
The importance of this campaign is not necessarily its effectiveness, which may 
be debatable.  The campaign itself  created the illusion that colonists were not living 
‘beyond the line’ but were instead British subjects or citizens.  Their colonies were part 
of Britain, not merely its holdings.  While they did not hold the same rights as those 
living in Britain, as would become apparent a half century later,336 they were considered 
domestic inhabitants nonetheless.  The campaign itself did not change this, but its 
presence demonstrates that the colonies needed to be under the control of the state in 
order for piracy to be defeated.  Of course, piracy itself did not end at this time.  There 
were intermittent attacks throughout the 18th century but these pirates were cast as 
criminals, not as threats to the state, and were therefore legible to it.337  The golden age of 
piracy had ended and piracy in the Atlantic was not a major problem for European states 
until the turn of the 19th century and then for different reasons and with different 
consequences. 
Each of these actions is ‘creative’ in the sense that i  “brought something new into 
the world”.  They shattered existing practice and reconfigured the conceptual maps of 
those ruling the colonies.  Each also solved the problem of piracy as it related to the trade 
upon which the state and the economy were built.  This second claim is not to say that 
each one actually solved the problem, though they all helped.  Even more important, they 
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were viewed as having solved it and therefore each be ame a part of the new boundary 
that was drawn as a result of the ‘war on piracy’.  While they were undertaken and spread 
by the English state once they proved effective, thre is evidence here that many times 
these policies came from colonial requests or innovati n.  Each of these two mechanisms 
happened simultaneously: creative action was taken with a view to solve a problem in 
conjunction with the process of ‘shattering’ outlined above, resulting in the drawing of a 
new boundary of sovereign authority.  
“The absence of sovereignty over the oceans is not a imeless feature” 
Golden age piracy proved to be a big problem to 18th century colonial states.  It 
challenged the idea of property that underpinned th mercantilist trading system, it 
directly affected the coffers of colonial states, and it challenged the idea that the state 
itself could provide security to those it claimed to rule.  It grew out of the intersection of 
the rise of mercantilist trade, the lagging of governance structures to deal effectively with 
this emergence, and the practices of warfare and colonial rule during that period.  Golden 
age pirates rebelled not just against England or the awful conditions on 18th century 
merchant and naval ships moving across the Atlantic but also against the entire edifice of 
society and the states that perpetuated it.  Golden ag  pirates were rebelling against state 
rule as it was carried out in the early 18th century, while using ‘the line’, and by extension 
the practice of colonial governance, against the state.  As a result of having this boundary 
‘shattered’, the state needed to draw new boundaries of sovereign authority.  In this case, 
England specifically did so by moving the lines that divide the international from the 
domestic.  This happened by taking greater control of colonies and the inhabitants 




of the English court system into the colonies effectiv ly meant that the colonies were 
domestic arenas where previously they had been international holdings of the crown. 
This should not necessarily be seen as the state merely taking more control, but 
instead as an ‘authority swap’.  Colonies made decisions with the force of English law 
but attempted control of sea lanes began to weaken.  As Thomson argues, “the absence of 
sovereignty over the oceans is not a timeless featur  of the international system but 
something that emerged in the course of the eighteenth century”.338  Change, not control, 
is the operative word.  States changed how they drew an important boundary of sovereign 
authority; they exchanged attempted control over th sea for control of land in order to 
make the sea safe for trade.  That said, attempts to claim jurisdiction over the oceans did 
not cease untilsometime in the 19th century.339  What did change is that attempts to 
directly protect sea lanes with naval power came to an end while attempts to protect 
colonies began. 
The consequences of this new line were numerous.  The world was once again 
safe for Atlantic trade, which grew in leaps and bounds starting around 1730.  Not only 
did trade bloom once again in its aftermath, but this episode was crucial in the 
development, if not the creation, of a tight-knit “Atlantic World”.  The concept of such a 
world is one that has come into vogue in the historiography produced in the last few 
decades.340  Implicit in this is the contention that the Atlantic became a part of Europe but 
Asia and the Pacific did not.  Studies have proliferat d which look not just at the French 
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Colonial Economy or the British Empire, but also at the Atlantic Economy or the politics 
of the Atlantic as a whole.  There is also a plethora of evidence of a society developing in 
this geographic space, such as the standardization of goods between French and English 
trading cities and the inter-imperial relations necessary to suppress slave revolts.341  For 
our purposes, the important point is that the creation of a political “Atlantic” happened at 
some point in the late 17th and/or early 18th centuries.  I argue that piracy played a vital 
role in this process by forcing states to cooperate and take greater control of colonial 
governance and policy.  However, there is not a singular causal arrow.  Inevitably other 
forces, ranging from the growth of trade to political developments in the colonies 
themselves, played important roles that should not be forgotten or understated; the 
“Atlantic World” is about more than tying colonies closer to states, but when we think of 
the “Atlantic World” as we see its development owes quite a bit to the consequences of 
combating piracy in the early 18th century. 
The consequences of this new boundary reverberated els where as well.  For 
instance, Rodney Bruce Hall’s arguments about the “territorial sovereign identity” of 18th 
century European states is based in part on the mercantilist colonial governance solidified 
with the defeat of piracy.342  In his seminal, The Sinews of Power, historian John Brewer 
outlines how colonial trade was a major part of Britain’s rise to power in the 18th 
century.343  The colony and its trade were meant to enrich the metropole and the golden 
age of piracy meant that the best way to do this wa to make it part of the domestic 
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sphere.  Many within both history344 and IR345 recognize this connection between trade, 
imperialism, warfare, and the state in the 18th century.  These connections even had 
implications to states that were not involved in the Atlantic.  For instance, Britain’s vast 
trade surpluses and sound fiscal position, dependent in part on its successful Atlantic 
trade, allowed it to lend money to Prussia, a land-locked state.  This money was integral 
to Frederick the Great’s military successes against Au ria and France on the continent, 
especially during the Seven Years War.  Patterns of mercantilist trade and colonial 
governance were deeply tied into the broader patterns of international politics that 
characterized the 18th century and those patterns of trade were shaped in part by the war 
against piracy. 
Similarly, while war in the colonies usually followed war on the continent, the 
opposite was not the case before this period.  The idea of ‘no peace beyond the line’ no 
longer held in the Atlantic.  Mercantilist trade was  large part of the statecraft of this 
period and the world was now made safer for trade to flourish.  In addition, no longer 
could a skirmish in the colonies stay there.  Colonial conflict could lead a state into war 
in Europe, as was the case with English entry into the War of Austrian Succession, 
known in England as the War of Jenkins’ Ear, in the 1740s.  We also see a difference in 
how colonies were treated in peace treaties before and after this period.  For much of the 
seventeenth century, warfare at sea was “essentially a contest about maritime lines of 
communication”.346  This is reflected in the Treaty of Utrecht, signed in 1714 two years 
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before the peak of piracy’s golden age.  England gained control of a single port, Gibraltar 
and won the asiento, a series of trading rights, i.e. the use of sea lanes, in Spanish 
colonies.347  However, the War of Jenkins’ Ear (1739-1748) was fought over control of 
territory in Spanish colonies and England won great t rritorial concessions as the victor 
of the Seven Years’ War in 1763.  Colonial territory had become prized during this 
period and the campaign against piracy played a role in this development because it drove 
home the importance of controlling land in order to control the sea.348 
Conclusion 
In the late 17th and early 18th centuries, colonies were still ruled in a manner 
similar to that of a century before.  In the introduction of this chapter I talked about six 
different practices that together drew ‘the line’ that separated Europe from the colonies.  
They were 1) direct protection of ships on trading lanes claimed by a state, 2) warfare 
over trading lanes, 3) the use of privateers during nominal times of ‘peace’ in Europe, 4) 
economic patterns of extraction, 5) the enforcement of ‘no peace beyond the line’, and 6) 
low levels of involvement in colonial governance.  Of these six, two were already 
beginning to falter.  While peacetime privateering was used in the name of fighting 
piracy, it only contributed to the problem and had not been a common practice since the 
late 17th century.  Similarly, economic patterns of extraction had slowly been replaced by 
the triangular trade over the latter half of the 17th century.  These two changes in 
conjunction with the other four practices above created the space for piracy to flourish. 
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Pirates had found a way to exploit these circumstances, attacking trade and 
making themselves illegible, effectively ‘shattering’ the practice of colonial rule, by 
attacking shipping, challenging state authority andthreatening to blow up the entire 
colonial economic system.  It should be reiterated, however, that many pirates were 
merely doing the same thing that they had been doing f r decades; it was the context and 
the narratives that changed.  In turn, this challenged each of the other four practices and 
resulted in the need to redraw the international/domestic boundary.  State attempts to 
control the sea became less common.  It soon became obvious that the way to protect 
shipping was not to directly protect ships and trading lanes but instead to control land, to 
make sure that pirates, should they arise, had no place to go with their booty.  This gave 
less of an incentive to fight wars over trading lanes and indeed the wars that post-date the 
golden age of piracy were over land instead of trading rights. 
As part of this process, the colonial was brought into the domestic sphere.  War in 
the colonies meant war in Europe.  No longer could something like peacetime privateer 
attacks be considered as anything other than one stat  attacking another.  The colonies 
were a part of the state and as a consequence needed to b  governed directly as such.  
Each of the six practices were shattered and needed to be replaced.  The golden age of 
piracy cemented two already ongoing processes: the use of peacetime privateering 
stopped and mercantilist trade dominated the rest of the century.  However, it is directly 
responsible for other changes. 
Colonial states developed new practices to solve the concrete problem of golden 
age piracy by taking control of colonial policy and coordinating between colonies and 




courts, greater involvement in colonial governance, and an anti-piracy propaganda 
campaign targeting colonists – demonstrated that the colonies had been brought into the 
domestic and the realization that the sea was made safest for trade through controlling the 
land that surrounds it.  Attempts to control parts of the sea began to wane during this 
period even as the sea became a place where state inter sts ruled.  This, of course, does 
not mean that the protection of ships, for instance, disappeared; only that it was no longer 
an unreflexive practice, replaced by attempts to control land. 
As a consequence, the international/domestic boundary had been moved.  There 
was still a line since the distinction between ‘inter ational’ and ‘domestic’ did not 
disappear, but a phrase like ‘no peace beyond the line’ became nonsensical in this new 
configuration.  The golden age of piracy acted as asite whereby states redrew the 
boundaries of sovereign authority, developing new practices and new conceptions of the 
international and the domestic – and citizen and alien – because the old conceptions were 
shattered.  The state had faced a crisis brought on by a major episode of transnational 
violence and re-inscribed itself as the dominant sea of political power by coming up with 



















‘Propaganda of the Deed’, Passports, and Boundaries  
in Europe at the turn of the 20th century 
 
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how an episode of revisionist violence, 
golden age piracy, challenged the state and shattered boundary producing practices.  
Using the tools developed in Chapters 2 and 3, we can see that the golden age pirates 
were made illegible by contemporary boundaries, shattering practice and forcing the state 
to come up with a creative solution to draw a new boundary and re-inscribe the state.  
This chapter attempts to use those same tools in another case, that of the propagandists at 
the turn of the 20th century in Europe.  The anarchists of the turn of the 20th century 
created a crisis for state leaders through a series of a sassinations and public bombings, 
what they called ‘propaganda of the deed’.  They were a transnational community who 
blamed the ills of society on government and the concentration of power and property. 
Like golden age piracy, propagandist violence forced states to redraw conceptual 
boundaries.  There were two relevant boundaries that made anarchist violence illegible to 
states.  First, the public/private boundary was drawn in such a way that anarchist ideas 
were not allowed into the public sphere and were the subject of a brutal repression 
campaign.  This boundary was supported by the following practices, 1) use of show trials 
and public executions to demonstrate state power and 2) a focus – driven by conservative 
nationalism – on ideas, as opposed to actions, as the threat and corresponding attempts to 
squash them out through coercion.  Those states which proved successful in the struggle 
managed to redraw the public/private boundary in order to open political space to allow 




syndicalism and the labor movement.  This new boundary cut off the lifeblood of 
anarchist recruiting by restraining the state from outright repression. 
The other important boundary for this case was an international/domestic 
boundary that allowed for the free movement of peopl  and goods across borders 
untracked.  Boundary was produced by two practices, 1) an ideal of free, open movement 
of people and goods exemplified in few restrictions to what could cross borders, 
including the abolishing of passports in the first half of the century, and 2) policies on 
political exiles that resulted in a system where some states (Italy, Spain, Russia being the 
best examples) simply tried to kick exiles out of their countries with little care where they 
happened to go while others (England, Switzerland) gave a home to these exiles.  In 
response, states altered extradition practices.  New m thods of policing presaged a 
growth in surveillance which culminated in large databases on criminals and citizens.  
This led to the creation of passports and greater control of who and what crossed borders.  
It was not the borders themselves that changed but their meaning via the practices that 
drew them.  Previous boundaries restricted the moveent of ideas but allowed the 
movement of people.  The new boundaries would do the opposite.  This is an authority 
swap that resulted in the drawing of new boundaries that would define the nation-state of 
the 20th century. 
“Believing in a better future” 
Those I call ‘propagandists’349 were usually lone wolf actors.  Most of those who 
used bombs, pistols, and knives to attack leaders, public buildings, and monuments were 
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not a part of some centralized network that took order from a particular node.  The 
attacks were not planned centrally nor were they necessarily a part of a larger conspiracy 
against the state and society.  However, these men and their actions were connected by a 
set of philosophical ideas and an epistemic community that transcended borders.  There 
were a number of anarchist newspapers and pamphlets, and anarchist meetings treated the 
movement not as a disjointed series of local meetings but as part of a larger, international 
movement.  Attacks in Spain or France were cheered at the Club Autonomie in London; 
attacks in Italy fueled attacks in the United States.  Accumulated knowledge on how to 
make bombs and evade capture was passed through these meetings, papers, and 
pamphlets.  In this sense, they were truly transnatio l actors even if those committing 
the acts of violence were often disconnected and highly local.  Their transnational 
character was not necessarily in the connections between actors (though this was also 
present) but in common affinities and ideas. 
Unlike the pirates of the golden age, propagandists came from a lineage with a 
well-defined and fertile political philosophy challenging the state.  The godfather of 
anarchist thought was Pierre Joseph Proudhon350  Much like his socialist and communist 
contemporaries, Proudhon focused on the effects of property on man and society.  In his 
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seminal What is Property? Proudhon claims that property is theft.  He argues that even if 
we agree with those like John Locke that a man is etitl d to the fruits of his labor this 
right is not as universal as it may seem.  According to Proudhon, a man who grows corn 
is entitled to that corn but this does not entitle him to the land that the corn is grown on.  
Simply because labor gives us the right to its fruits does not mean that we own the parts 
of those fruits given to us by god.  The idea of property so common in liberal philosophy 
is at fault for the inequality and squalor that characterize modern society.  However, 
where Proudhon broke from other political philosophers on the left such as Jean Jacques 
Rousseau and Karl Marx, was his belief that strong centralized authority was not the 
answer.  It was this authority that enshrined and protected private property and therefore 
was the cause of society’s ills.  As Emile Henry would remark at his trial, “socialism 
changes nothing about the current order.  It maintains the authoritarian principal, and this 
principal…is only an old leftover of faith in a superior power”.351 
Proudhon’s thought, like that of Karl Marx, gained traction in the mid to late 19th 
century as the process of industrialization created large disparities in wealth and 
opportunity across Europe.  This created an underclass, argely hidden from public view, 
which was ripe for revolutionary zeal, what came to be known as the ‘social’ or ‘labor’ 
question.  The first hints of this discontent came in 1871 when members of the Parisian 
working class took control of the capital for three months until the state was able to 
muster enough troops from the countryside to brutally crush the rebellion.  The 
Commune, as it became known, turned out to be a rallying cry among those with 
revolutionary sentiments.  To many, both inside andoutside the movement, revolution 
                                                           




seemed almost inevitable on the current trajectory.  French novelist Emile Zola, 
sympathetic to the revolutionary cause, captured this sentiment in the musing of Madame 
Hennebau, the manager’s wife in his novel G rminal.  Upon watching a march of striking 
miners, Madame Hennebau muses that she saw “the red vision of revolution that on some 
somber evening at the end of the century would carry everything away.  Yes, on that 
evening the people, unbridled at last, they would make the blood of the middle class 
flow…” 352  The era was one ripe for revolutionary zeal, creating a broader fear of the 
lower classes among some sections of the bourgeoisie. 
The beginnings of the anarchist revolutionary movement gave it three touchstone 
moments.  Two of these moments, the Paris Commune mentioned above and the 1886 
Haymarket riots in Chicago, served as further evidence of the crushing power of the 
bourgeois state.  The third, the assassination, after many attempts, of Russian Tsar 
Alexander II in 1881, galvanized the movement with the hope of success.  It is worth 
going over these last two events in order to give us a deeper understanding of the 
movement’s psyche and a selection of its adherents’ subsequent turn toward violence.   
On May 3, 1886 police fired out onto a crowd of strike s at the McCormick Reaper 
Works.  This led to a protest the next evening in Haymarket Square in Chicago led by the 
city’s anarchist contingent.  As the last speaker wrapped up his address, a bomb was 
thrown into the crowd injuring 67 policemen and killing eight of them.  Subsequently a 
group of anarchists, none of whom threw the bomb, were arrested and tried for the 
murder of those eight policemen.  They were convicted and sentenced to death.  Three 
had sentences commuted and were released after long prison stretches, one committed 
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suicide in his cell and four were hanged.  The trial, which Paul Avrich called “one of the 
most unjust in the annals of American Jurisprudence”,  353 became a touchstone.  The 
accused loudly proclaimed that they were on trial not for murder but instead for 
“believing in a better future”.354  Since the bomb-thrower was never actually found, many 
anarchists came to believe that it was the police themselves who threw the bomb in an 
attempt to crack down on the city’s burgeoning anarchist movement.  The authorities saw 
this as justice.  As J. Hayes Ladler, the British consul to Chicago, wrote, “The verdict has 
brought relief to every class of society, anarchists now know that they cannot push their 
liberty to abuse”.355 Of course, ‘every class of society’ did not include that from which 
the anarchists came.  Haymarket became, like the Commune before it, a touchstone, a 
symbol of the anarchist struggle against bourgeois s ciety. 
While Haymarket became a rallying cry, the assassintio  of Alexander II gave 
the anarchist community hope.  Anarchism first took h ld not in the industrialized west 
and north of Europe but instead in the largely agrarian society of Russia.  Sergei Nychaev 
developed a group called Norodnaya Volya, or The People’s Will.356  It was the People’s 
Will, not the communists, who were at the forefront f Russia’s revolutionary movement 
in the middle to late 19th century.  A chief goal of the group was the assassin tion of Tsar 
Alexander II, ironically the man responsible for freeing Russia’s serfs.  After a number of 
failed attempts, three young men associated with The People’s Will – Nikolai Rysakov, 
Ignaty Grinevitsky, and Ivan Emelyanov – successfully did so in 1881.  This not only 
sent a shockwave around Europe but also signaled to the broader anarchist community 
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that action could be taken after the failure of the Commune.  That this ray of light was 
coming from the oppressive regime in Russia made it all the sweeter.  While many were 
still more in favor of peasant revolts and strikes, the assassination of Alexander gave 
many an opportunity to talk about the inevitable revolution.  This was especially 
important since previous attempts at regicide had failed not only in Russia but also in 
Germany, Italy, and Spain.357  Following the attack, Russia began to hunt the anarchist 
threat down with vigor, expelling many from the country and into the greater European 
diaspora where they would first congregate in Switzerland and then London, creating the 
base of a broader movement. 
It was in this context that the revolutionary politics of Proudhon, Marx, and their 
myriad followers found a home.  However, this did not produce a united front.  The 
debate over hierarchy and the state in revolutionary politics created a rift in the leftist 
revolutionary movement that reached a head in the labor/revolutionary internationals of 
the 1870s and 1880s with the marxist and other labor groups arguing for state control 
over property and the means of production and the anarchists, led by Proudhon’s Russian 
pupil and onetime mentor to Nychaev, Michel Bakunin, arguing that state control would 
lead to a dictatorship of the proletariat.  There cannot be freedom if there is hierarchy.  
The anarchists were therefore focused on a transnational rebellion against the state and 
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hierarchy as opposed to the socialists’ national solution.358  The two parties ended up 
going their separate ways, as much rivals as comrades.359 
That said, while the marxist had a plan to organize the proletariat, the anarchist, 
since he tended to shun organization, had none.360  The question for the anarchist became, 
‘how does one start a revolution if one is against hierarchical organization?’.  Marxists 
could argue that industrialization was a necessary component of the ‘movement of 
history’ toward the rule of the proletariat.  They could assemble and create organizations 
meant to bring about the revolution.  The anarchists could not.  They were forced to 
develop a theory whereby “the emancipation of the workers will be made by the workers 
themselves”361 and the theorist or activist could only attempt to pr voke this spontaneous 
act.  Thus the idea of ‘propaganda of the deed’ was developed by thinkers such as Elisee 
Reclus, Errico Malatesta, and Piotr Kropotkin – a former Russian aristocrat turned exiled 
revolutionary who was largely seen as Bakunin’s successor as chief intellectual of the 
movement362 – and put into practice in Italy in the 1870s and 1880s.  Since anarchists 
tended to believe that human nature was good and that their revolution and ideal society 
were backed up by good science, they began to hold t e belief that the masses would 
revolt if they were made aware of the situation andthe alternatives.  While propaganda of 
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the word could be useful, propaganda of the deed would bring the attention of many 
people to the anarchist cause in a short amount of time and therefore help to bring about 
spontaneous revolution.  However, as Marie Fleming remarks, “The irony of the situation 
is that while the theoreticians of modern anarchism were moving in the direction of 
accepting propaganda of the deed, in order, thereby to increase the possibilities for 
‘anarchist’ action by the masses, they [the intellectuals coming to this conclusion] were 
reducing the importance and scope of their own activities”.363 
In its earliest incarnation, propaganda of the deed was thought to be best carried 
out by peasant revolts and labor strikes.  But the men who would use dynamite and 
assassination to strike fear across Europe and the ‘civilized’ world in the quarter century 
prior to the Great War were a derivation of this idea.  A bomb could enlighten the people 
to the revolutionary fight, tell them who the enemy was, who was fighting on their side 
and, ultimately, cause them to rise up in rebellion and usher in the anarchist utopia.  In 
many ways this created a tactical split within the anarchist community that would prove 
the downfall of the propagandists.  On the one hand there were the intellectuals and 
organizers, men like Kropotkin, Malatesta, and Reclus.  On the other were the lone men 
who read these works and were inspired to use whatever violent means they could to 
attack those they believed were responsible for thei position in life.  These two groups 
had very little official contact and the former would end up repudiating the latter.  Of 
course, this was not known to authorities or the general public who saw the anarchist 
                                                           





movement as a vast conspiracy meant to bring about the end of civilization, a myth the 
press, the secret police, and the anarchists themselves were all too happy to perpetuate.364 
“The anarchist assassin…murders simply at haphazard”  
Unlike the case of golden age piracy where the focus was on a single boundary, 
‘the line’, this case includes challenges to two different boundaries, connected as a 
consequence of events.  The first boundary was manifest in what public speech the state 
did and did not allow.  In the wake of the French Revolution, states bought into a 
conservative nationalism which would attempt to capture the power of nationalism while 
preserving a rights structure similar to the pre-revolutionary days.  While 1894 did not 
look like 1820 in this regard, the idea of an open ublic sphere and state involvement in 
the day to day lives of its people was still not inscribed in the habitus of state leaders.  
The second boundary was one of open borders where t movement of people and goods 
was part and parcel of everyday life.  For the most par , borders between states were 
between government and realms of rule.  While state tt mpted to take advantage of 
nationalism in the 19th century, many did not concern themselves with the everyday lives 
of their citizens.  They were not tracked nor were they protected in ways that became 
common in the 20th century.  Above, I list four pertinent practices: 1) public trials and 
executions, 2) attempts to control ideas based on a conservative nationalism, 3) 
unrestricted movement of goods and peoples, and 4) uneven policies dealing with 
political exiles.  This section will briefly talk about these practices and the boundaries 
they created and how they played a large part in the rise and sustaining of anarchist 
violence roughly between the years 1880-1910. 
                                                           




To the ruling classes, authority was thought to be a part of human nature and the 
state provided it, whether through custom or ‘merit’.365  Those who went against this 
authority were termed the ‘enemies of humanity’.366  However, the process of getting rid 
of such groups ‘root and branch’ faced challenges as the increasingly prevalent norms of 
legal process and expanded media reach made this problematic.  One consequence of this 
insistence on controlling the ideas allowed in public political discourse was an inability to 
discern the ideas from the actions that may or may not have resulted from them.  
Therefore, anarchy became the crime and a ‘war on anarchy’ was all but declared in 
name similar to the ‘war on terror’ that would follow a century later.  As US President 
Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed, “Anarchy is a crime against the whole human race”.367  
The target is not the assassin, the bomb thrower, or the propagandist, but anarchy, the set 
of ideas that argued against hierarchy.  Under current practice, this was something the 
state was to control.  In addition, propagandist activity was made illegible by current 
boundaries.  One observer remarked that: 
Every other class of political assassin has at least some definite, tangible object in view.  
He commits murder because he seeks to remove some particular ruler, or a member of 
some particular governing party or body.  The anarchist assassin, however, murders 
simply at haphazard…They exploded bombs in a theatre in Barcelona which was filled 
with innocent men, women, and children, none of whom were connected with the 
government.368 
 
Here, we can see that the anarchist’s justification for violence, the attempt to bring about 
an anarchist utopia, was seen as nonsensical in a world dominated by the states.  
Narratives of entrant violence are easily understood while illegibility is part and parcel of 
a narrative of revisionist violence.  Anarchist violence was illegible to those working with 
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the conceptual maps of the late 19th century.  This sentiment is echoed elsewhere as well. 
For instance, a briefing on the extradition of the propagandist Theodule Meunier from 
England to France claimed that anarchists are not interested in “a new form of 
government, but general destruction”.369 
State attempts to control the public sphere and who could and could not enter into 
it became increasingly unsuccessful as the material and conceptual tools needed to enter 
it became more accessible.  This put immense pressure on the current boundary between 
public and private.  Industrialization had brought with it the technology, embraced by the 
anarchists of all stripes,370 not only to make weapons such as dynamite, but also to 
increase the movement of peoples, goods and ideas brought about by the increased reach 
and freedom of a growing media.  This meant that a poor man in Italy could hear news of 
the execution of a French anarchist and decide to go t  France in order to exact revenge.  
A poor Polish immigrant in the US could hear of thereatment of an American-born 
Italian anarchist and decide to assassinate President William McKinley.  Industrialization 
also brought about the vast economic inequalities and urban poverty that led many young 
men to take up violence.  Attempts to control the public sphere in the manner that had 
been possible in previous decades were no longer possible in an era of industrialization.  
While state practices had yet to adapt, propagandists could take advantage in order to 
attack the state.  Chaliand and Blin sum up the situation nicely, “The very gradual 
emergence of democratic freedoms allowed malcontents o broadcast their demands on a 
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scale that had previously been unthinkable.  Yet, th  winds of freedom blew 
weakly…thus legitimizing such protest movements”.371 
In addition, there was little control over the movement of people across borders.  
This may seem like the lack of a boundary but the boundary in this instance deals with 
what is considered international and what is considere  domestic, not how strong borders 
are.  While the ideal of borders creating set pieces of land that were theoretically free 
from outside influence had been centuries old by this time, in practice the control of 
everything and everyone that crosses those borders, Kra ner’s ‘interdependence 
sovereignty’,372 had yet to be realized.  In late 19th century Europe “borders were not hard 
to cross, legal agreements between states in matters such as extradition were few, and 
communications between police departments were still rudimentary”.373  Part of this was 
a conception of what did and did not matter to the state.  At the risk of painting with too 
broad a brush, the European state of the 18th century had not been legitimated through its 
ability to protect those living within its borders and therefore was not very concerned 
with the lives and doings of its citizenry, at least not in the manner that we think of it in 
the early 21st century.  Its major focus was on the upper classes and those who could play 
the game of high politics.  As nationalism became a greater force in European politics, 
this changed.  The nationalism of the 19th century was a reaction to the French 
Revolution and the power Napoleon tapped into and was accordingly fashioned in a 
conservative manner whereby the nation was utilized by the state.374  Here, the citizenry 
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were tools for state leaders to use for their benefit, largely in creating standing armies, 
enhancing national economies, and staffing colonial governments. 
But this view of the nation as something to be used by the state also carried with it 
a certain level of apathy towards what these people did – thus the growing level of 
inequality and urban squalor – and where they went.  For instance, for much of the 19th 
century there were no passports and people could move rather freely across Europe 
without harassment or questioning.375  As the Spanish Duke of Arcos complained, “the 
anarchist agitator who is driven out of one country by the authorities finds lodgment in 
another”.376  The only regular level of control given over the movement of people was in 
the realm of political exiles, where the exile was b nished from the home state.  A 
number of states, notably England and Switzerland,377 became places of political shelter 
for exiles and there was no standard practice of extraditing or cataloguing them.  Such a 
lax system of border control was useful in facilitating the movement of goods and money 
when the doings of common people were of no great concern to the state, but it certainly 
benefitted the anarchist.  Even in the globalized era of the 21st century, open borders are 
still accompanied by a passport system, codified practices regarding political exiles, and 
routine checks of passing goods.  In many ways borders are much less porous today than 
they were in the late 19th century. 
When combined with the attempt to control the political discourse and use rough 
police tactics and sham trials,378 open, porous borders seem unworkable.  If people and 
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ideas can move all over Europe, it is hard to control what is said, shown, and thought 
within a contained political space.  While oppression of all types was an issue, police 
brutality became public knowledge.  When Spanish brutality in the Montjuic prisons 
could lead to anarchist bombings in France and rallies in London, there was a problem for 
those attempting to maintain order using these methods.  Current boundaries not only 
provided beneficial working conditions for propagandists but also rendered them illegible 
to the states opposing them.  The process of ‘shattering’ began as what previously had 
been habitual actions for state leaders needed to be rethought and conceptual borders of 
sovereign authority redrawn. 
“Satan has made himself a dynamiter”  
In the thirty-five years prior to the First World War, Europe was beset by a series 
of bomb attacks and assassinations by those labeled ‘anarchists’.379  Between1898 and 
1901 four heads of state were killed.380  Russia experienced the killing of a Tsar in 1881 
after many failed attempts and the killing of many prominent officials throughout the 
period.381  There were three attempts on the life of the Kaiser, the French President was 
assassinated in 1894 and the Spanish Prime Minister in 1906.  In 1900 there were 
unsuccessful attempts to assassinate the Prince of Wales in Brussels and the Persian Shah 
in Paris.382  Italy experienced numerous peasant revolts led by anarchists and the 
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assassination of King Umberto.383  The period also saw numerous attacks in landmarks, 
public cafes, opera houses, and apartment buildings frequented by the bourgeoisie.  There 
were also periods whereby attacks were concentrated in a single country or city over a 
short period of time, creating a sense of terror abve and beyond any number of 
explosions or casualties.  For instance, there were11 bomb explosions in Paris between 
the years 1892 and 1894.384  Similar patterns developed in Spain around the same time.  
The violence was not limited only to Europe, either.  One attempt on the Kaiser was 
undertaken while he was in Cairo.  In addition to Haymarket, the US experienced the 
attempted assassination of Carnegie Steel’s Henry Clay Frick by a man named Alexander 
Berkman, and Leon Czoglosz’ assassination of President McKinley.385  Argentina became 
a breeding ground for both wayward anarchist intellectuals and propagandists of the deed 
such as the infamous French propagandist August Vaillant while action was also reputed 
to have occurred in India and the Phillipines as well.386 
Of course, as outlined in Chapter 3, the number of attacks and the danger they 
posed are at best only a part of the story.  While anarchists attacked important targets 
successfully and caused damage, much of their threat also emanated from the narratives 
that surrounded them.  The anarchist came to be considered the most devious of criminals 
due to the surprising nature of their attacks, which only added to the sense of terror they 
created.  They could be hiding anywhere, they could be anyone.  They could be under the 
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bench of a carriage waiting to strike or sipping coffee at a café that was about to explode.  
They had no central figure and their dealings were conducted outside of the public eye.  
A January 1894 column by Jose Echegaray in the Spanish Periodical La Lectura sums up 
the mood: 
Explosives are on the order of the day in the Chambers [of parliament],in the disorder of 
the night in the theaters; they hang as a menace over the entire bourgeoisie, without 
respecting the poor worker if they encounter him in passing, and there is no person who 
does not worry about dynamite, nitroglycerine, panclastinas, and detonators...  Modern 
explosives have come to upset everything: ideas and property and social relations. 
 
The lowliest wretch in the worst social rubbish heap [pudridero social] holds a threat 
over the entire society, like a horde of barbarians showing their monstrous heads over the 
frontier.  The result is that the least becomes the first, if not by power, by terror...  Satan 
has made himself a dynamiter and tries to be equal with God, and threatens his shadow 
[on earth].387 
 
There are two things to keep in mind here.  First, the anarchists are said to be against 
“ideas and property and social relations”.  This demonstrates some of the illegibility 
fostered by current boundaries, but it also demonstrates a conscious attempt by those 
countering propaganda of the deed to, accurately as it turns out, paint it in opposition to 
society and the state.  Here we can see how they became ‘enemies of all humanity’, or as 
Echegaray suggests: ‘barbarians’, ‘monstrous’, and ‘Satan’.  The anarchist was usually 
denounced in the strongest way possible as having ‘inhuman designs’.388  For instance, 
Johann Most was denounced as a “malicious and evil disposed person and unlawfully, 
maliciously, and wickedly contriving, intending, and attempting in defiance of all 
principles of morality and good government to justify the crimes of assassination and 
murder” at his trial for incitement in London in 1881.389  Given this rhetoric, Roosevelt’s 
declaration that anarchy was the greatest threat of the age was not out of place. 
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Second, the manner of the act was viewed as cowardly.  They were the ‘lowliest 
wretch of the worst social rubbish heap’.  This created a deeper sense of crisis.  One 
German correspondent claimed that “the anarchist elem nt is so mobile that even if a plot 
were destroyed today, tomorrow another one would be formed”.390  Propagandist actions, 
their transnational character, and the level of secrecy they were able to keep led to 
numerous claims of an international conspiracy against the pillars of society.  
Consequently, every threat was taken seriously.  One instance demonstrates this very 
well.  During a trial for anarchists arrested in England in connection with a plot in 
Walsall near Birmingham in 1892, a telegram of support was sent to the defendants from 
the “United Anarchists Groups, London”.391  The phrase itself caused a panic and the 
belief that there were many attacks on the horizon fr m these ‘united groups’.  If the 
anarchists are united who knows where they will attack next!  However, it appears that 
the letter was sent not by any particular group but instead by a single man, Thomas 
Cantwell, editor in chief of the Commonweal newspaper.392  The whole panic was fueled 
not by good intelligence but instead by a prior belief in a large conspiracy that made the 
use of the term “United Anarchist Groups, London” a threatening one.393 
It did not help matters that many combating propaganda of the deed had every 
interest in exaggerating the threat.  A largely false idea took hold that the anarchists were 
part of a major international conspiracy.  Conspiracy theories helped the secret police 
forces arrayed against propagandism receive more funds and be allowed more leeway 
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when working.  These forces called all attacks ‘anarchist’ even if the group undertaking 
them identified themselves otherwise and they even perpetrated some attacks as a way to 
either capture anarchists and/or exaggerate the threat to gain more favor with home 
governments.  Historian Alex Butterworth has even go e so far as to trace the origins of 
the Protocols of the Elders of Zion to attempts to tag this conspiracy onto Europe’s 
Jewish population.394 
Similarly, the media were all too willing to trump u  any possible anarchist 
threats in a bid to sell more papers.  Anarchist attacks, trials, and plots were front page 
news and took up a lot of column space.  The Evening News made claims that 8,000 
anarchists were present in London in 1894.395  Of course, the anarchists themselves 
embraced this turn of events as a way to bring about the revolution.  Since propaganda of 
the deed was based on the theory that a series of acti ns (deeds) could bring about the 
revolution as more people came to realize how corret the anarchists were, they had no 
problem with their portrayal by the press and by those fighting them.396  Many 
propagandists viewed their trials more as opportunities to get their message to the people 
than as a way to save themselves.  One, who pleaded guilty of possession of explosives, 
freely ventured his own plot to blow up the London stock exchange and repeatedly yelled 
out, “I want to kill the capitalists”.397  Trials also became events that allowed for the 
spread of anarchist propaganda.  During the trial of Francois Claudius Koenigstein, alias 
Ravachol, his friends circulated a pamphlet that climed that the bourgeois make “of this 
man a monster in the eyes of satisfied egoists and the indifferent who do not want to see 
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that it is they who created him”.398  They also demonstrated a stance of defiance toward 
death similar to the golden age pirates.  Emile Henry claimed at his trial, “In no way do I 
seek to hide myself from the retaliation of the society that I attacked.”399  All of this 
played into the hands of the anarchist. 
So the threat propagandists posed to European state and society went above and 
beyond the number of bombs that were exploded or the heads of state laid to rest.  It 
touched a nerve that led to overstated, and possibly bogus, conspiracy theories that were 
fueled by the secret police, papers, and the anarchists t emselves.  In these conditions, the 
public remained scared, police forces received resources, and papers were sold.  While 
we risk oversimplifying when we claim that the nationalism of the 19th century was used 
for the purposes of the state, it does capture something important.  This was a period 
where man’s nature was popular explanation for most s cial phenomena: the criminal had 
a ‘nature’ and a ‘look’.400  Peoples were of ‘races’ and ‘scientific’ theories like eugenics 
became popular.401  Political elites believed that it was in the nature of the common man 
to follow their lead.  However, in order to convince the public that it was they who 
should lead, state leaders needed to provide protecti n.  Much of early nationalist rhetoric 
contrasted a particular nation to its supposed enemies (i.e. the French against the 
German), showing how the state was the nation’s repres ntative tasked with defending 
against the intrusions of the ‘other’ while simultaneously aggrandizing the nation.  
However, anarchists complicated this picture.  Not only did they present a clear 
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alternative version of social organization, but the usual tools for defeating security threats 
did not work.  Anarchists proved too decentralized, too hard to separate from the 
populace and too willing to sacrifice their own lives for the cause.  In addition, this 
failure to stop anarchist bombings and assassinations chipped away at the state’s claims 
as the provider of security.  Not only was anarchist rhetoric against the state and their 
attacks used as propaganda, but the very fact that here were attacks made the 
legitimating claims of the state less persuasive.  Why countenance hierarchy if it cannot 
protect you? 
Was the very existence of the state at risk?  Chances are that it probably was not.  
However, that the anarchists were viewed as its biggest threat during the period is enough 
to claim that they created a crisis.  As explained i  Chapter 3, threat is not something to 
be objectively determined but instead something that depends on the narratives used by 
both perpetrator and target.  Propaganda of the deed produced a crisis for the capitalist, 
monarchical, occasionally liberal order that ruled during this time.  Therefore it was a 
threat to the state, not merely a particular state or a particular regime.  This order was not 
to hold for long following the First World War402 in part due to the choices outlined 
below.  Those states that did not adapt, notably Spain and Russia, saw grave 
consequences for their ruling orders as anarchists played important, but ultimately 
unsuccessful, roles in the Russian Revolution and the Spanish Civil War. 
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What does the literature on the propagandists say about their eventual downfall?  
Propagandism is not a common topic in IR403 despite the parallels drawn, here and 
elsewhere, between the anarchists and Al Qaeda.404  Where we do see conjectures about 
the downfall of propaganda of the deed is in the histor ography.  Usually these are split 
into two groups: those that view the First World War as decisive405 and those that favor 
the changes undertaken by the anarchist movement its lf.406  Both are partially true.  
Many of the changes that happened, both to the statand international institutions, after 
the First World War did make it harder for propagandists to operate.  Even prior to the 
war, more anarchists began to reject propagandism and st rted to expend more energy 
into legitimate channels such as the labor movement. 
However both explanations leave out important details.  The propagandists’ end 
does not graft neatly onto the beginning and the end of the First World War.  Propaganda 
of the deed was certainly on the wane by 1910 in all but Spain and Russia and flared up 
again in Italy and the United States in the 1920s.407  Additionally, many of the changes 
that took place in the interwar years were already under way prior to the First World War 
or at least had their roots in pre-war policies to combat propaganda of the deed.  Many of 
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those claiming that the anarchist communities’ rejection of violence was decisive tend to 
ignore the changing incentive structures provided by the state that presage these 
decisions.  Anarchist intellectuals and organizers saw that propaganda of the deed was 
not “working”, granted, but many also saw more promising avenues in anarcho-
syndicalism at a time when such actions were just beginning to become legitimate.  This 
is compounded by the tendency for many of these scholars to downplay propaganda of 
the deed as a minor part of their preferred political movement. 
In contrast, the argument here is more in line with Jo n Merriman, Richard Bach 
Jensen, and to a lesser extent Barbara Tuchman, who see a relaxing of anti-labor laws and 
a begrudging acceptance of anarchism in the public sphere as important in its downfall.  
Both of these changes are a part of the new practices hat I argue redrew boundaries.  In 
addition, an international element predicated upon the closing of borders to free 
movement, facilitated by techniques of surveillance developed in response to propaganda 
of the deed, also reduced violence by anarchist groups.  Therefore, what we see is a 
change in the boundaries of sovereign authority, opening up the public sphere to anti-
state ideas while restricting the movement of peopl and goods across borders. 
These solutions took years to come to fruition.  The immediate response in most 
states was to step up police work and prosecutions, what Benedict Anderson has 
described as “a mass of draconian ‘anti-terrorist’ legislation, summary executions, and a 
sharp rise in torture”.408  While this did lead to the successful prosecution of the particular 
culprits, it did not prove effective in stemming the tide of attacks.  The ‘structure’ of the 
propagandists and their willingness to die for the cause made defeating them even harder 
                                                           




than previous threats.409  Violent acts were undertaken not by ‘official’ anarchist 
movements but instead by lone individuals sympathetic to the cause.  Therefore, 
prosecuting a movement leader such as Piotr Kropotkin r Errico Malatesta would prove 
unproductive as would the infiltration of anarchist groups in places like London and 
Patterson, NJ; direct connection between these groups and acts of violence were usually 
non-existent even for groups that outwardly supported propaganda of the deed.  Harsh 
punishments were also unproductive.  As detailed above, propagandist trials became 
media events and served as a platform for the accused to spread their gospel.  The 
damned became martyrs and heroes to a particular section of the public who felt crushed 
by the combination of industrialization and nation-building.  Each execution tended to be 
answered by a ‘revenge’ response by another propagandist.  Executions were an old 
practice which was not working, completing the process of ‘shattering’. 
The events in France between 1892 and 1894 serve as an example of this pattern.  
In 1891, violence between strikers at a mine in Clichy and authorities led to miner deaths 
and the arrest and torture of some strikers who identifi d as anarchists.  According to 
those in the movement, “police officers began to hi the prisoners, to whip them; they 
trampled them under their boots; they amused themselves by cutting them with sword 
slashes”.410  Those tortured would be sent to prison.  In respon e, Ravachol, who was a 
friend of one of these men, set off a series of boms in the residences of the convicting 
judge and attorney.  The bombs were not as successful as planned and no one was killed, 
but nonetheless it put the city of Paris on edge.  Ravachol was discovered and arrested 
after bragging about his deeds to a waiter while ordering dinner at the Café Very.  While 
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Ravachol’s bombs did not kill anyone, authorities soon discovered that he was wanted for 
a series of murders and burglaries across the country.  When confronted, Ravachol was 
defiant, stating that his aim was to avenge the jail d anarchists at Clichy.  “My object was 
to terrorize so as to force society to look attentively at those who suffer.”411  He argued 
that to rob the rich was the right of the poor as it was better to become a thief and 
murderer than to die of hunger.  Ravachol was sentenced to death for the murder of a 
hermit during a robbery a few years prior.  He was c rried to the guillotine proclaiming 
“Vive l’Anarchie!”. 
Ravachol became the patron saint of propaganda of the deed as the word 
ravacholisier, meaning ‘to wipe out an enemy’, became common anarchist lingo across 
Europe.412  Songs sung in anarchist pubs were written to comme orate his act and death 
with lines like, “All the bourgeois will taste the bomb” and “Let’s dance the 
Ravachole!”413  Soon thereafter, there was a bomb attack by a man named Meunier on the 
restaurant where Ravachol was arrested, killing the proprieter though missing its target: 
the waiter Llherot who originally reported Ravachol to the police.414  Meunier was able to 
escape to England where he spent two years before being caught and extradited on 
charges of murder, not anarchism.415  Another bomb was soon discovered in the Paris 
office of a mining company that was experiencing a strike at a mine in Carmaux in 
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southern France.416  This time the bomb was supposedly defused and taken carefully by 
policeman to the nearest station.  However, once at the station it exploded, blowing up six 
policemen.417  The plot was similar to the one undertaken by Ravachol and was carried 
out by a young scholar by the name of Emile Henry.418  Henry, however, was neither 
caught nor suspected and was able to get himself to London for the period of about a year 
undetected.  In the meantime, a man by the name of August Vaillant, a poor man whose 
work in a sugar factory could not provide for his daughter and his mistress and who was 
radicalized during time spent working in Argentina, decided to attack the Chamber of 
Deputies.  Throwing the bomb from the upper deck, it made a loud crack, causing panic 
and multiple injuries but no fatalities.  At his trial, Vaillant proclaimed that not only had 
he purposefully not killed anyone (he would have usd a different bomb if he had) but 
that he was striking out against a society that lets one third of its people live in poverty 
and kills heroic men like Ravachol.  Vaillant would be sentenced to death despite not 
having killed anyone, causing threats of future attacks and widespread outrage.419 
Despite a fierce campaign undertaken on his behalf not only by anarchists but also 
by noted artists like Emile Zola and Laurent Tailhade – who had lost his eye to an 
anarchist bomb – Vaillant was not pardoned.  He would become the first Frenchman to be 
sentenced to death in the 19th century for a domestic crime that did not involve murder.  
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In addition, the Chamber of Deputies passed the lois scélérates or ‘wicked laws’,420 
which severely repressed the anarchist press, anyone with supposed anarchist leanings, 
and anyone with unauthorized dynamite.  The idea bec m  the crime.  In response, a man 
by the name of Pauwels phoned in a suicide in two different apartments that were rigged 
with explosives, killing the investigating officers.421 
In 1894, Emile Henry returned from London and set about devising a plot to blow 
up the Café Terminus in downtown Paris, a popular afte  work spot for the city’s 
bourgeoisie.  The explosion injured twenty and killed only one.  Henry was captured in 
the aftermath and confessed not only to the Café Terminus bombing but also the bomb 
that went off at the police station one year earlier.  Henry was unrepentant claiming that 
he wished he had killed more with the Terminus bombing.  When asked why he set off a 
bomb in a place where “peaceful anonymous citizens gathered in a café to have a beer 
before going to bed”,422 he proclaimed that all bourgeois were guilty and in league with 
the state.  Their comfortable lives were made on the backs of the poor who could not 
make ends meet.  He also went on eloquently about revenge for the killings of Vaillant 
and Ravachol and defiantly told authorities, “Go ahe d and cut off my head, you may as 
well…Others will come after me.”423  Henry was sentenced to death and was heard to 
scream a muffled, strangled, “Be brave comrades and vive l’anarchie!”,424 before being 
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guillotined.  Henry became yet another hero of the movement, the “St. Just of 
Anarchism” beheaded by the French state. 
The decision not to pardon August Vaillant predictably brought the ire of the 
anarchist press who claimed that President Sadi Carnot would feel the brunt of an 
anarchist bomb.  They were eerily close to the truth because Carnot was stabbed to death 
on a visit to Lyon by a young Italian, Santo Caserio, who had read about his decision not 
to pardon Vaillant in a local paper.  A few days later, Carnot’s wife received a letter 
addressed to the ‘Widow Carnot’.  It was a letter sent from Caserio prior to his attack and 
included pictures of Ravachol and Vaillant and the words, “He is avenged”. 
 Between 1892 and 1894, eleven bombs exploded in Par s in the homes of judges 
and lawyers, at the offices of mining companies, in the chamber of deputies, and in cafés 
frequented by the bourgeoisie.  It got so bad that a scare in a Paris theater in 1894 led to 
multiple deaths due to screams of “Une Bombe!  Les anarchistes” when scenery crashed 
backstage.  The Lois Scélérates were once again updated in 1894 following the bombing 
of the Café Terminus and the Paris police began arresting people for “incitement to 
hatred of the bourgeoisie”, but the attacks continued.425  It became clear that the public 
trial of Ravachol had created a series of imitators and revenge seekers. 
France was not alone.  Similar cycles of copycatting a d revenge also played 
themselves out in Spain.  In 1892, a peasant uprising n Jerez meant to rescue five 
comrades who had been sentenced to life imprisonment for a labor uprising ten years 
prior led to the garroting of four young men.  One of the men, before being choked to 
death in public, got out the words “avenge us”.  In 1893, a man by the name of Pallas 
                                                           




threw a bomb at the Spanish Minister of War, General Martinez, killing one soldier, five 
bystanders, and the General’s horse (though leaving the General unscathed).  At his trial, 
Pallas talked about revenge for the Jerez ‘murders’.  When he was sentenced to death, he 
yelled out “Agreed! There are thousands to continue the work!”.426  Before his death, he 
proclaimed that “Vengeance will be terrible!”  A few weeks later a bomb went off in the 
Teatro Lyceo in Barcelona killing fifteen and causing mass panic.  The government’s 
reaction was swift and devastating, rounding up anyone associated with anarchism and/or 
socialism and torturing them at the infamous Montjuic prison just outside Barcelona.427  
A man by the name of Santiago Salvador admitted to being responsible for the bombing 
of the Lyceo opera house as revenge for the death of Pallas.  Within days, another bomb 
went off, killing two more people.  The harder the police pushed, the more bombings 
there appeared to be.428  Repression was unsuccessful in stemming the anarchist threat.  
Its only positive was that, in the words of the Duke of Arcos, repression had the effect of 
“scattering their forces”, though this was cold comf rt since this many times meant 
attacks elsewhere.429 
Official multilateral cooperation also proved unfruitf l.  A few multilateral 
agreements were reached, such as the 1898 Rome Confrence and the 1904 St. 
Petersburg Protocol.  The 1898 Rome conference was scheduled after the assassination of 
the popular Austrian Empress Elisabeth by an Italian anarchist and included all of the 
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major states and their police departments.  Its biggest achievement was the agreement of 
a legal definition of anarchism430 and an agreement to change the ‘attentat’ extradition 
clause to not grant political exile to those guilty of killing or attempting to kill a head of 
state.  However, none of the agreements from the Rome Conference were put into 
legislation.  Only one of the agreed upon protocols, that states look to punish anarchists 
for the use of explosives abroad, was ever drafted in any of the participating states, and 
that state, England, did not even sign the final conference draft.  The measure was never 
brought to a vote despite repeated Tory promises.  In addition, the St. Petersburg 
protocol, setting up official channels of communication between police departments, was 
not signed by the US, UK, or France who saw it as unnecessary and as a way for Russia 
and Germany to interfere in their respective processes (and liberal rights).  In particular, 
the English rejected the Russian proposal to make anarchism itself a crime.431 
For these reasons, both agreements proved to be largely ineffectual and were 
secondary to the large number of informal agreements between police departments and 
the unilateral spying which was occurring nearly everywhere.  For instance, the Russian 
Okhrana had a bureau in Paris, the British Special Br nch cooperated with the Okhrana 
against the wishes of Parliament, and Italy set up a network of secret agents in cities 
across Europe and North America to spy on Italian emigrants.  However, it could be 
argued that this was largely ineffective as well.  The state with the largest international 
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secret police, Russia, never rid themselves of anarchist agitation during the time of the 
Tsar.   
Many bombings were instigated by police agents provocateurs with the goal of 
foiling the plot and alerting the public to an international conspiracy that did not actually 
exist.  One famous incident occurred in Belgium in 1894.  The attack was to be used as 
an excuse for greater funds for the Special Branch of Scotland Yard based on evidence 
which linked eight Germans and two Dutch anarchists to he attack.  Subsequently, it was 
revealed that the man who had carried out the attack, a Baron Ernest Ungern-Sternberg 
who also went by the names Hekkelman and Hartings, wa  in the pay of the Russian 
Okhrana’s infamous chief Peter Rachovsky. It was also revealed that English special 
branch officers were known associates of the accused.432  Hartings’ cover was ‘blown’ 
when upon his arrest he asked for a Monsieur Leonard, Leonard being the maiden name 
of Rachovsky’s wife. 
The practice of using special agents also backfired because many undertook 
attacks without the knowledge of their superiors.  An Italian infiltrator in London named 
Gennaro Rubino used funds given to him by an Italian special agent named Prina to start 
an anarchist press.433  Upon being revealed as a secret agent by the anarchists, Rubino 
decided to prove his worth to the anarchists by using a weapon given to him by the Italian 
government to attempt to kill King Leopold in Belgium.  Rubino was captured after the 
failed attempt and the whole episode was a major embarrassment for the Italians and 
stalled future cooperation.434 
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In a perverse twist, these policing efforts most likely added to the growing sense 
of crisis during the period rather than really helping.  This became the chief reason why 
the English rejected cooperation attempts by the Russians, Italians, Germans, and 
Spanish.435  In the words of one English official, “In my opinio  no good could result 
from Spanish detectives coming over here to study the system adopted by the 
Metropolitan Police”.436  Many of these requests centered on cracking down on anarchist 
ideas, something the British were reluctant to do because, as stated in a response to the 
Spanish, “To be an anarchist is not any offence to English law as it is to hold any other 
theory with regard to social or political questions”.437  The presence of these foreign 
police officers usually made things more dangerous, not less.  Indeed, one English 
official noted to the Italians that their actions “seriously aggravate the danger they are 
designed to check”.438 
The English even began to believe that the most dangerous anarchists were those 
whose spying was uncovered by the anarchist community.  Examples include Rubino and 
a man named Michele Angiolillo who assassinated the Spanish Prime Minister Antonio 
Canovas after he was shunned by the French anarchist community as a suspected spy.439  
In several instances, threats were invented just to provoke a reaction from other states, in 
particular the English.440  In response, many states began to move away from this police 
cooperation in the decade prior to the First World War, desiring diplomatic cooperation 
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that could be better monitored.  This is why the US, K, and France were reluctant to 
sign the St. Petersburg Protocol.  Propaganda of the deed as an international threat, 
however, did not wax as these agreements and spy missions waned.  In many ways, these 
actions did little but attempt to reinforce old boundaries, covering up the problems in 
extradition policies and porous borders by extending state reach across them. 
However, the effect these actions and meetings had on what came later should not 
be underestimated.  Despite recognition among contemporaries that such actions were 
ineffective, they would be copied by future organiztions.  Alex Butterworth points out 
that the files of the Russian Okhrana were studied by both the CIA and the KGB in the 
early Cold War period with an eye toward copying their tactics.441  There are also claims 
that the Nazi Schutzstaffel modeled itself on anti-archist Special Forces that sprung up 
around Europe.  Richard Bach Jensen argues that the 1898 Rome agreement and the 1904 
St. Petersburg Protocol were predecessors to the creation of Interpol a few decades 
later.442  Jensen states that these acts made police cooperati n “official and systematic to a 
degree it had never been before.  Because of this, the system promoted by the Final Act 
of Rome and reinforced by the St. Petersburg Protocol can now take its rightful place as a 
major precursor, perhaps the first, to the creation in 1923 of an authentic international 
police organization.”443  It would appear that much of the international policing that took 
place in the 20th century had its roots in this period, even though these were largely 
ineffective in the fight against the propagandists.  I  was a new practice created to 
reinforce an old boundary. 
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“A mortal enemy of anarchy could not have done more” 
The first wave of policies meant to defeat the propagandists was not only 
ineffective but in most cases, it backfired and made the threat even stronger.  As states 
‘retrenched’, they found that the methods they had at hand were not well-equipped for the 
job.  As one observer put it, “attempted suppression of anarchism by governments has 
been [a] great failure”.444  This forced them into coming up with new ideas and new 
tactics.  Tactics that were not only ‘successful’ bt were also a) ‘creative’ in that they 
brought some new action into the world and b) had te effect of drawing new boundaries 
around political authority, re-inscribing the challenged state(s).  This section will look at 
both mechanisms in tandem since, as mentioned in Chapter 3, they are only analytically, 
not empirically, distinct. 
So what did work?  If repression and public trials were ineffective in stemming 
the tide of propagandist attacks, how were they defeat d?  Boundaries that closed the 
public sphere off from anarchists and other groups while allowing for the free movement 
of peoples proved unworkable in defeating the propagandists.  New boundaries needed to 
be drawn.  This was done by a twofold strategy.  On the one hand, by prosecuting acts 
but not ideas, anarchists were allowed into the public sphere and a wedge was drawn 
between propagandists and others within the movement, isolating the former.  On the 
other hand, increasingly effective systems of surveillance made it harder for anarchists to 
avoid capture.   This culminated in the introduction of passports in the interwar years 
which made free movement, which was so important to anarchists, nearly impossible. 
                                                           




As in the last section, events in France in the 1890s are instructive.  President 
Carnot’s execution led to the rounding up not only of known propagandists but also 
anarchist intellectuals in the Trial of Thirty.  They were tried as one group for conspiracy 
as if they were in league together, but the evidence was so flimsy that even a sympathetic 
jury acquitted most of them, including all of the intellectuals.  Unlike previous episodes, 
there was no response to this very public trial.  Instead of repressive tactics and sham 
trials, which only served to make attacks worse, th French realized that allowing the 
intellectuals and propagandists to operate did not lead to more attacks but to fewer, 
assuming the intellectuals could be separated from the propagandists.445  Of course, many 
anarchist intellectuals were all too happy to distance themselves from those conducting 
assassinations and bombings.  While Ravachol’s actions split the anarchist intellectual 
community across Europe,446 most came around after his execution because they believed 
his sentence was due more to his anarchist beliefs than to his crimes.  However, Henry’s 
bombing two years later was loudly denounced by many who saw it as immoral and 
ineffectual.  Anarchist publicist Charles Malato said that Henry had “above all struck 
anarchism”, while literary critic Octave Mirbeau wrote, “a mortal enemy of anarchy 
could not have done more than Emile Henry”.447  The trial’s acquittal of prominent 
anarchists in France, a group that did not necessarily include those who condoned 
propaganda of the deed, made them largely untouchable on precedent so long as they 
were not associated with violent acts.  This wasn’t a conscious decision on behalf of the 
French government as much as a lesson learned through the prosecution’s failure. The 
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trial itself was seen as a sham but it gave the anarchists an air of legitimacy. As a 
response, the French government stopped producing anarchist martyrs, commuting an 
anarchist’s death sentence in 1898 to life in prison and acquitting all four accused in 1905 
of plots against the King of Spain and the President of France.448  The days of being 
jailed, and especially executed, for being an anarchist were largely over in France as was 
propaganda of the deed.449 
After the assassination of King Umberto I in 1900, Italy stopped passing laws 
directed at anarchists and Interior Minister Giovanni Giolitti instructed journalists not to 
sensationalize anarchists attacks.  One could work on anarchist ideas without being 
prosecuted for the acts of the propagandists; only the bombings and assassinations were 
illegal.  This, combined with an effective propagand  campaign that described the 
propagandists as the “enemies of all mankind”, turned public opinion against them and 
led to disillusionment with violence among the movement’s leaders.450  In fact, most of 
the public had no idea about most anarchist beliefs d spite the public ‘successes’ of 
propaganda of the deed.451  The ideology had failed. 
At the same time, a wave of union liberalization brought many anarchists into the 
public sphere and further drove a wedge between different factions of the community.  
Those states that liberalized early, particularly the UK and the US, saw much less 
anarchist activity than other states.  As Richard Bach Jensen has argued about Italy, 
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“Labour union and strike activity became available as a safety valve for proletarian 
energies”.452  Liberalization was not a conscious to defeat anarchism per se but it proved 
effective and channeling anarchist energies into more legitimate actions. Anarcho-
syndicalism, the anarchist version of unionism, wasborn in France in 1895, a year after 
the Trial of Thirty.  This was a movement that was already beginning in the 1890s and 
soon picked up as propaganda of the deed began to wane over the next decade.  It saw the 
rise of a new set of intellectuals, led by Georges Sorel, who focused on the eight hour 
work day and the labor movement.  As anarchists were allowed to work through unions, 
they increasingly denounced propagandist violence as a strategy.  By the end of the First 
World War, many who were open to anarchist ideas now found it more effective to work 
through the system which gave them bargaining power, eight-hour work days, and greater 
political rights.  Among those arguing for syndicalsm were old anarchist theorists and 
publishers like Kropotkin, Malatesta, and Emile Pouget.453  Of course, many anarchists 
scoffed at efforts for the eight hour work day and other union campaigns, claiming that it 
did not matter how long one worked if one was stillpart of a hierarchy.  This further 
demonstrates the way that some anarchists were welcom d into the public sphere and 
others were not.  The states which did not learn this lesson, Spain and Russia, 
experienced a civil war and a revolution, respectivly, in which anarchists played an 
important role.  The states which did learn this lesson (France, Italy, US, Austria, 
Germany) saw a sharp decline in propagandist violence i  the first decade of the 
twentieth century. 
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This is essentially a redrawing of the public/private boundary.  Remember, 19th 
century nationalism was about the use of the nation to the benefit of the state.  However, 
these attempts to control the public sphere in the forms of censorship, police brutality, 
and public executions did nothing but fan the flames of the movement.  By allowing 
anarchists into the public sphere and by legitimating he syndicalist movement, anarchists 
were incentivized to abandon propaganda of the deed.  The point was not that the state or 
the ruling classes capitulated as the labor fights undertaken by the syndicalists were 
fiercely fought.  It was that there was now a state-legitimated avenue for those fights.  
This was especially true with anarchist intellectuals as men like Kropotkin, Reclus, and 
William Morris became less dangerous once they began giving talks to the Royal 
Geographic Society and undertaking speaking tours in the United States.  Open up the 
public sphere to contrasting ideas and the anarchists, while still bitterly critical of the 
state, were no longer interested in propaganda of the deed.  The state is no more than the 
actions it undertakes; a state with a more inclusive public sphere is a state with different 
democratic possibilities than one without. 
The experience in England was much different from that on the continent.  
England, along with Switzerland, had long been a place where political exiles could live 
and work in peace.  Amnesty for such people was part of a liberal tradition454 for the 
English were “not disposed to think of political refugees as dangerous”.455  Naturally, it 
had quite possibly the largest concentration of anarchists in its capital.  Anarchists of 
Russian, Polish, French, and Spanish origin flocked to London when their life at home 
was at threat and they published numerous journals such as Kropotkin’s famous La 
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Revolte and Morris’ Commonweal and hung out in clubs such as “L’Autonomie”.456  
L’Autonomie was founded in 1887 and became a major anarchist hangout and a subject 
of interest for foreign governments and others who liked to blame England for their 
anarchist troubles.  One German correspondent claimed that “It is ridiculous to allege that 
the English police are carrying out any sort of surveillance at all on the anarchists who 
reside in London”.457  In response, the English argued that this club was more social than 
political.458  Continental governments were not blameless.  The French were accused of 
“wanting to funnel toward England the dregs of the Society”.459  However, there were 
arguably no lives lost to anarchist bombings at the height of propaganda of the deed. 
Despite the sizable anarchist contingent in London, there were only two foiled 
plots and one attack in England.  The first foiled plot was from a group of anarchists in 
Walsall in 1892.  London police tracked a man by the name of Balotta from Walsall to 
Tottenham Court Road in London where he was found with explosives.460  Balotta, and 
two other London anarchists by the names of Charles nd Cails were charged under the 
Explosives Act.  All Three were sent to prison for ten years while another accomplice 
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was was sentenced for five years.461  Charges of conspiracy were never proven.  
However, there is a question as to whether or not the ‘plot’ was set up by a French agent 
provocateur by the name of Coulon, who provided the explosives and the supposed 
‘plan’.462  The larger significance of the case was the insinuat on of a setup, which 
simultaneously caused outrage among the London anarchist community and was used to 
drive a wedge between different factions therein.463 
The second foiled plot took place in 1894 when two Italians, Francis Polti and 
Giuseppe Fornara, were arrested and charged under the Explosives Act.  While no 
conspiracy charges could be sustained, the court proceedings themselves were electric.  
Polti claimed that he had meant to avenge the death of Vaillant and stoked conspiracy 
theories by stating that anarchists were nearly done on the continent and were about to 
become active in London.464  Upon his arrest, Polti named Fornara as his co-conspirator.  
Fornara claimed in court that if he had had the money, he would have gone to France or 
Italy but since he had no money he was planning on bl wing up the ‘Royal Exchange’ 
because “there were many bourgeois and capitalists there”.  He pleaded guilty claiming 
that he “wanted to blow up the capitalists and the middle class”.465  Both this and the 
Walsall case demonstrate the way in which the Metropolitan police were able to stop 
attacks before they took place because of advanced surveillance systems (see below) and 
because they made a distinction between anarchist ideas and propagandist actions.  This 
was apparent during the propagandist run in Paris when England refused to extradite 
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Theodule Meunier and Jean Pierre Francois, a supposed accomplice of Ravachol, for 
anarchism. They were only extradited when they could be credibly charged and found 
guilty of murder.466  To the English, the former was a political creed, the latter a 
prosecutable crime, and it was only the latter upon which they wanted to dwell.  While 
this gave police and prosecutors less freedom to act against anarchists, it kept attacks 
from happening and prevented the media circus that followed attacks on the continent. 
However, there was one rather famous attack on the Gre nwich observatory, the 
inspiration for Joseph Conrad’s novel, The Secret Agent.  In February 1894 an explosion 
near the observatory resulted in one death: that of Martial Bourdin, the man carrying the 
bomb.  Both Conrad’s novel and later evidence point t  the possibility that the explosion 
was an accident, when Bourdin tripped and set off the explosive on his way to a 
destination abroad, believed to be Paris.467  Due to concurrent events in Paris, the event 
created a media firestorm and brought pressure uponthe police.  One paper refuted police 
claims to be monitoring the anarchists because if they were it would be “inconceivably 
stupid of them to allow a man so professedly known as Martial Bourdin to wander around 
at will with a bomb in his pocket”.468  Others feared it was part of a larger plot gone awry, 
suggesting that “Had not this unfortunate accident in Greenwich Park taken place, the 
consequences, I feel certain, would have been terribl ”.469  Of course there is evidence 
that Bourdin was not ‘professedly known’ and that the whole incident was a circus.  Still, 
this is the only ‘attack’ to happen in England during this time while the continent 
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experienced many.  Its nature, a possibly accidental attack by a man who was attempting 
to travel with a bomb already made, shows the manner i  which England was spared.   
This does not mean that nothing was happening.  London was teeming with 
special agents and agents provocateurs attempting to thwart the anarchist conspiracy.470  
This, however, presumed that there was an anarchist con piracy, that the men who set off 
bombs were part of a large group centered in London.  This was demonstrably false.  
Ravachol, Vaillant, Henry, Caserio, Pallas, and Salvador, among many others (including 
Czoglosz and Berkman in the United States), were lon actors tied to a set of 
transnational ideas and sympathies.  Yes, Henry was supposed to have met Malatesta and 
spent time at l’Autonomie when in London, and Berkman had a relationship with US 
theorist Emma Goldman, but for the most part these were single men undertaking solitary 
deeds.  While plots were routinely talked about at l’Autonomie and elsewhere in 
anarchist hideouts, they never seemed to come to frui ion and many were probably 
instigated by secret agents attempting to arrest tho e they could get to undertake such 
plots as was supposedly the case in Walsall.471  Scotland Yard First Detective Patrick 
McIntyre recalls that, “I know, of my own knowledge, that a large minority of those 
frequenting the place were in the service and pay of Continental Governments”.472  It was 
mostly likely all for naught.  England was not a stging ground for anarchist plots 
hatched at l’Autonomie as many feared. 
What London may have provided, however, was a platform for the spread of 
anarchist propaganda that connected these disparate individuals into a transnational 
community.  Plots tended to be hatched inside the heads of lone actors but these actors a) 
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needed the knowledge to make bombs if they were to b  used and b) needed to have read 
anarchist propaganda in order to be inspired.  Both needs were filled by the many 
anarchist publications and many of these publications were centered in London.  London 
in the 1890s became the intellectual center of anarchism, with papers in multiple 
languages which were shipped out to anarchists across the globe.473  However, shutting 
down these publications, especially the ones that did not call directly for violence, was 
not only hard to do but was also against cherished values of freedom of the press in the 
UK as inscribed by law. 
Of course, anarchist papers, and those publishing tem, were still tracked 
assiduously and there were many attempts by politicians to shut down papers.474  English 
police were able to pursue this avenue because the English had a law against inciting 
murder via the press.  This law was used to sentence the inflammatory German anarchist 
Johann Most to 16 months hard labor.475  Many, both in England and outside, attempted 
to use this law to bring down the anarchist press as a whole.  However, as the anarchist 
press became increasingly adept at not explicitly ca ling for violence, such efforts were 
usually for naught.  For instance, one British MP asked for the trial of those who 
published the popular paper Commonweal after they congratulated those who had 
recently attempted to kill the Spanish King and Queen.  The response from the British 
authorities was that the paper did not express regret at the attack’s failure nor did it call 
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for future attacks and therefore it did not violate th  law.  In addition, “any attempt to 
prosecute would serve no purpose but to advertise the mischievous article”.476  In fact, 
many anarchist publications would learn how to publish incendiary claims without 
traversing the law by calling for more violence.477  Here it appears that England’s liberal 
society478 may have helped it to avoid propagandist attacks, but in a world of freedom of 
movement of people and information it may also have played a role in the flourishing of 
violence elsewhere.479  Anarchists themselves claimed that “England Alone has been 
spared on account of her hospitality to the anarchists”.480 
Italy was another country without many bomb attacks but which still played a 
major role in the propagandism of the pre-World War I era.  Their actions help us to 
address the second conceptual boundary changed in the campaign against the 
propagandists: the movement of people and goods acro s borders.  Most of the problems 
that anarchists caused in Italy were in the form of labor revolts and peasant uprisings.  
That said, Italy was also a hotbed of anarchists who saw their society as one of the more 
backward and unfair.  At some point in the early 1890s, Italy began to undertake a policy 
of exiling suspected anarchists.  Having abolished t  death penalty, they found it 
advantageous to send them out into Europe rather than killing them.  It is therefore no 
accident that Italians become the chief perpetrators of tyrannicide.  Carnot, Canovas, and 
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the Austrian Empress Elisabeth were all assassinated by Italian anarchists.  Exiling 
anarchists led to a flood of those who had become adept at inciting and inflicting violence 
in numerous peasant revolts in Italy out into Europe.  Most of these exiles went to 
England and for the most part, England was not notified of their arrival.  This appears to 
have been common during this time, much to the frustration of the English Special 
Branch.481  This is essentially the same action Russia took in the 1880s after the 
assassination of Tsar Alexander I, forcing many Russian anarchists (and nihilists and 
other revolutionaries) out into Europe, leading to the spread of the doctrine across the 
continent.  Again, the free, unchecked, and poorly monitored movement of people and 
ideas around Europe helped to feed anarchist violence during the era. 
From the middle of the 19th century until the First World War, only Russia and 
the Ottoman Empire used passports.  Movement around E rope was generally free.  
Passports began to be used during the First World War and were codified in the early 
1920s, about the same time that restrictions on immigration also began to appear 
(especially in the US).  As demonstrated above, the ability to move about Europe was 
critical to anarchist success, especially since some states, such as the UK, were not as 
draconian as others (Spain, Russia, France in the 1890’s).  That said, the institution of the 
passport cannot be solely attributed to anarchism.  The rise of the First World War and 
fear of spies – driven as it was by their extensive us  in the fight against anarchism – 
were the major reasons for the use of the passport and he immigration restrictions that 
characterized the interwar period.482  But that is not the claim made here.  Instead I argue 
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that the passport was consciously justified as a part of the war against anarchism and that 
the establishment of the passport was not possible without the measures taken against 
anarchism, even as other factors played a role.  For instance, the United States justified 
the implementation of entry restrictions during peacetime as means of keeping out “the 
undesirable, the enemy of law and order, the breede of r volution, and the advocate of 
anarchy” or “anyone advocating…or teaching anarchy483 and the British denied passports 
to “suspects, anarchists, and bolsheviks”.484  Making the end of propaganda of the deed a 
part of the justificatory framework of the institution of passports is enough to make it a 
cause as it creates the rhetorical space for passport  to be taken seriously while coercing 
opponents with claims of national security.485 
However, even if the passport itself may not have be n solely or largely caused by 
the anarchist threat, it could not have happened without the system of surveillance and 
categorization of citizens that become popular among European police forces when 
dealing with anarchism a mere decade prior.  These changes revolve around the idea that 
people can be tracked by databases of bodily featurs which originated from the work of 
Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso.486  Lombroso argued that criminals come from a 
genetically mutated crop of individuals, allowing him to make broad generalizations 
about how criminals looked and why their look was symptomatic of their devolution.487  
Lombroso would look at a man like Ravachol and proclaim that he could see the facial 
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mutations that signaled him to be a lowly criminal.  Gaining even more traction was the 
work of Alphonse Bertillon.488  Bertillon is probably best known for his criminal 
identification technique called Bertillonage, a system of physical identification of 
criminals, which was very popular in Europe and the US.489  Much like Lombroso, not 
excluding the eugenic undertones, Bertillon believed that criminals could be identified by 
physical features such as the length of their arms and the size of their ears.  However, this 
system began to go out of style around the turn of the 20th century.  Bertillon’s real 
contribution is the development of the mugshot and his method of crime scene picture 
taking. 
Bertillonage was supplanted by the system of fingerprint taking still used today.  
This began in England in the late nineteenth century and along with a series of scientific 
police reforms initiated by a man named Francis Galton.490  Galton, much like Bertillon 
and Lombroso, was tied into a larger eugenic project which attempted to “place a given 
individual within a population of recidivists and ‘unfit’ habitual criminals, whose 
propensity for social menace was written upon their bodies.”491  However, his method 
soon turned into a way to piece together past events through biometric measurements.  
Oddly enough, maybe the best characterization of these reforms and the thought behind 
them is Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes novels and short stories.492  Holmes, 
despite being fictional, epitomized the scientific approach to police work that helped to 
keep Britain from experiencing the high volume of propagandist attacks experienced on 
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the continent. These were methods that were bottom-up, taking place alongside the less 
successful methods of Lombroso and Bertillon.  They w re soon copied elsewhere.  In 
the United States, the response to propaganda of the deed included the development of a 
federal agency dedicated to investigating crimes in order to ease the burden on the Secret 
Service.  This agency would eventually become the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), which still exists to this day.493  The FBI began to compile a permanent fingerprint 
database in response to the 1919 anarchist attacks which ultimately led to the infamous 
Palmer Raids.494 
However, the change is not simply one of improved policing techniques but the 
meaning and consequences of these techniques.  Besides being a great way to identify 
criminals, large databases were necessary for fingerprint taking and other systems to 
work.  They were possibly the first incarnation of ‘big data’.  The mugshot meant that 
pictorial databases of criminals could now be kept even as physiological identification 
fell out of favor.  As propaganda of the deed posed such a threat to the state and the 
prevailing order of the time, these techniques spread quickly upon news of their success.  
Even if we are to grant that it was the nationalist fervor of the First World War that was 
the proximate cause of the passport, a functioning passport system still needed to be 
based upon an elaborate database of bodily identifirs.  This was provided by the fight 
against the propagandists, especially as extradition practices became more tightly 
controlled through diplomatic agreements in line with the Rome Conference, restricting 
the movement of the propagandists prior to Great War.  The advent of the passport and 
other measures such as postal service restrictions put the final nail in the coffin of the free 
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movement of people and ideas which was so important to the propagandists.495  As 
detailed above, this happened in conjunction with the opening up of the public sphere to 
include anarchist and other radical ideas.  These ‘creative’ actions, creative in the sense 
of bringing something new into the world, had the eff ct of drawing new boundaries 
around political authority.  At the same time, by giving up some control over the content 
of political discourse but gaining control over themovement of people and goods across 
borders, we see an ‘authority swap’.  The state was not ‘weaker’ than it was before and it 
did not ‘erode’.  Nor did it expand or become stronger.  Instead, by redrawing boundaries 
of sovereign authority, it stayed at roughly the same level quantitatively but qualitatively 
it was vastly different. 
Conclusion 
At the beginning of this story, sometime around 1880 in Europe, we see a 
situation in which, broadly speaking, conservative nationalism had led to attempts to 
control the content of political discourse in the region while a growing philosophy of 
laissez-faire capitalism in conjunction with a lack of technological know-how led to 
increasingly open borders as people, goods, and ideas w re able to cross without the 
knowledge of state authorities.  These boundaries were drawn through the four practices 
listed above: ideology of free movement and few border estrictions, uneven political 
exile policies, public show trials and executions, and an ethic of conservative 
nationalism.  Each of these practices was ‘shattered’, proved ineffective in a world of 
growing interconnectedness and technological advancement.  They each proved 
significant in sparking the wave of propaganda of the deed that became quite possibly the 
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biggest political crisis of the era.  So long as these practices existed, it was hard for those 
combating the propagandists to do so with any effect, r -inscribing these practices and 
boundaries actively made the situation worse. 
 Creative solutions were necessary and new boundaries were to be drawn.  In most 
states, anarchists were channeled into the system and away from the destructive 
propaganda of the deed as the state began to address some of their claims.  Future 
Ravachols and Henrys were less likely to turn violent in the years around the First World 
War because anarchist ideas were disseminated freely with little consequence.  
Simultaneously, these states took control over the movement of people and ideas across 
their borders, creating large fingerprint databases and eventually introducing the passport.  
Gradually, passports and the control of borders came to constitute the state as we thought 
of it in the 20th century.  While the passport, the Rome conference, and the directives of 
some states such as Italy show that central policy p a ed a role it usually followed 
success.  Scientific policing was not a centrally planned policy until after it proved 
successful and the acceptance of anarchists in the labor movement happened more 
organically.  Still, they redrew boundaries and re-inscribed the state.   
Of course, the story told here is not nearly as uniform or clean as it is made out 
here.  Each affected state developed policies that were unique to themselves and not 
every state drew each boundary effectively.  Here, however, I want to spend some time 
going over the consequences of propaganda of the deed for Spain and Russia, the two 
states that lagged behind the rest of Europe (and the US) in combating anarchist violence 
and the two that developed what may be seen as a novel ‘s lution’ to the problem.  In 




which had always used passports but was a major exporter of revolutionaries, anarchists 
originally saw the 1917 revolution as something to et behind. They did just that along 
with many exiles, including Piotr Kropotkin, who returned to Russia to join the 
revolution.  However, soon the optimism faded as it became clear what Lenin’s vision 
was.  Anarchists were persecuted alongside all others who opposed the regime and 
Kropotkin died a few years later in solitude.  Anarchism was no longer a force once the 
Soviet Union came into being.  In Spain, anarchist activity was a feature of the landscape 
throughout the 1920s and the anarchists formed one of the anti-monarchical factions of 
the Spanish Civil War.  However, they, along with the socialists, were crushed by the 
victorious fascists and did not return following the advent of Franco’s reign.   
In both countries, anarchists played key roles in bri ging about revolutions; 
however, they found themselves on the losing side both times to other anti-monarchical 
forces.  An abhorrence of organization did not help in either case.496  However, even as 
these specific regimes ‘failed’ to deal with this threat and subsequently perished, the state 
found another possible route to combat ‘propaganda of the deed’; totalitarianism.  With 
these two examples in mind, one would not want to claim a covering law that open public 
spheres were the only way to defeat this episode of anarchist violence; this was just how 
it was done in most of Europe.  However, as these spaces closed in countries such as 
Russia and Spain, anarchists did not return.  Totalitari ns seemed to be better equipped to 
run repressive regimes in an age of nationalism than e ancien regime.  This is probably 
because all of the totalitarian regimes listed above claimed to act in the interests of the 
nation and the people.  Doing so gave the state a cert in level of freedom and popular 
                                                           




support not found in ancien regime administrations while simultaneously giving it new 
tools to ferret out dissidents of any stripe.  These cases help us to run through the 
counterfactual of different policies possible findig success against propaganda of the 
deed. It is evident that there is more than one way to redraw borders in response to a 
crisis and events in Spain and Russia during the interwar period prove this point.  There 
is true creativity and agency, not the selection of a single policy that works. In both cases 
(the liberal western states and the new fascist ones), a shared crisis caused new 
boundaries to be drawn which would have resounding effects on political life throughout 






























Chapter 6:  
Drones, Data, and Redrawing Boundaries in The Global War on Terror  
 
 The episode of violence typified by al Qaeda and demonstrated in the attacks of 
September 11, 2001 (9/11) is the latest example of r visionist violence.  As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, much of the literature on terrorism in IR has focused on actor motivations, the 
act of terrorism, group structure, and/or the level of damage done to explain incidents of 
terrorism, the threat posed, and its effects.  All of these have the effect of folding al 
Qaeda into a larger pools such as ‘terrorism’, ‘networks’, ‘Islamic terrorism’, etc, 
masking its unique effects.  A smaller group of scholars have recognized that al Qaeda is 
a unique actor in contemporary terrorism, marking them as ‘trans-state’, ‘system-
threatening’, ‘transformative’ or ‘predatory’.497  In Chapter 3, I build on this to argue that 
the narratives that have developed around al Qaeda re of those of revisionist violence, 
violence that challenges the core of the state system.  Of course, al Qaeda has used 
narratives of entrant violence to justify and rally support for its actions across the Muslim 
world.  These narratives are evident in its strategy o attack the ‘far enemy’ – the US – in 
order to defeat the ‘near enemy’ – secular Arab governments.498  In addition, its 
participation in the Afghan poppy trade has seen criminal narratives develop around it.  
However, this only shows that any particular episode f violence contains many 
narratives.  What is interesting about al Qaeda for the purposes of this project are the 
strong narratives of revisionist violence.  The threat is ontological, challenging the state 
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as a polity, sovereignty as a practice, and like the golden age pirates and propagandists 
before them, forces the state to redraw the boundaries of political authority to effectively 
combat the threat. 
 Unlike the other two cases, the process of redrawing boundaries is still being 
undertaken.  For this reason, we cannot be sure that new developments in the Global War 
on Terror (GWoT)499 such as targeted killing and data surveillance are being habituated 
and will lead to the drawing of new boundaries.  However, these developments have an 
unmistakable element of such a dynamic.  Targeted killing, especially via drones, and the 
National Security Agency (NSA) and Government Communications Headquarters 
(GCHQ) programs to track, collect, and analyze datah ve made al Qaeda legible, making 
it possible to defeat them.  Because of these innovati ns, new conceptions of citizen and 
alien decouple the citizen from his or her body andinto a series of data flows, national 
security is extended into new territorial and conceptual jurisdictions, and points where 
data is collected become new boundaries.  As a result, borders change from sites of 
exclusion to sites of collection.  These developments lead to the reassertion of the state 
into processes in which it had previously been absent. 
“They’d been here all along” 
Three interrelated conceptual boundaries played a role in the illegibility of al 
Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks; 1) a world of bounded polities where all threats have a local 
origin, 2) a legal, practical, and conceptual boundary between domestic and international 
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surveillance, and 3) an idea that borders were sites of xclusion.  Each will be taken in 
turn. We start with the idea that all threats, even those labeled ‘transnational’, emanate 
from local disputes, claims, oppression, etc.  While the term ‘transnational’ was used to 
describe a plethora of threats, this referred to the operations of the group – do they attack 
across borders, are they a network, etc. – rather than the politics of the threat.  
Historically, this made sense.  Hezbollah’s attack on US Marine Barracks in 1983 made 
sense within this world because it emanated from struggles between Lebanon and Israel.  
Similar patterns develop from attacks by groups like Hamas or IRA.  These local 
struggles were similar to state threats.  Terrorism was believed to be largely state 
sponsored500 wherein these threats “were [still] things you managed via diplomacy”.501  It 
was believed that al Qaeda was no different, even if its claims were not fully understood.  
This can be seen in US President Bill Clinton’s remarks on terrorism in the 1990s.  In one 
instance, he placed jihadist terrorism as similar to the threats of state collapse and internal 
warfare in Haiti and Yugoslavia because all were ‘non-state’.502  At the center of these 
actions is a conception of politics that is synonymous with the state and its local claims to 
authority.503  All non-state violence was assumed to be perpetrated in the service of a
state or state project.  There was little room for p litics outside of the state.  The practice 
constructing this boundary may seem tautological: only threats connected to state were on 
the radar of policymakers and those working in national security.  It had been this way 
for decades. 
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The belief can be demonstrated by how long it took f r al Qaeda to be taken 
seriously as a threat to the United States.  If al Qaeda was primarily a part of local 
struggles in one or more Arab states, it would be much less likely to attack within the 
United States and harder to make the argument for funding and attention.  Bin Laden was 
first fingered for the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York in 1993.  This was 
followed by the Khobar Towers bombing, the attacks on US embassies in Tunisia and 
Kenya, and the attack on the USS Cole, all prior to 9/11.  Knowledge of al Qaeda was 
quite common in certain circles of the Clinton Administration, especially Richard Clarke, 
the National Security Council’s (NSC) Director of Counterterrorism, and those working 
beneath him.  To these officers, 9/11 was not a strategic surprise; though all claim it was 
either a tactical surprise and/or on a larger scale than expected.504  This is evidenced by 
Clarke’s September 4, 2001 memo to NSC Director Condoleeza Rice which warned of 
the deaths of “hundreds of Americans”, an order of magnitude less than the attacks one 
week later.505 
While this meant that al Qaeda was known to many prominent national security 
people, there were many who refused to take them seriou ly.  Clarke commented that,  
“I think if you ask most terrorism experts in the mid-1990s, ‘Name the major terrorist 
organizations that might be a threat to the United States,’ they would have said 
Hezbollah, which had a relationship with Iran. They would have said Hamas, which is a 
Palestinian group. Most people would not have said Al Qaeda. Most people wouldn't 
have known that there was an Al Qaeda.”506   
 
The only places searched for these threats were states themselves and the groups 
challenging or being funded by them.  Daniel Benjamin and Steve Simon, analysts 
working under Clarke, claim that the FBI and the Departments of Defense and State were 
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largely resistant to taking al Qaeda seriously.  Benjamin asserted that it was “a bridge too 
far” for these Departments to take al Qaeda seriously.507  For instance, many in the 
Pentagon purposely dragged their feet when asked to come up with military scenarios to 
counter al Qaeda in the 1990s because “Iran remained the counterterrorism community’s 
top concern”.508  The Bush Administration demonstrated the same dynamic.  In January 
2001, Clarke warned that al Qaeda was not a local threa  to be brought into a regional 
framework but was instead a transnational challenge509.  Most of those at the NSC were 
aware of the threat.  Again, it was senior leadership elsewhere that proved a problem, 
especially in the Defense Department.  Phillip Zelikow, who worked in the 
Administration and had already written about al Qaeda prior to 9/11, stated that it took 
many in the Administration “some time.  You notice that the almost immediate reaction 
of [Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld and [Under Secretary of Defense Paul] 
Wolfowitz is to assume that this is somehow a state ac  and wonder whether Iran or Iraq 
might somehow be responsible for this.” 
In addition, after retaliatory actions following the 1998 embassy attacks, Clinton 
was mocked for trying to ‘wag the dog’510 to refocus attention away from his sex scandal.  
CIA Director George Tenet and others were mocked for trying to drum up al Qaeda’s 
threat in the late 1990s.  There were of course many reasons this happened ranging from 
partisan animosity to a post-Cold War hangover but m ch of this inability to recognize al 
Qaeda as a major threat in the late 1990s is due to the belief that threats come from local 
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struggles, i.e. states.  For instance, China’s rise and the problems surrounding the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were certainly on the radar.  As one 
policymaker explained to me, “Zero Americans died from international terrorism in 1999.  
So make a budget case for why we should dramatically increase spending at the end of 
1999.”511  Al Qaeda as a serious threat to attack within the US would have been taken 
more seriously if it had been recognized as an organization divorced from local struggles.  
Threats had been bounded within this particular aspect of the state system. 
This boundary can be viewed as a baseline assumption for each of the next two.  
First, there were legal, practical, and conceptual boundaries between domestic and 
international intelligence.  This boundary was created by the following practices: 1) a 
culture where those working in international and domestic agencies rarely cooperated or 
shared intelligence and 2) a separation for the protecti n of US citizens from the CIA and 
NSA.  The first of these led to stove-piping and prevented the types of intelligence 
gathering and analysis that have developed as a response to 9/11.512  Both provided a 
challenge to data collection.  Attempts to collect meta-data in order to identify and 
prevent future terrorist attacks were prevalent in the 1990s, if not earlier.  However, these 
attempts were discarded not only because they were vi wed skeptically by veteran 
intelligence officers but also due to the legal hurdles that split domestic and international 
intelligence. 
During the 1990s, head of the Information Defense Ag ncy (IDA) Eric 
Kleinsmith made waves within the Defense Department by collecting open source 
internet data and placing it in three dimensional mps that could show hotspots of 
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terrorist activities, a program that became known as Able Danger.  His data collection 
efforts pulled up sensitive information not just on suspected foreign terrorists but also on 
US citizens including Defense Secretary William Cohen and future Secretary of State 
Rice.  However, he was told that the data he collected on US persons could only be held 
for 90 days before being discarded, not enough timefor proper assessment.  He ended up 
having to ditch the project all together.513  After his program was shut down, it was 
shifted to a consulting firm called Raytheon only to be shut down again on the same 
premises.514  The lines between domestic and international intel gence were drawn in 
such a way as to make such surveillance practically impossible.  First, there were privacy 
laws that stopped international agencies from colleting domestic intelligence.  Second, 
there were other organizations in charge of domestic intelligence such as the FBI (whose 
investigations required warrants) and the FBI tended to focus on the investigation of 
previously occurring crimes, not the prevention of future ones.  This was separate from 
international surveillance which was undertaken by the CIA and NSA and could be done 
without warrants if it did not include a US citizen.  The line between domestic and 
international intelligence is not a hard and fast one but instead a constructed one.  As 9/11 
commission chair Lee Hamiton told me, “The law itself creates this difference”.  It was 
the practice drawing the boundary.  The barriers were not only legal but practical and 
institutional as well.  Domestic and international surveillance were undertaken by 
different agencies and for different purposes: crime and security, respectively.  This made 
it harder for relevant information to be connected, a publicly acknowledged cause of the 
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US’ inability to prevent the 9/11 attacks.515  This distinction would eventually melt away 
as a result of the GWoT. 
 Different spheres of intelligence demonstrated a belief that threats to national 
security came from outside of borders, the third boundary mentioned above.  The border 
was a site of exclusion meant to keep such threats out of the domestic realm.  Practices 
such as policing borders, border checks, the use of passports, and cargo inspections were 
meant to keep undesirable goods, peoples, and even ideas from entering the country.  As I 
demonstrate in Chapter 5, this has not always been the case.  Prior to the First World 
War, borders were used more as demarcations between sov reigns.  The movements of 
the lower classes were not important because they were not seen as a part of the state.  
Propaganda of the deed, among others things, put an end to this.  The movement of 
people and goods came to be viewed as important and so it was regulated by the state.  
This regulation happened at the border, which was now thought of as a site of exclusion 
and a series of practices developed which were meant to exclude certain people or goods 
in order stop threats from entering. 
 Bounding all threats into local struggles, boundaries between international and 
domestic intelligence, and borders as sites of exclusion were all in tension with the 
processes we associated with globalization.  Al Qaeda was able to utilize international 
news media to proselytize through its attacks516 and the internet to build and maintain a 
decentralized network and communicate propaganda an technical knowhow.  This is 
very similar to the way that the propagandists were abl  to use mass media and new 
printing technology to publicize ideas and events.  In all of my cases, the boundaries that 
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were challenged had been weakened by other processes but were maintained through 
habit that was only shattered by the recognition of revisionist violence.  This case is no 
different. 
 Al Qaeda was able to take advantage of the boundaries d awn by the US and other 
powerful states, making these targets vulnerable “prisoners of the past”.517  The reaction 
to 9/11 within the US government demonstrates this. The very idea that al Qaeda could 
attack the United States was a shock to many seasond counter-terrorism experts in the 
US government.  To John Poindexter, Ronald Reagan’s National Security Advisor, 
“terrorism was a foreign problem”.518  That they could attack the United States from 
within was an even bigger shock which challenged th very conception of what a border 
was.  Mike Wertheimer, the NSA’s top technologist, could not believe that the hijackers 
“had been plotting their attack within miles of the NSA’s headquarters in Ft. Mead, 
Maryland.  They’d been here all along”.519  How could an attack happen from inside the 
United States if it was able to effectively secure its borders?  This would presage some of 
the immediate responses to 9/11 such as stronger airport security and increased checks on 
containers coming into the nation’s ports.  Al Qaeda’s actions were illegible within the 
contemporary boundaries that made up the ‘conceptual map’ of US officials. 
 Illegibility extends to any attempt to discern al Qaeda’s chief motivating factors.  
Historian Faisal Devji argues that al Qaeda’s jihad is not political but is instead best 
thought of as ethical or moral.520  Al Qaeda creates a global landscape which works 
beyond geography, cause and effect, “historical ideas and identities”, and ultimately the 
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state itself.  This is why it has proven so hard for th se in the west to appreciate the 
organization, because it is something that makes so little sense in a world of local 
struggles.  Devji argues that “Osama bin Laden is idiscriminate in his invocation of 
domestic and foreign causes for the attacks of 9/11, thus erasing any distinction between 
the two and operating instead at a purely global level…”521  Cian O’Driscoll echoes this 
globalized conception of al Qaeda by pointing out that its members’ “biographies often 
relate to a disdain for national boundaries… travel widely and have little connection with 
their homelands.”522  While it is certainly possible that many recruits did join as a means 
to fight local disputes from Palestine to Chechnya, the ethos of the group was a 
globalized one.  Further, Devji claims that the choi e to attack the US Embassies in 
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 “had nothing to do with their political or military 
status…it depended on the presence of local, willing agents in the region.”523  Former 
defense analyst Kathleen Hicks contends that al Qaeda is “not a territory occupying 
organization”.524  Locality, while present, is secondary.  Contemporary boundaries made 
al Qaeda’s goals “incomprehensible” 525 and the attacks illegible and nearly impossible to 
combat. 
“This is civilization’s fight” 
In this section, I will review the narratives developed by both al Qaeda and its 
enemies in order to demonstrate that a narrative of r visionist violence can be used to 
make sense of al Qaeda’s actions.  These narratives, as pointed about by Mikkel Thorup 
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and others,526 are remarkably similar to those used to brand golden age pirates and 
propagandists as the ‘enemies of mankind’.  In addition to the attacks of September 11, 
2001 in which 2,996 people were killed in New York, Virginia, and rural Pennsylvania, 
the al Qaeda network has been prolific.  Prior to 9/11 these attacks included the bombing 
of a Yemeni hotel, the World Trade Center, US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, 
Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, and the USS Cole.527  In the years following 9/11, they 
have been linked with a series of bombings across the Muslim world in Casablanca, 
Amman, Istanbul, Riyadh, Manilla, Jakarta, and two in Bali in addition to the 
assassination of Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007.528  During this time al 
Qaeda was also able to carry out high casualty attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 
2005.  Al Qaeda also inspired attacks by those withlittle to no formal connections to the 
organization, such as the Patriots’ Day attack in 2013.  Failed plots including the Bojinka 
plot to hijack 12 transpacific planes heading to the United States, an attempt to run a 
plane into the Eiffel Tower,529 an attempt to detonate explosives hidden in shoes530 and 
the Christmas Day bombing531 add to the hysteria.  Al Qaeda has also taken part in local 
struggles in the Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, Yemen, Iraq, and 
Syria,532 among others.  That said, the creation of a crisis and the casting of al Qaeda’s 
actions as revisionist violence does not come naturally from their deeds but in how those 
deeds are translated into threat. 
                                                           
526 Thorup, “Enemy of Humanity”; Land, Enemies of Humanity. 
527 “Timeline: Al Qaeda’s Global Context.” 
528 msnbc. com and NBC News, “Al-Qaida Timeline.” 
529 “Timeline: Al Qaeda’s Global Context.” 
530 “Shoe Bomber.” 
531 “US ‘Foils Underwear Bomb Plot’.” 
532 These last two efforts have combined into a splinter group, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 




Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of al Qaeda is thequestion of what exactly they 
want.  It has been said that they are looking to return to a 10th century caliphate,533 to 
institute sharia across the world or at least in the lands that belong to Islam, to get the 
United States out of the Middle East,534 to end democracy and freedom as we know it,535
and, as a symbolic gesture, to awaken the Umma.536  They have even been accused of 
nihilism537 with the intention of doing harm to, or even starting a war with, the US,538 and 
of looking for revenge.539 Some feel that their goals were utopian and unrealistic and that 
“they want to create a vacuum into which they think goodness and light will suddenly 
pour”.540  There are elements of truth to many of these claims.  For instance, bin Laden 
has said that he bristles under American occupation of the holy land and would like to see 
Palestine “completely liberated and returned to Islamic sovereignty”.541  However, this is 
a recruiting tactic.542  While bin Laden and the al Qaeda leadership were ang red by the 
presence of American military bases in Saudi Arabia nd Israel these were symptoms of 
the larger problem: the global dominance of the secular, liberal state.  Al-Zawahiri claims 
that “Palestine is the cause that has been firing up the feelings of the Muslim nation from 
Morocco to Indonesia…  In addition, it is a rallying point for all Arabs, be they believers 
                                                           
533 Lewis, The Crisis of Islam. 
534 This is an extension of the ‘far enemy’ thesis, see n.2 above.  
535 See quote from Clinton and Bush below 
536 Interviews with Byman, Pillar, Brannen, Hamilton 
537 “they are sort of nihilist, they reject basically everything”, interview with Brannen 
538 Interviews with Benjamin, Hamilton, Brannen 
539 Interview with Byman 
540 This was echoed by many of the people I interviewed.  It shows some of the trouble even today with 
comprehending exactly what al Qaeda was and is after. Quote is from the interview with Brannen. 
541 Bin Laden, Messages to the World, 9. 
542 This is discussed in Devji and was a conversation that I had with Matthew Levitt. Devji, Lanscapes of 




or non-believers, good or evil”.543  Local struggles are meant to act as bases of operation 
and to inflame Muslim sentiment worldwide; their locality is immaterial.544 
One of the common media tropes about al Qaeda is tht it is a throwback to 
another era.  It is fed up with modernity and is looking to recreate the world of the 
prophet.545  The fight is framed as modern vs. pre-modern, enlightened vs. medieval.  
However, as John Gray and Jean Baudrillard argue, this is simply not the case: al Qaeda 
is a creature of modernity.546  It is thoroughly versed in the practices of this era.  It has 
used the internet for communication, the increased movement of peoples to train, recruit, 
and attack, and deregulated financial flows to pool and store money, among others.  It 
also has a modern idea of its own mission and purpose.  Even when it draws upon ancient 
or medieval Arab images and rhetoric, they are put to se for modern ends.  This was 
recognized by the 9/11 commission report, whose authors mused that al Qaeda was 
“more globalized than we were”.547  In this way, al Qaeda is a reflection of the world 
which it is fighting against, which is exactly what makes it so dangerous. 
I would argue that Devji’s contention that al Qaeda’s goals are metaphysical and 
lay outside the realm of politics is half right.  Al Qaeda is quite political, only they are not 
recognized as such by states which can only make sense of Al Qaeda’s religious claims 
on their own terms.  In this way, we can see the distinction between al Qaeda and, for 
instance, a Palestinian cause which was “finally legitimized within an order of 
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intentionality dedicated to the establishment of a national state”.548  The Palestinian cause 
made sense within the state system.  Al Qaeda circa 2001 did not.  It desires freedom, 
justice, wealth, power or other concepts that are usually associated with politics, only “it 
wants them on its own terms,”549 to “define the terms of global social relations outside the 
language of state and citizenship.”550  It is “envisioning a whole new map”.551  This itself 
proves to be a threat to the state while using the very same boundaries set by states (and 
the practices that are challenging them) against it.  If al Qaeda is attempting to field a 
battle on a metaphysical plane where boundaries as we know them are non-existent, even 
engaging in the battle would be perilous for the state.  This is the plane of ‘effects without 
causes’ and al Qaeda itself has little control over th  consequences of its actions.  
According to Devji, the sphere of action is not even one of Muslim autonomy, which is 
the same one occupied by Christians and Jews.  Consequently, there is to be no 
distinction, no boundary.552  This explains why so many have failed to diagnose al 
Qaeda’s mission, leading to the illegibility detailed above.  Its politics do not exist on the 
same plane as its enemies, so state to state or state to citizen relations are unhelpful ways 
to understand them.  What must happen is for the stat to redraw boundaries, to develop 
new practices that can make al Qaeda a ‘legible’ problem.  Devji is not the only one to 
notice this dynamic.  Zarakol argues that al Qaeda is “ threat to both the rules of the 
game and the status-quo state(s)” and “a direct threa  to the international system”.553  
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Ronald Krebs and Jennifer Lobasz argue that al Qaeda “threatens the very logic of 
inside/outside that sustains the modern nation-state”.554   
If al Qaeda has so little control over the consequences of its own actions, we need 
to look at US rhetoric as it regards the GWoT in order to complete this picture.  Krebs 
and Lobasz note that: 
The attacks of September 11 were. according to the dominant discourse, attacks on the 
nation-state, but this should hardly be treated as unproblematic or natural.  These events 
could have been represented differently: for example, as attacks on the central symbols of 
the neoliberal empire, as crimes against humanity, or as crimes against innocents.555 
 
Therefore, the threat posed by al Qaeda is determind as much by the narratives 
developed by the target as by the group itself.  The interpretation of the attack is as 
important in locating the threat as the motivations behind it. 
That the threat posed by al Qaeda was different tha other attacks in US history 
was apparent in President Bush’s first public remarks on the event, before any claims that 
the attack was perpetrated by al Qaeda.  He started his first public speech “Today, our 
fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of 
deliberate and deadly terrorist acts”.556  Notice that the attack is not on the US or upon 
those living in NY and DC or working at the World Trade Center or the Pentagon.  It is 
against a ‘way of life’ and ‘freedom’, concepts that are manifest by, but larger than, a 
particular state.  Just nine days later, this sentiment was displayed in greater detail in a 
speech to Congress announcing the ‘War on Terror’: 
They hate our freedoms—our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to 
vote and assemble and disagree with each other. . . . This is the world’s fight.  This is 
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civilization’s fight.  This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, 
tolerance and freedom.557 
While there is no mention of the state itself as an institution under attack, it has been 
framed such that core values and institutions are at isk.  Two things are important to 
draw out here.  First, recognition that the state as a polity was at risk does not make for 
very good rhetoric.  Remember that the pirates of the golden age attacked ‘god, country 
and labor’ and the propagandists were against ‘institutional and social relations’.  Second, 
in each case what was attacked happened to be the vry ideals upon which the state 
legitimated itself.  In the 18th century this was trade and god, at the turn of the 20th 
century this was order and property, and at the turn of the 21th century this was freedom 
and a democratic way of life.  Hence, by recognizing a d creating a threat to these values, 
there is an implicit recognition of the state itself being under attack.  Of course, these are 
not the only ideals upon which the state legitimated i self in each era, but they are the 
values that state leaders felt were under threat and wanted to mobilize to defend. 
That something new had occurred was recognized by the Bush Administration; 
old ways of doing things were no longer operational because a new threat had emerged.  
In June of 2002, Bush stated that, “Deterrence… means nothing against shadowy terrorist 
networks with no nation or citizens to defend”.558  In 2006, Bush reiterated this point: 
The terrorists who declared war on America represent no nation.  They defend no 
territory.  And they wear no uniform.  They do not mass armies on borders or flotillas of 
warships on the high seas.  They operate in the shadows of society.  They send small 
teams of operatives to infiltrate free nations.  They live quietly among their victims.   
They conspire in secret.  And then they strike without warning.559 
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This echoes the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), which called al Qaeda a 
‘shadowy network’.560  The same sentiment was echoed by other administration officials.  
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage claimed that 9/11 created a “whole new 
world”.561  Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz claimed that, “the old approach 
to terrorism was not acceptable any longer”.562 
Of course, it is not as if the Bush Administration created this rhetoric.  The threat 
of terrorism was something dealt with seriously since at least the 1980s.563  Bush’s 
predecessor, Bill Clinton, used similar rhetoric, framing terrorism in largely similar ways.  
In his remarks following the second most deadly terrorist attack on US soil, the bombing 
of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, Clinton remarked 
that it was undertaken by, “forces that threaten our c mmon peace, our freedom, our way 
of life”. 564  Following US retaliation for al Qaeda perpetrated bombings on the US 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, he stated that, “America is and will remain a target of 
terrorists precisely…because we act to advance peace, democracy, and basic human 
values”.  At stake is the “ongoing struggle between fr edom and fanaticism”.565 
 The nascent narrative on terrorism developed in the 1990s recognized the same 
dangers and used many of the same tropes as Bush’s rhetoric in the wake of 9/11, yet 
there was no crisis.  What solidified the crisis was the creation of the GWoT.  Nine days 
after 9/11, President Bush declared the GWoT and foreshadowed its expansive reach: 
“Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there.  It will not end until 
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every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated”.566  There are 
three parts of this proclamation worth discussing here.  The first is the use of ‘war’, the 
second is the expansiveness of the enterprise, and the third is how the first two combined 
to create what Dana Priest and William Arkin called “Top Secret America”.567 
By casting counterterrorism as part of a war, terrorism was identified as the 
defining national security issue of the 21st century.  Tenet sent out a memo five days after 
the attacks entitled, “We’re at War” in which he proclaimed that the CIA “must give 
people the authority to do things they might not ordinarily be able to do…If there is some 
bureaucratic hurdle, leap it.”568  Similarly, John Poindexter, the new head of the Office of 
Information Awareness at Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), 
remarked in its aftermath that, “This is not busines as usual, we must put introduction of 
new technology on a wartime basis”.569  This use of the term ‘war’ reflects the 
seriousness of the crisis and places it alongside the other cases explored in this study.  
Second, buoyed by the rhetoric of a whole new world, the expansiveness of the war on 
terror was a choice that would have far reaching consequences.570  The GWoT broadened 
the fight from al Qaeda to all terror, terrorism, and terrorists.571  One year after the 
attacks, the 2002 NSS proclaimed the war on terror “a global enterprise of uncertain 
duration”.572  One critic, calling it a “grossly manipulative piece of salesmanship”, argued 
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that “it would be impossible to define any way of there being an end”.573  It included not 
just the US and its traditional allies, but even potential rivals such as Russia and China.   
As much as the ‘coalition of the willing’ and talk of ‘new’ and ‘old’ Europe amongst 
Bush Administration officials are highlighted, the GWoT has proven to be a multi-lateral 
undertaking, signifying the seriousness of the threat.574 
Finally, these two trends combined to throw a veil of secrecy over everything 
remotely related to national security.  As Priest and Arkin argue, “Calling the reaction to 
al Qaeda’s 9/11 attack a ‘war’ ensured that the government could justify classifying 
everything associated with running it”.575  Lee Tien concurs, “It is as if in order to 
mobilize for the War on Terror you have to spread this shroud of secrecy over more and 
more of the government.”576  This veil provided cover not only for labeling everything 
‘national security’ but also allowing a multitude of agencies and contractors to innovate 
ways to defeat the threat, though it was certainly possible for this to happen without such 
secrecy. It hasn’t all been positive for the US government either. This veil has cast a pall 
over the Snowden revelations, making it harder for the public to trust the government that 
it is doing responsible things with the data.577  However, as Matthew Levitt put it, secrecy 
is not an easy thing to get past in the intelligence community: “We won’t be successful in 
today’s world if we don’t keep secrets.”578 
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“Not whether but when” 
 Like the campaigns against the golden age pirates and the anarchist terrorists, the 
early stages of the GWoT were characterized by retrenchment.  During the Clinton 
administration, many saw terrorism as a law enforcement problem.  However, while there 
was recognition that 9/11 shattered current ways of thinking about the world, the 
immediate response reinforced old boundaries.  In some instances, the recognition of a 
‘whole new world’ was used to enact policies that were desired previously.  First, border 
exclusion was enhanced through stricter airline security checks undertaken by the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and by increasing random inspections of 
shipping containers.  Both of these may (or may not) have proven useful in the wider 
GWoT, but they were attempts to reinforce the boundaries that made al Qaeda almost 
impossible to combat.  The enactment of the Patriot Act immediately had a similar effect, 
though its ultimate significance lies with the data surveillance and the new boundaries.579  
However, the most visible response, and arguably the least effective, came from the 
belief that terrorism was caused by bad governments, a  extension of the idea that all 
threats emanate from local struggles.580  This is the logic that brought the United States 
into wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  While the world had changed, the Administration 
changed only in its approach to the same old problems.  Part of the reason for these 
actions was an institutional stickiness based on the capabilities of the US and its 
‘coalition of the willing’.  The military industrial complex of the US provides it with a 
surplus of materials to conduct warfare against other states.  This was especially true 
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prior to 9/11, when counterterrorism and counterinsurgency got much less attention.  The 
surplus of materials to fight interstate wars is evid nce of the belief that all threats 
emanate from local struggles.  This belief was internalized and habituated.  If it was not, 
then new capabilities would have been built that would have made other options more 
likely or at least made this one less so.  This failure of imagination led to the institutional 
and material capability held by the US in the aftermath of 9/11 and these, in turn, played 
a role in the decisions to go into Iraq and Afghanistan. 
There was a clear tactical reason, and possible revenge motive, for going into 
Afghanistan because Taliban leader Muhammad Omar was providing shelter to bin 
Laden, al Zawahiri, and other leading al Qaeda figures.  While the invasion opened up the 
space necessary for the subsequent targeted killing campaign which led to bin Laden’s 
death and crippled core al Qaeda in the region, the war stills drags on thirteen years later.  
It has led to 3,500 coalition fatalities and many more local ones and still no stable Afghan 
government.  However, while the invasion of Afghanistan could be interpreted as a 
necessary undertaking for future drone operations,581 the decision to enter Iraq looks like 
a clear case of retrenchment.  Even as the war ended up costing almost 4,500 American 
lives and probably over 100,000 Iraqi lives,582 not to mention its monetary and political 
costs, few links with al Qaeda have been found.  In fact, al Qaeda only became active in 
the country after the invasion and the current troubles with ISIS have their roots in the 
Iraq War.  Critiques of the Iraq War were common in my talks with policymakers.  A 
more interesting debate that formed in my interviews, however, was whether or not Iraq 
could be considered a counter-terrorism measure.  Pillar said that it was “something they 
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[the Administration] wanted to do anyway.”583  Zelikow argued that the narrative of Iraq 
was “substantially different from the narrative of the War on Terror”.584  Talk of a 
reinvasion of Iraq was common in certain Republican n tional security circles during the 
1990s.585  One administration official remarked that internal debates on Iraq were “about 
not whether but when”.586 
However, others had a different take on the relationship between the Iraq War and 
the GWoT.  Daniel Byman saw it as part of an effort t  stop terrorism by deposing bad 
governments while Daniel Benjamin argued that “the attacks of 9/11 spawned a kind of 
vacuum in National Security thinking about what to do next that led to…the invasion of 
Iraq.”587  Zelikow admitted that the “political climates [for Iraq and the GWoT] are 
insoluble”.588  Here, 9/11 became an opportunity to enact already f vored policies and 
rhetorically coerce political opponents into the Iraq War by painting it as part of the 
GWoT.589  Since al Qaeda was against democracy and freedom as defined by the US, 
Iraqi Leader Sadaam Hussein’s opposition to both painted him into the same corner as 
bin Laden.  In many ways this echoed the battle lins of the Cold War: democracy and 
capitalism vs. a communist other. 
 Administration rhetoric tied the Iraq War into the GWoT.  Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld testified before the U.S. Senate in 2002 on Iraq: 
“Last week we commemorated the one-year anniversary of the most devastating attack 
our nation has ever experienced, more than 3,000 people killed in a single day.  And 
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today I want to discuss the task of preventing even more devastating attacks, attacks that 
could kill not thousands but potentially tens of thousands of our fellow citizens”.590 
 
Wolfowitz listed the reasons for the war as follows: “One is weapons of mass destruction, 
the second is support for terrorism, the third is the criminal treatment of the Iraqi people. 
Actually I guess you could say there's a fourth overriding one which is the connection 
between the first two.”591  Internally, he complained that the reason we were not tying 
Saddam to al Qaeda was a “failure of imagination”.592  The war became part of a larger 
counterterrorism strategy built around a ‘community of democracies’.  As stated in the 
2006 NSS: 
Free governments are accountable to their people, govern their territory effectively, and 
pursue economic and political policies that benefit their citizens.  Free governments do 
not oppress their people or attack other free natios. Peace and international stability are 
most reliably built on a foundation of freedom.593 
 
Freedom is equated with the state and, in this formulation, is a major pillar of the GWoT.  
Even if the real reason in the minds of Administration officials had little to do with al 
Qaeda,594 Iraq was justified through the GWoT, sold as part of a larger ‘solution’ to the 
crisis whereby bad states made terrorists.  The dominant narrative became al Qaeda vs. 
democracy and freedom; the only way to beat them and make the world safe for 
American ideals was to start spreading those ideals, with force if necessary. 
 The world’s most powerful state and its ‘coalition f the willing’ responded to the 
threat by doubling down on current boundaries, trying to understand the threat through 
familiar conceptual maps.  That the invasion of Iraq was something advocated for by 
Administration officials before they got into power only strengthens this argument.  
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According to their conceptual maps, the non-state thr ats came from states in the form of 
tyranny or weakness in ‘troubled’ areas such as the Middle East, Africa, and Central 
Asia.  Despite the shattering of 9/11, the response was still to reinforce old boundaries 
and old ways of acting in the world.  It was only with their failure that new strategies 
could take root and old habits were well and truly shattered. 
“The robot is our answer to the suicide bomber.” 
 The invasions of Iraq did little to advance the GWoT.  While it could be argued 
that the invasion of Afghanistan exposed al Qaeda’s le dership and forced it on the run, 
the war itself was far from enough.  Other tools would be needed, creativity was 
paramount.  Two tools have become prominent.  The first is the start of targeted killing 
campaigns largely conducted by unmanned aircraft or drones.  The second was the 
NSA’s program to collect and analyze metadata.  Each is taken in turn below. 
 However, before we start to talk about what has been effective in the GWoT, it is 
best to talk about whether or not there has been succe s.  First, what does success mean?  
Most have stated that success must mean preventing at acks.  On this score, those I talked 
to were unanimous that the GWoT has played a role in the small number of attacks on US 
soil and to US interests.  However, no one seems to think that the job is done, with one 
source commenting that it is “not yet complete and may not be complete for some 
time”.595  Another commented that he does not see much strategy nd suggested that it is 
“all tactical and operational”.596  Other types of successes have been pointed out, ranging 
from the decimation of the core al Qaeda597 to the new funding streams for national and 
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homeland security.598  Neither does this have to be a complete victory.  Janine Davidson 
openly questioned whether or not the War on Terror could ever go away,599 while several 
shared Dan Byman’s thought that “If you set the bar at, ‘there will be a Boston Marathon 
attack every couple of years’ I think people could go on with their lives”. 
 However, there have been two other interesting strands from these discussions.  
The first is that a few of the people I talked to suggested that the War on Terror will be 
over when it is no longer a top priority.  Paul Pillar pointed this out, arguing that the 
GWoT will be over when we no longer care about it.600  Kathleen Hicks said that it was 
about “managing terrorism”.601  Along this line, Shane Harris asserted that “We are going 
to be fighting terrorists for a long, long time.  But we are not going to do it with our 
army”.602  When we bring counterterrorism off of a war footing, provided that basic goals 
seem met and it is not in defeat, the crisis itself wil  begin to dissipate, new boundaries 
will be drawn and the GWoT will be seen as some sort of success.  This we can see today 
as the GWoT begins to take a back seat to other national security priorities and the NSA 
revelations bring critical focus on national security activities. 
 The other interesting strand is that a majority of the people I talked to mentioned 
the evolving nature of the threat.  Many mentioned how al Qaeda had fragmented and is 
now as much a brand name for groups such as al Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haraam in 
Nigeria, and, until recently, ISIS, among others.603  Others pointed out the new localized 
nature of the threat, with one stating that, “I do think there has been a re-localization of 
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the jihad”.604  This is particularly evident in the rise of ISIS and their attempts to govern 
territory in Mesopotamia and the Levant.  Neither of these points were made as evidence 
that the War on Terror has been successful.605  Yet, they could be read as such.  If al 
Qaeda is now a series of franchisees focused on territory, then much of the battle has 
already been won.  ISIS can be made sense of within the state system because it is 
looking to control territory.606  It is now entrant violence and no longer a threat to the core 
of the system. 
Targeted Killing 
 While Predator and Reaper drones have become synonymous with the GWoT, the 
history of unmanned aircraft stretches back before 9/11.  Budgeting and research in the 
United States started in the 1970s, use began in the 1990s, and drone operations were 
common in combat theaters in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Richard Clarke pushed for the 
installation of a program using Predator drones armed with Hellfire missiles in counter-
terror operations prior to 9/11.607  Of course, there was resistance to the use of drones.  As 
Rob Finkelstein, president of Robotic Technology, Inc., complained, the lack of 
implementation over the past 20 years was due to “friggin brain dead bureaucrats who 
have no vision…The sad thing is that many useful systems could have been fielded years 
ago,” saving many lives.608  Following 9/11 this turned quickly.  As one US researcher 
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has put it, “the robot is our answer to the suicide bomber.”609 Here we have the GWoT 
opening up space for both the government and the private sector to develop such weapons 
platforms for the purpose of counterterrorism, taking advantage of pre-existing 
technology for a new purpose.  As described below, targeted killing and drone usage did 
not become until after they proved successful. 
Unmanned aircraft, or drones, have been used for three purposes.  The first is in 
traditional military operations.  Drones have provided air cover to operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and were used to help create a no fly zone in Libya.610  Secondly, they can be 
a method of surveillance, gaining information in hotspots in a manner not too dissimilar 
from the U2 spy planes of the Cold War.  Finally, they have been used to kill suspected 
terrorists.  Targeted killing, or signature strikes, began under the Bush administration as 
CIA programs started in Yemen in 2002 and Pakistan in 2004.  But they have really 
grown under the Obama Administration, which has taken “on the more targeted, more 
kinetic operations, especially with drones, that were beginning to come on line in the last 
year of Bush and put a great deal of emphasis on that and were focusing on decapitation 
of terrorist groups”.611  In other words, the Obama Administration only made it policy 
once it had an inside look at its possibilities andthen they ran with it. The Bush 
Administration oversaw 47 drone attacks in Pakistan between 2005 and 2009 while the 
Obama administration oversaw 52 strikes in 2009 alone f llowed by 112, 73, 48, and 26 
from 2010-2013.612  That means that in each of his first four years in office, Barack 
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Obama saw more signature strikes in Pakistan than his predecessor did in his last four 
years combined.613  In addition, the Obama Administration has overseen another 80 drone 
and 15 traditional air strikes in Yemen.614  These strikes have killed 35 known al Qaeda 
leaders in Yemen and 58 in Pakistan as of 2013 and a total of 3,500 militants overall.615 
 The Justice Departments of both Bush and Obama have m intained not only that 
the GWoT is a war but that targeted killings are lawful in wars zones.  Indeed, Obama’s 
Attorney General Eric Holder has suggested a similarity between a drone strike and the 
tracking of the plane of Japanese General Isoroku Yamamoto during the Second World 
War.616  Putting aside questions of legality and just war, these claims demonstrate that the 
GWoT is the justification for these campaigns.617  The US has not always endorsed 
targeted killing.  In July of 2001, Martin Indyk, the US ambassador to Israel, publicly 
called his host country out for the targeted killings of HAMAS officials, saying, “They 
are extrajudicial killings, we do not support that.” 618  It was not until the threat of al 
Qaeda presented itself that it became thinkable for the United States to use such a tactic 
as a regular part of its national security operations. 
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 Drone bases have proliferated over this period.  There are six operational bases in 
Pakistan, despite closings amid public controversy.619  In fact, closings and reallocations 
may be part of a larger strategy to make sure that operations are not interrupted by the 
attention given to any single base.620  Drone operations in Yemen are undertaken from 
bases in Saudi Arabia and operations in North and Western Africa have increasingly been 
undertaken from a base in Niger.621  There are also major hubs in Ethiopia and the 
Seychelles622 and a base recently closed in Djibouti.  In addition, there are reportedly 64 
drone bases in the United States.623 
 The proliferation of drone bases around the world has not necessarily been met 
with resistance.  Niger has welcomed the use of drones for surveillance to help to protect 
its own borders from being breached by Islamic fundamentalists from Mali, Nigeria, and 
Libya because, as President Mahamadou explained, “We rely on countries like France 
and the United States, we need co-operation to ensur  our security”.624  Drone bases in 
Pakistan have come under fire from the Pakistani public and the Pakistani government, 
but there is evidence that top Pakistani leaders are not only accepting of drones but have 
asked for them.  General Ashfaq Kayani asked the US for “continuous predator 
coverage” of the tribal areas even as he publicly assailed the program as “unjustified and 
intolerable”.625 
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 There are, of course, downsides to these attacks.  Fir t, many have claimed that 
these attacks create more radicals than they kill, especially in places like Yemen and 
Pakistan which have already been hotbeds of terrorist activity.  In fact, reports have 
suggested that the recent attacks on the US embassy in Benghazi were, at least in part, 
retribution for the drone strike that killed al Qaed  leader Abu Yahya al-Libi.626  This 
position was common amongst my interviewees, with many mentioning that the side 
effects of targeted killing are serious.627  Second, such attacks also kill innocents.  For 
instance one 2013 attack in Yemen is estimated to have killed 11-15 civilians at a 
wedding attended by a supposed militant.628 
 One incident in particular encapsulates many of the complex problems that 
targeted killing presents.  Yemeni cleric Salem Ahmed bin ali Jaber got some local 
recognition for speaking out against al Qaeda militants in his area.  Local al Qaeda 
leaders decided to meet with him and, upon guaranteeing his security, they met under a 
tree near his mosque to talk about ali Jaber’s remaks.  However, during this meeting, all 
of the men in the outdoor meeting were killed from a drone attack. 629  Not only did an 
innocent die, but it was a man who had spoken out against the militants and could have 
been a local ally to the US in the region.  However, the assumption was made that since 
he was talking to members of the organization he was guilty by association.  Even if 
drones are more precise630 than traditional aircraft, the decision making process is still 
open to human bias and error.  In addition, many do worry that these riskier missions are 
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being undertaken because the technology is available.  It becomes a “we got a hammer, 
we start seeing more nails kind of phenomenon”.631 
Finally, there are data problems.  Since it is very hard to get numbers on whether 
or not a militant or a civilian is killed, accounts tend to differ.  The United States counts 
all able-bodied military aged males, including some as young as 16 year old 
Abdulrahman Awlaki, as ‘combatants’ in cases with no confirmation.  According to one 
official, “It bothers me when they say there were seven guys, so they must all be 
militants…They count the corpses and they’re not really sure who they are.”632  The New 
America Foundation has estimated that 400 civilians have been killed,633 while the 
Bureau for Investigative Journalism estimates as many as 881 civilians have been killed 
through 2012, including 176 children.634  However, such claims are challenged not only 
by the Obama Administration’s figures but also by those who argue that there is no way 
of getting reliable data from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) since no 
one has access.635  Civilian death tolls do not account for the ‘damage’ done to civilians 
living in territories that are constantly surveyed by drones, which some view as 
substantial.636  The US has recently declassified information stating that drone attacks 
have “close to the same number of civilian casualties per incident as manned aircraft, and 
were an order of magnitude more likely to result in civilian casualties per engagement”.637  
Drone technology also tends be used in tougher situations.  The technology has given the 
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US confidence to attack in situations previously thought impossible, leading to the deaths 
of terrorist targets in conjunction with more civilians deaths. 
NSA Data Collection 
The ability to tap into systems carrying data for phone and internet use has existed 
for some time.  Former US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara attempted to design a 
similar system called IRIS in the early 1980s and the idea of data collection dates at least 
as far back as HG Wells’ conception of the World Brain in 1938.638  John Poindexter, 
Ronald Reagan’s National Security Advisor, started to evelop basic systems to connect 
information in real time as a tool of counterterrorism following the bombing of a US 
barracks in Lebanon by Hezbollah in 1983.639  Prior to 9/11, the US also had a data 
system named CARNIVORE.640  Multiple sources confirmed that data collection had 
begun in the late 1990s641 but, as Kleinsmith and his colleagues discovered, it never got 
the full funding or attention its adherents thought necessary. 
The barriers to using and implementing such systems began to melt away after 
9/11.  The attack “obviously provided the rationale for the ramping up of increased 
surveillance... it may have happened that at some point we may have tried to do that but it 
becomes easier to sell that we are doing that after 9/11.”642  It also made it easier to ask 
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for assistance from telecommunications companies: “In 2002 or 2003…it was easier for 
the NSA to go to the companies here in the states and s y ‘this is a high national priority’, 
we strongly want you to cooperate. You get the cooperation”.643   
Many in the intelligence community took the attacks as a failure, a shattering of a 
previous practice, and were not only open to new methods of intelligence gathering and 
analysis but also to stretching the boundaries of legality.  Poindexter recalls spending the 
next few days after the attack sketching out a program he called Total Information 
Awareness, or TIA, claiming that, “The key to fighting terrorism is information”.644  He 
would later become the head of the Information Awareness Office inside DARPA.  In 
addition to information itself, analytical tools were needed.  James Heath, of the US 
Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), has stated that the point of Able Danger 
was to, “interact with it [the data], allow you to find needles within that haystack 
effectively and quickly”.645  At the same time, NSA Director Michael Hayden began to 
use Executive Order 12333, signed by Reagan to counteract the formation of the foreign 
Intelligence Service Act (FISA) court, to begin collecting correspondence which included 
only one foreign correspondent.  In 2001, President Bush decided that the collection of 
meta-data was not against the constitution.646  Hayden’s agency would create a program 
called BAG, or “Big Ass Graph”, to collect and make sense of communication.  These 
two systems would eventually converge to create the programs leaked by Edward 
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Snowden in the summer of 2013.647  Similar programs have been developed by other 
agencies such as the Terrorist Finance Tracking Proram (TFTP) which sorts through 
bank records and transactions passing through the Belgium-based company SWIFT – for 
which the Treasury Department has a subpoena – with an eye to tracing and intercepting 
terrorist funding.  It has reportedly led to the capture of at least one important Southeast 
Asian al Qaeda leader in 2006.648  The department claims that this is not data-mining 
since most people do not undertake the types of transactions captured by the program.649  
Again, the GWoT creates space for low level innovations in counter-terror that end up 
becoming official policy not through central directive but through proven ‘success’.  
The GWoT has been widely cited as justification for the collection of bulk meta-
data.650  Hayden’s pitch to telecom companies for user datachanged from cyber-attacks to 
terrorism immediately after 9/11 and was met with some success.651  Decryption 
programs are justified as helping the US defeat “terrorists, dissidents, and other targets”652 
while the NSA uses the failure to ‘connect the dots’ prior to 9/11 as a justification for its 
data collection methods.653  President Obama has justified the program with a specific 
example, “The program grew out of a desire to address a gap identified after 9/11.  One 
of the 9/11 hijackers, Khalid al-Mihdhar, made a phone call from San Diego to a known 
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al- Qaida safehouse in Yemen.”654  Then FBI director Robert Mueller corroborated this in 
a House judiciary meeting, “If we had had this program in place at the time, we would 
have been able to identify that particular telephone number in San Diego.”655 This 
suggests that al-Mihdhar could have been caught in time to prevent 9/11.  It is claimed 
that 300 terrorists have been captured using the search tool XKeyScore, which allows 
analysts to search emails without oversight,656 and the US commander in Iraq has claimed 
that signals intelligence removed 4,000 insurgents from the battlefield during the 2008 
surge.657  The NSA also claims that their foreign data collection operations alerted them 
to Najibullah Zazi, who, upon capture, admitted to planning a bombing of the New York 
subway system.  In England, the MI5 chief has claimed that GCHQ’s collection efforts 
are necessary because there are “several thousand Isl mist extremists [in the UK]”. 658 
Of course, the NSA runs into legal problems when colle ting bulk meta-data.659  
Telephony data can only be collected and stored if one end of a conversation is outside 
the US and warrants are necessary for looking into these conversations.  Warrants are 
also necessary in order to look into internet searches and communications within the 
United States.  Some of these problems have been clared legally.  For instance, a three 
month rolling FISA ruling enabled by Patriot Act section 215 and FISA act 702 allows 
the NSA to collect phone data from major providers such as Verizon on communications 
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that have one US customer involved.660  Many privacy advocates claim the NSA is also 
collecting data from international servers, regardless of whether communication includes 
US persons.661 
Other problems have been dealt with by pushing these legal boundaries.  The 
NSA works with a ‘three-hops’ rule wherein the NSA starts with a number and can then 
look at the number of anyone connected three degrees of separation away.662  When using 
internet data, analysts are given discretion about whether or not the communication the 
NSA wants to tap into is domestic or includes a foreign component and are also warned 
not to “ask about or speculate on sources or methods”.663  If there is reason to think that 
the data is domestic after capture, the analyst is allowed to look inside it to confirm.  In 
addition, it has been ruled that the NSA can keep such data for as long as it keeps 
international data.664  Another potential circumvention is cooperation with allies such as 
the UK and Israel.665  The US has given GCHQ, its UK equivalent, $100 million dollars 
for unknown ‘deliverables’666 since there are fewer restrictions for collection in the UK.667  
France also has a comparable program.668  The NSA claims that it has worked in 
partnership with more than 30 countries but maintains that it does not ask for “what the 
NSA is itself prohibited by law from doing”,669 i.e. spying on American citizens. 
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 Both the NSA and GCHQ have worked in conjunction with tech companies to 
collect data in two different ways.  First, there a“upstream” collections where the NSA 
gains access to private fiber optic cables.  This is done through a series of partnerships, 
such as FAIRVIEW and STORMBREW where the NSA partners with a particular 
company.670  Second there is the PRISM program where the NSA gains access to the 
servers of these companies.671  As one NSA document boasts, “Prism is a team sport!” 672  
There is evidence that the NSA has paid companies for compliance costs,673 while 
Microsoft is alleged to have worked with the NSA by allowing the agency access to the 
latest version of Microsoft Outlook.674  GCHQ has been working with companies such as 
BT and Vodafone.675  Other companies have begun to report requests,676 though some, 
like Apple, deny complying at all, despite growing evidence that this is not the case.677 
 Many claim that the benefit of these programs may not exceed costs to privacy.  
Privacy advocates label increasing government surveillance as “anathema to 
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democracy,”.678  “The more surveillance there is, the less democratic our nation will 
become”.679  David Husband remarks, “understanding how the government’s power over 
you has increased is vital to our civil discourse”.680  Greenwald links privacy to human 
creativity.681  When asked to justify his decision to leak confidential files on these 
programs, Snowden remarked in reference to the XKeyScore, “I, sitting at my desk, 
[could] wiretap anyone, from you or your accountant, to a federal judge or even the 
president, if I had a personal email”.682  A recent report by the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board (PCLOB) – a US Executive branch agency created through the 
recommendations of the 9/11 commission – hints at the ‘preventing 9/11’ narrative.  The 
report claims that al-Mihdhar’s call had actually been intercepted by the NSA but it had 
no information about his whereabouts whereas the CIA had knowledge that al-Mihdhar 
had entered the country.  All the information necessary was already in the US: “The 
failure…stemmed primarily from a lack of information sharing among federal agencies, 
not of a lack of surveillance capabilities...This was a failure to connect the dots, not a 
failure to connect enough dots.”683  The PCLOB report also refutes the numbers of 
thwarted attacks claimed by the NSA, a position backed up by the failure of a presidential 
task force to claim a single attack was thwarted.684  However, Michael Hayden called the 
deleterious effects of the GWoT “light stuff” compared to other wartime misdeeds in US 
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history and asked me “What liberties have you lost?” 685  There is also some debate and 
question over how much data the NSA actually collects and looks at.  It claims that it can 
collect only 1.6% of all internet communication and 0.00004% of all internet use. 
However, Jeff Jarvis claims that after streaming, HTTP, and person to person (P2P) file 
sharing are taken into account, the NSA can monitor “practically everything that 
matters”.686 
 The success of both targeted killing and data colle tion is still to be determined 
but a narrative of success is developing.  There are some numbers and verifiable 
successes related to the targeted killing campaign: 93 al Qaeda leaders and 3,500 
militants have been killed via drones as of 2013, including Osama bin Laden, and there 
have been no US casualties.  Whether or not it is obl terating al Qaeda or is actually as 
precise as the Administration says that it is, it appears to be thought a success.  My 
interviewees with policymaking experience, to a person, were convinced drones have 
proven a tactical success.687  As Benjamin noted, “If we had drone technology back then 
[the late 1990s] it would have been a whole different story but we would also have 
needed the political will to do it.”688  There is skepticism about their usefulness as part of 
an overall strategy.  Beyond questions of civilian deaths, many see targeted killing as a 
tactic that has been elevated to a strategy with little purpose other than killing terrorists.689  
Michael Hayden claimed that, “we always knew that drone use would make it harder to 
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change the facts on the ground”.690  And, as one former defense department official 
stated, “so and so got schwacked, so and so is up to get schwacked, but where is the 
assessment of what this did to the network?”.691 
There is more disagreement about the effectiveness of the bulk collection of data.  
Most policymakers I spoke with were adamant that the programs were successful and that 
Snowden’s leaks weakened US national security.  However, it is hard to identify concrete 
successes.  Zelikow claims that the nature of intell gence is, “such that it is very difficult 
without a lot of sustained work to actually separate which particular intelligence 
programs, even within the NSA, contribute to various finished intelligence reports 
circulated by the NSA and other intelligence agencis.”692  He continues with a specific 
use for bulk collection: “let’s say in August 2001, which was actually the case in the 9/11 
story, and you wanted to go backwards and find out a lo more, we didn’t have that 
before 9/11.  The question was how can we reverse engin er this to prevent a 9/11 style 
attack”.  Another interviewee told me that “Zazi was caught because people are looking 
now”.  However, many privacy advocates are much more skeptical, claiming either that 
a) that there is little evidence that such programs work or b) there is no way to tell with so 
little transparency.  David Husband commented that, “If they tell you they can’t do cost-
benefit analysis that is an even more damning indictment of the program because that 
means they don’t even know how much it costs and what it’s doing and what benefit it’s 
                                                           
690 Interview with Hayden 
691 Interview with Brannen 




having.”693  Some policymakers are even skeptical that the bulk col ection of phone 
programs has been successful.694 
A narrative of success built on the principles of this project would go something 
like this.  What these programs have done is make it harder for al Qaeda to exist as a 
transnational group with little to no relationship to particular territorial jurisdictions.  The 
use of surveillance tools ranging from the bulk collection of phone and internet data to 
the TFTP have made the environment in which al Qaeda thrived less hospitable.  While 
goods, people, money, and ideas still cross borders, it is harder to conceal those 
movements.  This is one reason why we are seeing a re-localization of the jihad because 
it is much harder to conduct a transnational campaign gainst the state if the state can see 
what you are doing.  Similarly, drone strikes have crippled the upper levels of al Qaeda 
leadership, hastening the move to fragmentation that many of my interviewees pointed 
out.  It may be true that drone strikes have not been placed into a coherent strategic plan, 
but it appears that they are having an effect as ifthey were a part of one.  This effect, in 
conjunction with the rise of data surveillance, is ultimately easing the threat of revisionist 
violence even if it is simultaneously stoking other threats. 
A second narrative of their success is that both targe ed killing and data 
surveillance are becoming the go-to techniques of counterterrorism.  If “robots are our 
answer to suicide bombers”, then they may be making se se of al Qaeda and giving the 
state a way to defend itself.  One former drone operator confirms, “We’re not going after 
people – we’re going after their phones, in the hopes that the person on the other end of 
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that missile is the bad guy.”695  Byman comments that, “A number of our biggest kills 
were people we didn’t know were there.”696  These programs have been the culmination 
of the intelligence community’s post-9/11 efforts, the secret to unlocking counter-
terrorism.  Simply by working how they are supposed to, they can become a success.  As 
David Lyon put it, “Seeking superior technologies appears as the primary goal”.697  All of 
this points to the social construction and historical contingency inherent in talking about 
the meaning of success.  There simply is no way to measure it a priori; as Dewey 
outlines, it changes with the narrative. 
“There will be chalk dust on my cleats” 
The targeted killing and data surveillance programs re new innovations 
developed for and justified by the GWoT.  They have met some success and have the 
potential to result in the redrawing of the boundaries of sovereign authority.  Where these 
new boundaries will be drawn is still unknown as the process of reforming and 
institutionalizing relevant practices is still developing.698  In this section, I will focus on 
three major consequences and how they might result in redrawn boundaries: The move 
from new cyberspace boundaries focusing on collection which have moved borders 
assites of exclusion to sites of collection, the extension of national security into new 
territorial realms, and new practices of citizenship.  Unlike in the previous two cases, 
these boundaries are still developing and therefore what I discuss below is speculation.  It 
should not be confused with prediction, but is instead an attempt to think through the 
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consequences of each new development in one or more theoretically informed 
avenue(s).699 
Much of what follows can be interpreted as part of what philosopher Gilles 
Deleuze has termed the ‘control society’.700  The control society focuses on power and 
builds upon Foucault’s distinction between sovereign power and disciplinary power.701  
Sovereign power, utilized up through the 18th or 19th century, located power in the 
person(s) of the sovereign.  Crime, for instance, was conceived as a trespass against this 
person and punishment – public displays of power and penitence – demonstrated this 
conception.  Disciplinary power, on the other hand, was used to change behavior and 
took place in enclosed, sealed off places such as te chool, the factory and the prison.  It 
is best encapsulated by Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon, a prison with a tower encircled by 
cells which allowed for the observation of any prisoner at any time.702 
In contrast, the control society manipulates behavior by controlling flows.  If the 
panopticon is the archetype of disciplinary surveillance, the surveillant assemblage plays 
a similar role for the control society.703  The assemblage, a concept developed by Deleuze 
and Felix Guattari,704 is a formation of power that is decentralized.  The surveillant 
assemblage is noticeable in the shift from Big Brother-style government oversight to a 
flattened apparatus which includes private entities.  For example, PRISM depends upon 
data first collected from private entities such as Google and Verizon.  Similarly, much 
surveillance used in police work is actually done by private entities in the form of CCTV 
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cameras at gas stations, malls, etc. As Wilkinson and Lippert argue, “The de-centralized 
SA [surveillant assemblage] refers to an array of state and non-state institutions, 
technologies, and forms of information that become temporarily and loosely stitched 
together.”705 
Much like Hall’s shift from a dynastic to a territorial sovereign identity and 
Bobbitt’s change from state-nation to nation-state, th  ‘control society’ template, while 
capturing some of the larger processes at work, is not determinative and cannot explain 
the redrawing of a single boundary or its content.  Similarly, the assemblage concept goes 
too far in writing the state out of the future of politics.  While one can recognize the state 
is not the only important actor, it is the contentio  here that the GWoT has re-inserted the 
state into a process in which it had not previously been intimately involved.  It remains 
the pivotal actor, not one among many.  As David Lyon puts it, “The responses of 
September 11 are a stark reminder that for all its changing shape since World War II the 
nation state is still a formidable force”.706  While data collection does seem to follow the 
‘assemblage’ logic with CCTV cameras, credit card companies, internet and phone 
service providers, and social media companies (among others) standing as examples, it is 
the state that is able, legally and practically, to collect all of this information in one place 
and search it.707  This is reflected in the controversy over PRISM because the US 
government has worked in concert with Microsoft, legally forced Verizon to hand over 
data, and captured data without the consent or knowledge of some companies.  Exactly 
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how much data the state can and will take from private sources is still undecided as 
Google and other companies attempt to encrypt data to keep it proprietary.708  However, 
the state still becomes the possible conveyor of all data within its boundaries however 
defined and the only entity which can make claims of national or physical security 
making the bulk collection of meta-data possible.  The assemblage becomes a boundary 
whereby the state “allows” the collection of data which makes its security and control 
possible.  This extends sovereignty into the realm of cyberspace. 
One site for the redrawing of boundaries is the use of borders themselves.  
Targeted killing and data surveillance have led to the institutionalization of surveillance 
across borders.  The processes which have been culled together and termed 
‘globalization’ have made it easier to cross and even transcend borders, which is 
important to an organization like al Qaeda which alre dy views itself as existing on a 
global, metaphysical plane.  In response, the United States and others have begun to 
develop tools that adjust to these flows by drawing a new boundary that keeps track of 
them.  Un- or pre-collected data is on one side of this boundary, collected data is on the 
other.  Deleuze argues that what matters about borders in the 21st century “is not the 
barrier [or exclusion] but the computer that tracks each person’s position – licit or 
illicit”. 709  This creates a world where “flows open up spaces of control and…spaces of 
control contain flows”.710  Security changes from logics of exclusion where borders are 
meant to keep people out to logics of collection, where they are sites of control over 
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flows.711  Controlling flows does not mean that flows stop crossing borders but instead 
that the state is aware of them, tracks them, and c funnel them into the spaces, 
territorial and conceptual, it desires.  The tracking of terrorist activity using data 
surveillance does not stop such transactions from cr ssing borders, but it alerts the state 
when a suspicious transaction does occur so that it c n be investigated and acted upon.  
This is what has been dangerous to al Qaeda, not attempts to halt flows as such through, 
for instance, increased searches of shipping containers. 
These flows do blur some traditional borders and it is entirely possible that 
‘borders’ will be more associated with checkpoints i  the future than with claimed 
territory.712  As Vukov and Sheller argue, “These securitized corrid rs reach further out 
into transnational space (i.e. US borders checks on foreign territory) and deeper into 
domestic interior space (i.e. Mexican border checkpoints move hundreds of miles into US 
territory).”713  However, more likely is a two-tiered border system where the collection 
stations will be located in and outside of traditional borders while those borders will still 
demarcate what is to be governed and protected.714  This idea of borders is already 
making its way into the US National Security establishment.  This can bee seen in the 
2014 Quadrennial Security Review which states that one of the highest priorities of 
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national security is: “securing and managing flows of people and goods into and out of 
the United States”.715 
As surveillance begins to travel across borders, it i  inevitable that we will see 
claims of a breach in the sovereignty of other state .  While programs like Boundless 
Informant allow for the collection and searching of data from the developing countries 
that make up the world’s ‘hotspots’, the NSA has been spying on allies as well.716  
However, it is the drone program which really presses this issue. The US is implicitly 
claiming a unilateral right to kill the citizens ofther countries which pose a threat to it.  
This is a change from the treatment of supposed ‘failed’ or ‘weak’ states prior to the 
GWoT.  Of course, as Krasner makes clear, the territorial borders and jurisdictions of 
weaker states have been breached by stronger states inc  the inception of the state itself.  
However, in the latter half of the 20th century, a juridical norm of state independence 
formed as a part of decolonization.  Even as borders are breached in the name of 
humanitarian (or other) intervention, the state as a juridical ideal is not challenged.  This 
dynamic is front and center in the ‘failed’ or ‘quasi’ state literature that has been so 
prevalent since the end of the Cold War.717  It became a part of the conceptual map of 
political elites to think that the world’s problems are best ‘solved’ – or the goods of a 
liberal system are best achieved – in a world completely delineated by sovereign entities.  
This may be unraveling. 
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 There are a few possibilities here.  First, we could see the rise of what Hardt and 
Negri call ‘Imperial Sovereignty’ – a conception of rule where space is always open and 
frontiers predominate over borders.718  Drones kill foreign nationals in foreign countries 
without their consent, creating frontiers of action f r the world’s powerful states, 
especially the US, at the expense of the sovereign t rritories of weaker states.719  The 
GWoT has created the ‘permanent’ exception that allows for this imperium with 
“constant martial activity in the homeland and abroad”.720  This seems similar to the 
construction of a world without clear boundaries, or at least clear borders.  Another 
variant might be a world with boundaries securing many of the world’s most powerful 
states but a larger area with little recognition of b rders wherein such battles are largely 
carried out.  This would be similar to the world of 1900 without the formal colonial 
structures. 
 Hardt and Negre, like the ‘control society’ literature, tend to write the state out of 
the future.  While the state is nominally at the center of this ‘imperial sovereignty’, the 
permanent exception removes the need for boundaries.  Thi  is not the logic of the state.  
A more likely scenario is a change in the meaning of boundaries for weaker, ‘quasi’ 
states.  This may mean the development of a practice whereby threats to a state’s 
homeland are considered a part of their jurisdiction, even if it is hard to envision this right 
being recognized if Pakistan were looking to kill someone on US territory.  These 
boundaries will only be available to the powerful.  It could mean the development of an 
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open air space for surveillance with certain exceptions in a manner similar to the sea.  It 
could also mean the recognition that certain states do not control all of their territories 
and these territories are then open game for those whose national security depends on 
activities therein.  In all three scenarios, weaker states keep their sovereignty and may 
even gain some measure of national security but would l se some of the control or 
authority that they currently have.  This is reflected in the proliferation of drone bases 
throughout Africa.  While AFRICOM is too controversial for any state to host its 
command (it is run from Germany), drone bases have proliferated in Mali, Niger, and 
Djibouti among others.721  Even civilian airports have been used to launch operations.722  
The boundaries of sovereign authority are redrawn to reflect the reality of drone 
campaigns.  In theory, such changes could be applied anywhere in the world, but it is 
hard to imagine such changes taking place in the West or in parts of East Asia.  What we 
can say is that states that cannot capture data will be more vulnerable because they will 
not be able to control flows and stop possible attacks.  States that cannot stop or prevent 
surveillance, whether through drones or data, will be under the surveillance those who 
can.  Weaker states may even ask for surveillance from powerful states as Niger, Yemen, 
and Pakistan have done from the US at different times.  However, they will do this in the 
name of their own sovereignty.723 
 The other big possible change in boundaries is the effect of the creeping 
expansion of domestic surveillance on boundaries separating public/private and 
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citizen/alien.  Many of those I talked to see the lin between domestic and international 
intelligence vanishing, with 9/11 comission co-chair Lee Hamilton remarking that, “it’s 
kind of an artificial distinction…  There is a growing recognition that at some place 
intelligence needs to come together and this distinctio  between domestic and foreign 
must not be an inhibitor to the sharing of information.”724  This trend could manifest itself 
in two ways.  First, it changes the state’s view of its own citizens.  Of course, the state 
has always tried to classify those living within its boundaries, to make them ‘legible’.  
What we are seeing today is yet another derivation of this.  Such a new derivation means 
the drawing of new boundaries.  While classification has always been a part of the state, 
the method by which it is manifest has changed.725  Previously, surveillance tracked 
bodies and their traces – for instance fingerprints a d DNA samples.726  Surveillance in 
the 21st century is no longer about bodies but about data stre ms; what Roger Clarke has 
called ‘dataveillance’, the fingerprints of the 21st century.727  As Hall and Mendel argue, a 
fingerprint and other bodily markers recreate past events while ‘dataveillance’ attempts to 
predict future events via the connections and relations of data elements as opposed to the 
elements themselves.  Predicting the ‘rare event’ of terrorism now means looking into 
ordinary transactions such as shopping records and tr vel itineraries.  This creates a 
‘threatprint’ or a, “future digital footprint of a threat not yet in existence” which extends a 
person into the future.728  It should also be mentioned that the targets of surveillance are 
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implicated by using credit cards, travelling, and ejoying the advantages that Google, for 
one, provides as it collects data.729 
So what does this do to the citizen?  Wall and Monaha  argue that what they call 
“‘the drone stare’ is a type of surveillance that abstracts people from contexts, thereby 
reducing variation, difference, and noise that may impede action or introduce moral 
ambiguity”.  Drones turn “bodies into ‘targets’ for remote monitoring and destruction”.730  
While this is true for both citizens and foreign nationals, it does change how the state 
views people and bodies, with the potential to draw ne  boundaries around citizenship.  
In addition, data collection programs also pull peol  out of their own contexts, making 
them easily legible as ‘data doubles’ which become virtual representations of the self.731  
The person becomes the flows and transactions that he or she conducts every day.732  As 
Hasan Elahi states, “Our data dopplegangers mediate our interactions”.733  It is from this 
that the ‘rare event’ of terrorism, theoretically, can be thwarted.734  For this surveillance 
to work, people and ideas need to be turned into data.  Data can be collected and 
catalogued, so it is a way to follow people and ideas.  It allows for the creation of risk 
profiles which allow for prediction.735  While this may give a fuller picture of any 
particular person, it also allows for him or her to be disassembled and become a 
collection of attributes so that he or she becomes different things to different collectors 
                                                           
729 Albrechtslund and Lauritsen, “Spaces of Everyday Surveillance.” 
730 Wall and Monahan, “Surveillance and Violence from Afar”; Gates, “The Cultural Labor of 
Surveillance.” 
731 Haggarty and Erickson, “The Surveillant Assemblage.”  
732 Yet the state surveillance apparatus can also easily be overwhelmed by following all of these 
movements and flows, burdening the system with too much data, making it harder to identify clear threats.  
This proved an insurmountable obstacle with the earliest efforts to collect such data, as well as the BAG 
developed by the NSA after 9/11, and is still a very r al possibility.  Harris, The Watchers. 
733 Interview with Elahi 





and analysts.  The ‘wholeness’ of the person is challenged in a new way as his or her 
parts are analyzed without the context of the whole or its environment.  This data double 
can even affect the interactions we have with others as one of my interviewees 
commented: “Our data dopplegangers mediate our interactions”.736  It is not mistake-free, 
of course.  This technique of viewing bodies is what led to the ‘guilt of association’ that 
killed ali Jaber. 
This loss of ‘wholeness’ allows for parts of the ‘data double’ of a person to be 
coded as on the other side of the domestic/internatio l boundary.  The citizen/alien 
boundary could be redrawn so that parts of the ‘citizen’ are placed into the ‘alien’ 
category and therefore made eligible for surveillance.  This challenges the traditional 
intelligence boundary between international and domestic.  In Hayden’s words, “I will 
play in fair territory.  But there will be chalk dust on my cleats.”737  If domestic 
inhabitants or citizens are fair game for NSA surveillance, the difference between them 
and foreign nationals erodes in one important way: both can now be targets of state 
surveillance.  Of course, there has been pushback on this point and the machinations of 
the NSA, the FISA court, and the Obama Administration all demonstrate that there is still 
a distinction made between collecting data on Americans and doing so on foreign 
nationals.  However, if this boundary erodes, it may be that ‘citizen’ and ‘international’ 
overlap in ways heretofore unknown. 
A similar dynamic is at play in the debate about the use of targeted killing 
domestically.  Holder has maintained that the US may kill a US citizen on foreign soil if 
                                                           
736 Elahi reminded me that while we met for the first time during the interview, our data doubles had been 
interacting for some time through email conversation, my visit to his website, etc.  Despite never talking to 
each other and not being sure what the other looked li , we were already connected.  Interview with Elahi 




1) he or she poses an imminent threat, 2) capture is infeasible and is continually 
monitored throughout the mission, and 3) the operation is conducted in a manner 
consistent with applicable law of war principles.  Legal justification comes from the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which passed Congress in 2001 and 
was reinforced by the Supreme Court in Hamdi.738  Holder has also dismissed concerns of 
this happening on US soil as ‘hypothetical’, drawing parallels between Pearl Harbor and 
9/11.739  If US citizens can be killed extra-judicially in a manner similar to foreign 
nationals and/or targeted killing takes place on US territory, important aspects of current 
boundaries become fuzzy at best and non-operational at worst.  New boundaries are 
likely to be drawn here, but as of yet legal practice and statutes provide little guidance. 
 The consequences of the CIA’s drone program and the NSA’s data collection 
program promise to be far reaching and are unlikely to be completely rolled back.  Many 
of the NSA’s bulk collection programs rest on section 215 of the Patriot Act but even its 
demise may not stem the tide.  As privacy advocate Lee Tien told me, “A lot of 
companies started doing this stuff [surveillance technology] after the War on Terror got 
going and even if you roll the law back, you have not made the Patriot Act vanish today 
as the effects of all of that would continue to add to surveillance technology”.740  The 
same could be said of the institutional forms that developed as result.  The continued 
presence of these programs has the potential to redraw the boundaries of sovereignty; the 
biggest question now is how.   
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 In this section, I have laid out the sites where rdrawing is likely and speculated 
on some of the forms those changes will take.  None of this means that boundaries, or 
even borders, are no longer important.  Protecting the homeland, a concept defined by 
boundaries and borders, demonstrates their importance.  There is a line between citizens 
and foreign nationals that privacy advocates do not want to move  NSA officials work to 
find ways to circumvent.  Both sides admit the presence of an important boundary which 
separates the US from other states and populations.  What has changed here is that the 
state – in particular the US – has adapted and is undertaking the creative action of 
following the movement of people, goods, and ideas across borders in the form of data so 
that it can act when it perceives a threat.  In fact, it appears that we are witnessing the 
authority swaps present in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Conclusion 
One would be hard pressed to find an example of ‘shattering’ as clear and 
dramatic as September 11, 2001.  In response to the attacks, previous certainties were 
smashed, previous ways of looking at the world were no longer valid, and previous ways 
of doing things were antiquated.  New ideas and tools which had previously had trouble 
gaining audiences and advocates were suddenly considered.  The United States 
government and its allies created the GWoT with an undefined, expansive scope which 
had the effect of elevating the threat.  The violence of al Qaeda shattered the conceptual 
maps of state leaders and elites by making its actions illegible to states within existing 
boundaries and forcing the state to turn inward and think of its own citizens as threats.  




to draw new boundaries, to make sense of al Qaeda and turn its actions into recognizable 
patterns that can be countered effectively. 
Early efforts in the GWoT met with mixed results, ep cially as regards the plan 
of defeating ‘terror’ through regime change in the Middle East.  Looking back, this was a 
response one might expect from old practices and old habits.  If threats come from local 
struggles abroad, solving those local struggles is a sensible policy option.  As a result, 
new practices had to be formed which have met greate  success.  Targeted killing and 
data surveillance programs have become accepted as successful in crippling al Qaeda and 
giving the US and its allies the upper hand in the War on Terror.  These new programs 
are currently in the process of becoming practices th mselves even as they draw new 
boundaries of sovereign authority.  Borders move from barriers to collections in order to 
control flows, national security claims are extended b yond traditional jurisdictions in the 
name of targeted killing, and the role of the citizen, and therefore the boundaries drawn 
around the term, are likely to change drastically due to the use of big data in national 
security.  How these practices are institutionalized and the limits are placed on them are 
still being contested, but they promise to go a long way to determining the placement of 
these new boundaries.  These changes can be understood through the prism of the 
‘control society’, but it is only by looking at the case in detail that we can begin to 
understand exactly where they may be headed and their ramifications. 
Just like in the other cases, there is an authority swap.  The state gives up some 
authority, for instance in controlling who crosses borders, in exchange for some authority 
or control in some other realm, for instance in data collection and analysis.  This study 




relation to one another, placing them in the larger context of the future of the state and the 
processes we call globalization in the 21st century.  Second, I will examine and discuss 
the moral and ethical foundations and implications f this study.  Following Dewey, this 
means a situated political morality which focuses on the contextual possibilities of goals 







































Boundaries in the 21st Century 
 
In the introduction to this work, I claimed that there were three major 
contributions of this study: a greater understanding of the relationship between violence 
and sovereignty, a new way of interpreting the GWoT, and an intervention into the 
scholarly debates on globalization and the future of the state in the 21st century.  The first 
of these has been covered in depth in Chapters 2 and 3 d will be summarized here in 
addition to some of the trends apparent across the narratives.  Also in the chapter, I will 
deal with the generalizability of this study in the context of globalization.  Finally, the 
implications of this study with respect to the role f privacy in the GWoT will be used as 
a vehicle to sketch out the value positions inherent in my argument before concluding 
with some ways to move forward. 
Trends 
Some will doubtless read this and attempt to look at trends, to discern the pathway 
from the golden age of piracy to the end of al Qaeda which can then be projected further 
into the future in order to understand what might have been called ‘the movement of 
history’ in the 19th century.  This project provides those looking to do so with ammo.  
First, the boundary being redrawn in the case of alQaeda would appear to be a revision 
of the one drawn to defeat anarchist terrorism.  Propaganda of the Deed was defeated in 
part by the institution of passports, which signified that the state was interested in the 
movement of the lower classes and was willing to use borders to exclude or forcibly 
include these people.  As a result of the GWoT, borders are fast becoming collection 
stations as opposed to places of exclusion.  Thus, one of the boundaries formed in the 




interpreted as a way to determine which boundaries r  to be highlighted in future 
situations.  While it would be in the spirit of this study to investigate how the logic of 
borders is entangled in different forms of transnational violence, I would caution looking 
at this particular boundary because the boundary linking the two cases is not something 
that is intrinsically linked to revisionist violence. 
Second, there appears to be a movement in which national security is increasingly 
insured not through military might but instead through surveillance.  This was clearly not 
the case in the early 18th century.  New boundaries dealt with control over land and 
keeping colonial governors in check.  Surveillance began in earnest as a way to defeat 
propaganda of the deed.  We saw the first mug shots and the measurement of ears, noses 
and fingerprints in order to derive the ‘criminal type’.  This led to the development of 
documents which used these markers to identify an individual as a citizen of a state Q 
with the right to pass across borders.  These are surveillance techniques meant to keep 
people within national borders so that they can be controlled.  As the GWoT winds down, 
control over bodies is still prevalent but it has been joined by control over data flows as a 
new means of surveillance.  However, I would again c ution anyone who says that 
revisionist violence leads to more surveillance.  In these two instances it did, but 
remember that it did not in Colonial Atlantic and it may not in future episodes.  What 
changes is context-specific rather than part of a universal law. 
Another pattern in all three cases is that the men who took part in these episodes 
of violence all built reputations for being unconcerned by death.  Part of the legacy of 
golden age pirates was that they would rather “go to hell together” than die on the 




movement; indeed, the Spanish propagandist Pallas exclaimed, “Agreed!” upon his 
sentencing.  As 9/11 demonstrates, the suicide attack h s become an important tactic for 
al Qaeda.  While not all pirates, propagandists, or jihadists demonstrated a disregard for 
death (many pirates did reach the gallows, for insta ce), their attitude towards death may 
have played a role in their illegibility.  Modernity, dating back at least to Hobbes, is 
largely built on a fear of death and is derisive of the honorable death.  To go against this 
grain would make little sense to state leaders and their societies at large.  That said, these 
are not the only three groups who do not fear death.  Al Qaeda is clearly not the only 
organization to utilize the suicide attack and yet,none of these other groups has been 
recognized as revisionist violence.  At best we could say that defiance towards death 
heightens the crisis, the sense of illegibility: the state is under attack and it cannot 
threaten its enemies with death.  But this defiance is not a cause.  Even if each of the 
trends can be discerned, that in no way means this is what will happen going forward.  
Historical trends do exist but can only be observed post facto.  They are not the 
‘movement of history’ or some way to unlock the core f social and political life.  They 
are merely empirical trends that we observe and make sense of. 
Finally, I want to mention what is meant by ‘success’ in the campaigns 
undertaken in each case.  At first glance, it may appe r that the barometer for success is 
not the same.  Pirates were extirpated, propagandists extinguished, but terrorism remains 
a threat even while I claim some sort of success in the War on Terror.  Some explanation 
is necessary.  First, the stated objectives in all three cases were to end piracy, anarchism, 
and terrorism, respectively.  This did not happen, demonstrating how success changed 




being drawn. This reflects the decentralized nature of the re-inscribing process, a single 
barometer of success was not created and adhered to through a centralized plan. The 
piracy case comes the closest to this ideal but there w re cases of piracy throughout the 
18th century and the act of sea robbery was vital in the numerous wars fought during this 
period.  The key difference is that the piracy of the middle of the 18th century was not 
only less frequent but was more easily dealt with as criminal while sea robbery in the 
name of the state posed a different sort of challenge.  For the anarchist case, I have 
mentioned that assassinations actually went up in the years after the propagandists were 
active AND violence by anarchists did not necessarily recede.  However, assassination 
came to be interpreted as entrant violence in the name of colonial independence while 
anarchist violence now became a part of the syndicalist movement.  This does not mean 
that they were less threatening.  After all, it was an assassination by a secessionist group 
which triggered the First World War, but both made sense within current boundaries and 
they were no long posing the threat of revisionist violence.  In both cases, the threat to the 
practice of drawing boundaries was eased even if the action or people undertaking it 
continued. 
Success in the GWOT acts similarly.  There is greater discussion of what success 
might mean because we are currently in the midst of this particular episode of violence.  
Here, it appears that al Qaeda and the larger jihadist threat is localizing.  ISIS has peeled 
off and has begun constructing its own state.  Affiliates such as Boko Haram, Al Qaeda 
on the Arabian Peninsula and al Shabaab are more preoccupied with local concerns than 
core al Qaeda ever was.  If this trend were to continue, one could call the GWoT a 




has not ended and these new groups still pose some very serious threats to US interests as 
currently constituted, but the state itself no longer appears at risk.  Clearly, we cannot 
know if this is the case; ISIS may yet succeed in building a caliphate which has followers 
throughout the Muslim world.  But if the threat localizes, jihadism is no longer 
revisionist.  Success in all three cases is the end of the revisionist threat.  In each case, 
new threats actually grew out of the original threat, or at least new types of violence 
evolved whether they be criminal, resource, or entrant.  Success was never complete. 
Once again, the particulars are dependent upon the case, but the dynamic, the end of 
revisionist violence, is the same. 
Sovereignty 
Sovereignty is not a prepackaged set of rights and responsibilities that entities 
called states do or do not fulfill, nor is it a setof systemic norms that govern behavior at 
the meso and micro levels.  The state is a practice, not a thing.  There are two patterns to 
draw out of this study on sovereignty.  First, each of the narratives above demonstrates 
that the state is dynamic with variation across time and space.  This has implications for 
the study of IR, much of which assumes the presence of the state.  Its dynamism means 
that not only does this presence need to be problematized, but so does the form that any 
state takes in any particular time and place.  Thisnotion of the state as a project which is 
continually maintained and tweaked through the redrawing of boundaries opens up 
avenues for violence to act as a site for this process. 
Secondly, a conception of the state as a boundary-producing polity, and by the 
extension of sovereignty as the practice of drawing boundaries, highlights the margins of 




state and sovereignty in political science.  Concepts like “the rule of law”, “the 
monopolization of legitimate violence”, and “the welfare state” conjure up a picture of a 
centralized force, overlooking what takes place at the margins.  Boundaries create an 
inside and an outside; thinking of them as constitutive of the state refocuses our energies 
on these margins.  Margins are not always dangerous things.  For instance, privacy and 
free commerce are something that many living within states cherish.  However, this is not 
always the case.  Looking at boundaries refocuses our attentions away from the center 
and out into the places, conceptual and territorial, where the contention is actually 
happening, allowing us to observe how that contention changes long standing boundaries 
that construct the ‘center’. 
Of course the threats outlined in this study are more c mplex than finding oneself 
on the wrong side of a boundary.  The justifications f the pirates, propagandists, and 
terrorists display worldviews that cannot be accommodated within the boundary-
producing polities which rule them.  However, being on the outside but wanting in 
theoretically can be.  This is the reason why each episode is illegible to the state, 
threatening it in ways that are unique to the boundaries that are drawn.  Golden Age 
pirates took advantage of how practices of colonial rule clashed with the rise of 
mercantilist trade, propagandists took advantage of the tensions between mass media and 
conservative nationalism, and al Qaeda has taken advantage of the manner in which IT 
made contemporary boundary-producing practices obsolete.  These are men who lived in 
the margins of the world (the Atlantic colonies, the proletariat, and Central Asia) and who 
challenged boundaries that construct the state and the state system in a manner 




This is where violence and narrative play a role.  Since actions do not have 
intrinsic meaning I argue, following securitization theory, that the threat posed by 
violence is constructed by narrative.  In Chapter 3, I laid out a four-part typology of 
narratives on the relationship between violence and the state.  Resource violence is used 
to draw boundaries and create margins while entrant violence is used to create new 
centers or realign the benefits of being at the center.  The other two narrative types 
happen at the margins.  Criminal violence looks to create ‘zones of exception’ in which to 
act freely from state control.  Revisionist violenc is recognized as a threat to the 
boundary-producing enterprise as a whole.  A study which focuses on the margins of the 
system, therefore, will be much more attuned to the eff cts of criminal and/or revisionist 
violence in producing the state.  In addition, it is only if we recognize that the threats 
which are produced from violence depend upon how violent action is situated, i.e. what 
narratives are built around it, that we can begin to study how violence plays a role in 
constructing the margins that in turn help produce the state. 
Globalization 
The roles of dynamism and margins play themselves out in how we think about 
the state in the 21st century.  The idea that the state is receding or that i  is no longer as 
important as it once was, is a straw man.  But as we ee in Chapter 6, both the imperial 
sovereignty and the surveillant assemblage literatures have a tendency to write the state 
out of governance and international relations.  They do not claim that it goes away, but 
that it will have a reduced role either next to other entities which are able to control flows 




order to avoid depending upon boundaries, respectively.  These are more nuanced 
versions of the idea that the state and the processes of globalization are competing. 
The evidence presented here complicates this story.  While it does not advocate 
that the state is and will always be or that globalizing processes are nothing new, it shows 
that the state has the ability to change and that this change allows for the state’s 
continuance as the dominant political form.  New boundaries are drawn and rule by 
boundaries endures.  The state faces episodes of violence which produce similar threats to 
boundaries such as increased migration, trade, capital flows, faster communication, social 
networking, and environmental pressures.  Its respon e has been to redraw boundaries so 
that these episodes of violence can be made sense of, so that they can be normalized, and 
ultimately, even if they continue, they no longer pose the same type of threat and the state 
is re-inscribed. 
I do not claim to have found ‘the answer’ to the problem of globalization and the 
state.  Instead, I argue that there are similarities b tween certain episodes of violence and 
have developed mechanisms and processes which could be put to use in ordering 
experience.  Mechanisms such as illegibility and crisis production can help us to 
understand when similar threats to boundaries arise.  M chanisms like retrenchment can 
help us point out how entrenched the boundaries that make action illegible are.  Problems 
are solved through creative action and new boundaries can be drawn which make the 
threat legible and therefore much less of a threat.  Similarly, the mechanism of authority 
swap, rooted as it is in the idea that the state is dynamic, can guide us to look at these 
instances not as the state gaining or losing any sort of control, legitimacy, or authority but 




The state is a practice so habitual that those with political power cannot imagine 
exercising this power without it.  It is also the edifice upon which much modern political 
power rests.  For these reasons alone it is unlikely to simply fade away.  This is where my 
findings lead me in projecting the future of the state in the 21st century.  It will devise 
creative solutions to solve the concrete problems it faces and as a result will re-inscribe 
itself through new boundaries.  If forced to choose, I would say that the state will neither 
recede nor grow in import throughout the rest of this century but will instead find new 
ways to assert itself.  In the case of surveillance and the GWoT, the state serves as the 
only actor realistically positioned to combine the data streams collected by private 
entities and currently has the only accepted, thoug certainly contested, justification for 
doing so: national security.  This gives it an advantage over private conductors of 
surveillance and allows it to farm out surveillance and collection without being 
threatened. 
Of course, re-inscription is by no means guaranteed.  It is possible for a threat to 
arise which, for whatever reason, the state never makes sense of.  Such a threat would be 
serious enough to begin unraveling the state and create space for polities constructed not 
through boundaries but through alternative logics of rule.  This is the effect Daniel Nexon 
argues the Reformation had on the imperial structures of Early Modern Europe, resulting 
in the rise of the modern state.741  One thing that separates the globalization of the 21st 
century from the transboundary processes of previous centuries is not the qualitative 
differences between the respective processes or even the dynamics involved, but is 
instead the quantity of processes.  This produces a different set of threats and challenges 
                                                           




to the state.  It may be that states can deal with a few such challenges simultaneously but 
cannot deal with 15 to 20.  It is possible that the s er quantity of processes which 
transcend boundaries will be so high that even continuous successful redrawing will 
result in new forms of governance. 
It is important to remember that the state is created through practices and 
practices are habitual.  They are the unthinking forms of action, the ‘conceptual maps’ of 
how we see and act in the world, of what is and is not possible.  The practices which 
draw boundaries must not be one action among others but instead reified doings for 
which we have no basis to challenge.  However, if boundaries are being redrawn on so 
many fronts at the same time that no new boundaries can be habituated, then we may be 
into the territory of some other, as yet unimagined, polity.  If boundaries are constantly 
changing and being redrawn, the resulting world would no longer be adequately 
understood as a world of states.  Two things could result.  First, the idea of conceptual 
maps is challenged and we have a world of boundaries that are ever-shifting, wherein 
power and rule are clear only for small periods of time.  This is, in part, the argument of 
postmodernism.742  Second, such a state of affairs may lead to the abandonment of rule 
through boundaries.  Boundaries would no longer serve the purpose of demarcating rule, 
of separating territory, conceptual spaces, or people into ruled and not ruled.  What, in 
such a circumstance, would boundaries provide?  This alone would be a shattering on a 
much higher scale whose result would not be the drawing of new boundaries but rather of 
finding new ways of producing legibility and rule. 
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The ever changing nature of 21st century threats is something that many of the 
people I interviewed articulated to me.  Matthew Levitt explained that the biggest 
concern in counterterrorism is “keeping up with things as they evolve…  It is a rapidly 
changing world and change is much, much faster”.743  Lee Hamilton described the 
terrorism threat as an “evolving threat that contains a number of elements”.  He focuses 
specifically on cyber-attacks, which, 10 years ago, “we weren’t focused on… at all”.744  It 
is entirely possible that these trends are evidence of a world changing so rapidly as to 
move governance beyond boundaries produced through practice.  The danger to the state 
is not the transgression of boundaries, but the constantly changing nature of those 
transgressions which make it impossible to habituate the new boundaries. 
Privacy in the 21st Century 
Following Max Weber and others745, I argue in my introduction that the first step 
in conducting ideal typical analysis is a value positi n.  Theories are nothing but tools to 
help us understand the world from particular viewpoints.  These tools are imbued with 
value positions and those positions should be stated as clearly as possible by a researcher.  
Failure to recognize this is what leads to overwrought claims of objectivity and the 
reification of particular viewpoints.  With this inmind, I conclude this study by outlining 
the value positions which drive it.  In particular, I will elucidate an interpretation of John 
Dewey’s claim that morality is to be decided not by ultimate ends or goals but instead in 
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a particular situation.746  This claim will be discussed in light of the debate over privacy 
and surveillance which has been renewed by the Snowden revelations. 
There is no universal good; all morality is dependent upon the situation.  Dewey 
makes this claim in Reconstruction in Philosophy and it is similar to his claim in The 
Public and its Problems that the details of the state are something that we must “go to 
history to discover”.  In Reconstruction, Dewey argues that a reliance on universal moral 
principles force one to either irrelevance or fanaticism.  At most, a universal moral 
principle, such as justice, privacy, or democracy, provides us with the goals (or a tool for 
insight) we may wish to achieve in a specific situation.  According to Dewey: 
Action is always specific, concrete, individualized, unique.  And concretely judgment as 
to acts to be performed must be similarly specific.  To say that a man seeks health or 
justice is only to say that he seeks to live healthily or justly.  These things, like truth, are 
adverbial.  They are modifiers of action in specific cases.  How to live healthily or justly 
is a matter that differs with every person.  It varies with his past experience, his 
opportunities, his temperamental and acquired weaknsses and abilities.  Not a man in 
general but a particular man suffering from some particular disability aims to live 
healthily…  The good of the situation has to be discovered, projected, and attained on the 
basis of the exact defect and trouble to be rectifid.747 
 
There are two things to discuss here.  First, the atempt to find a set of universal moral 
principles is, according to Dewey, the downfall of moral philosophy dating back to the 
ancients.  Second, morality is dependent upon the goals of the situation, goals which are 
unique to that situation and which may change over time.748 
Finding new manifestations of normative goals demonstrates the very creativity 
upon which meaningful human action lies.  Instead of finding solutions which fit within 
current conceptions (this is what is usually meant by coming up with solutions), the 
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situation provides individuals and groups with the ability to come up with new 
conceptions, to ‘bring something new into the world’.  Allowing for such creativity is at 
the heart of both Joas and Dewey’s conception of democracy.749  Instead of tying 
themselves to a particular set of institutions or rights, democracy becomes an overarching 
goal based around allowing people to act creatively and fulfill their own potential.  This 
goal is realized in differently in different times and places.  Joas states that “the questions 
of democracy are today the result of applying the idea of differentiation to itself”.  He 
goes on to claim that: 
All conflicts over economic, political, military, and cultural issues are not taking a 
different form.  The questions of peace movements were directed not only towards 
military strategy itself but also toward the continued differentiation of a military-
industrial-scientific-complex…  The questions of the ecology movements are not merely 
directed towards the defense of a natural or traditional environment, but also take the 
offensive in challenging the legitimacy…of technological progress.  The classical 
questions of industrial society as to the structure of the social division of labor and the 
distribution of wealth may still be frequently articulated by the trade unions in their 
traditional form: however, they now become part of s mething which has been declared 
the object of societal self-organization.750 
 
In other words, Joas believes that each movement will be or already is being forced to 
change how it manifests its claims and its goals.  Democracy then is the ability to allow 
for this creativity.  Dewey states that democracy “annot be conceived as a… 
consecration of some form of government which has already attained constitutional 
sanction.”751  We should not act “as if our democracy is something that perpetuated itself 
automatically… that solved the problem of perpetual motion in politics”.752  Instead, 
democracy’s “purpose is to set free and develop the capacities of human individuals 
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without respect to race, sex, class, or economic statu ”.753  One may disagree with this 
definition of democracy on any number of grounds, but the method through which it is 
derived – an overarching goal, or set thereof, which can have different manifestations 
across time and space – reflects the value position that informs this project.  If we are to 
act morally and effectively in times when habit has been shattered, we must act in the 
situation in which we find ourselves, not according to universal truths.  Such universal 
truths MAY guide us in instances of habitual action, though they tend to reify inequities, 
but they are of no use in the types of situations examined here. 
This relates specifically to the GWoT and the possibilities apparent in future 
scenarios.  I have argued that the outcome of my cases was not inevitable; other 
‘solutions’ could have redrawn boundaries to make thr ats legible.  However, there is one 
exception, one inevitability: if the threat was to be defeated, boundaries needed to be 
redrawn.  It is contemporary boundaries which are making the episodes of violence under 
study so threatening to the state.  Bulk data colletion and targeted killing were not 
inevitable on 9/11.  It would be a mistake to summarize this project as ‘al Qaeda = drones 
and surveillance’.  Citizens have a large role to play in how such scenarios are carried 
out.  Anyone with a voice has agency and the situation can provide the opportunity for 
creative action not just from the elites who run and carry influence in the states targeted 
but also from the citizens of these states and other aff cted peoples.  If one is unsatisfied 
with the affairs of the past few years, there may still be time to influence how targeted 
killing and data collection are institutionalized in the United States as they rapidly 
become habituated practices which draw new boundaries.  But the point here is not to 
                                                           




send out a call to action but instead to suggest that this study gives us a way of 
understanding the situation that I believe is important.  While citizens and other interested 
parties can play a role in deciding the boundaries of the future, they must understand the 
situation they are in if they are to do so effectively.  And that situation necessitates new 
boundaries.  This means that we cannot simply continue with past practice unless a) the 
actions of al Qaeda and its allies do not involve us or b) we have no problem with al 
Qaeda’s actions tearing apart the state.  If these are the goals at hand, continuing past 
practices is a perfectly justifiable pathway. 
Instead, those unsatisfied with what is taking and has taken place in the GWoT 
must realize that they need to function in a situation in which change is necessary.  The 
situation in which previous manifestations of goals were evident no longer exists.  Too 
few opponents of both targeted killing and bulk data collection recognize this.  Too often, 
the focus has been on the technology at the forefront of these new practices,754 but a) the 
technology cannot be erased, it has already emerged from Pandora’s box and b) the 
technology itself does not dictate outcomes as they ar  socially constructed.  There are 
ways of using drones which do not lead to a militarzed security state or an imperial 
sovereignty as many fear.  There may also be ways to protect privacy in an era of big 
data.  So, decrying the technology can be just as self-defeating and unproductive as those 
who laud new technologies as our salvation.  Technology is neither terminator nor savior. 
This is manifest most clearly in the debate over privacy and bulk data collection.  
Some people may hold privacy very dear.  They may have in their heads a conception of 
privacy in which all personal information is the pro erty of the individual and is not for 
                                                           





consumption and use by public entities.  This is a laudable goal, but clearly it does not fit 
the situation.  Not only does the US government have the capability to access large 
amounts of data, but this data is already being colle ted by Google, Amazon, VISA, 
Verizon, Facebook, etc.755  It is already out there, and while it may have happened 
without our privacy activists knowing it and while t may have happened against their 
will, it happened and cannot be undone.  They must adapt to this situation.  To talk about 
‘privacy’ is the equivalent of talking about ‘health’ or ‘justice’ in Dewey’s argument 
above.  Action takes place in a situation and therefore the situation must be front and 
center when we assign that action meaning.  No reason to talk about universal goals such 
as ‘privacy’.  Additionally, there is no reason to c nfuse an overarching goal such as 
‘privacy’ with a particular manifestation of that goal.  Dewey argues that ‘health’ should 
not be some sort of universal goal, but he also argues that one can aim for ‘health’ as a 
goal in a particular situation because, “Classifications suggest possible traits to be on the 
lookout for in studying a particular case”.756  Universal goals may guide our actions in 
particular situations, but we cannot let them be tied o particular manifestations. 
This cashes out in the following claim: we may have to find ways to re-
conceptualize manifestations of goals that are no lo ger possible in the current situation.  
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This is something that many in the privacy advocacy community have been slow to adapt 
to.  While it is not surprising that policymakers and intelligence officers have come 
around to thinking about privacy in new ways, activis s are lagging behind and it does 
them no favors.  Much of the legal argument is built around how bulk collection violates 
the 1974 FISA law,757 enacted prior to the rise of digital communication.  The advocates I 
spoke to made it clear that privacy, while threatened in new ways, is the same as it 
always was.  One privacy advocate told me, “We had privacy, as a practical matter, in 
ways that we didn’t think about for the longest time until the technology starting 
exposing things in ways that they weren’t in the past.”758  Another echoed this sentiment, 
“In many ways privacy doesn’t really change, the threats to it change.”759  In both quotes, 
we see a universal ideal based around the withholding of information.  Another used this 
language in explaining privacy, “I can hold this back from Congress, I can hold that back 
from my family and friends.”760  The ways in which privacy might change dealt with the 
degree to which it is realized.  As DS suggested to me, “maybe it changes because we 
change the balance of it.”761  In this, I echo Harris who states that some in the activist 
community are, “clinging to…an outdated version or definition of privacy.  And frankly, 
that is why they have not made more gains.”762  That said, this should not be taken too 
far.  The problem here is not that privacy is necessarily ‘outmoded’, but that it is 
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characterized as a universal ideal.  Lee Tien described privacy to me as, “less as a thing 
or a commodity that can be possessed but rather… an attitude.”763 
Attempts to end government surveillance have already b ckfired.  A few years 
after 9/11, the public got wind of DARPA’s creation f the Total Information Awareness 
system developed by John Poindexter.764  Congressional hearings were convened and, 
amid the controversy, Poindexter’s operation was shut down.  However, through a 
loophole in the legislation, much of what Poindexter and his team were working on was 
repackaged and sent to the NSA and became the basis for the bulk collection programs.765 
At this point, Bob Popp, Poindexter’s second in command at DARPA, sorted 
through the many different features of the program with an eye towards cutting those 
which may raise red flags.  While he was reluctant o cut them, many officials did not 
think that research into the protection of privacy would pass the so-called “Washington 
Post smell test”.  What was the NSA doing that required it to conduct privacy research?766  
The privacy protections originally imagined for TIA were written out of the program by 
the time it was fully operational because of the constraints placed by those focused on 
privacy as withholding information.  In other words, the focus of the privacy advocacy 
community has actually given its opponents more space to do what they wish.  In 
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addition, the community has long risked looking like t was against national security.  As 
Harris told me, “activists have done themselves no fav rs when they allow themselves to 
be portrayed, sometimes unjustifiably, sometimes justifiably, as their real aim being to 
stop the government from doing surveillance.”767 
Instead of focusing on keeping or withholding information, we should start by 
defining privacy as the control of information.768  Withholding is a particular 
manifestation of that ideal, one that does not fit all imes and places.769  Another option is 
to radically give up information.  This is the strategy of Bangladeshi activist and artist 
Hassan Elahi.  Elahi was detained in 2002 following erroneous suspicion that he had left 
explosives in storage in Florida.  After a few days detainment and another six months of 
FBI questioning, Elahi decided to open his life up completely.770  He posts every time he 
changes his location or has opened up his bank accounts.771  This way the FBI cannot 
suspect him as a terrorist.  In his words, “The best way to protect your privacy is to give 
it away… you can monitor yourself much more effectively”.772  The strategy is that if 
everyone has the information it is, in his words, “useless…  What is important is 
analyzing the information – what is the information telling you?”.  With suspicious pieces 
of data, “you cannot delete, but you can bury” them with a lot of other information.  
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Control for Elahi is not simply about withholding but is instead about releasing.  This 
way you can control your online persona: 
There is so much of our identity that is online…  That data is having more interactions 
with more people than we are.  Who do you want in co trol over that data?  With us 
being proactive about it and deciding what that data is, and who that is, and how that 
represents you is much more direct than if it had been some random person who decided, 
‘well this is good enough, I think that describes you’.773 
 
Elahi does not think that past conceptions of privacy re useful in a digital world: 
“What we think is privacy today is definitely not what it was… the concept of it has 
changed.”  He echoes what some of the policymakers I talked to mentioned about the 
dangers to privacy: that what seems to be important is what is done with the data, not its 
collection.774  In addition to releasing information, Elahi argues that “we too can hold up 
a mirror”.  Therefore, in addition to the release of our data doubles, we can begin 
surveillance on the government.  There are two ways this could be achieved that could 
work in concert.  The first is already happening: make sure to track the actions of 
government and other officials.  For instance, in the pre-digital age, it was possible to 
prevent the spread of images by taking the film from a journalist’s camera on the scene. 
However, the quickness with which this information can be sent up to the cloud today 
makes it impossible to have control over images.  When journalist Scott Olson was 
arrested in Ferguson, MO earlier this year, pictures of the arrest made it out because it 
was so easy to capture the arrest and post photos online.  This means that the government 
is not the only entity able to do surveillance, peol  and other institutions can as well.  . 
Second, there can be a push for greater transparency.  If the threat is not data 
collection but is instead how it is analyzed and used, then techniques for analysis and use 
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need to be out in the open.  This would put the state in the same position as its citizens 
and give it an air of legitimacy, creating space for necessary surveillance.  This has not 
happened; repeatedly the American people are told one thing only to later find out that 
another is true, eroding trust and by extension the s ate’s capacity. 
 Much of this rests on the views of the public.  On the one hand, the events of the 
past decade and a half demonstrate that security from terrorism is important to US 
citizens.  It may not be as important as many in positions of power believe, but it is 
important.  However, the question of whether or not private and public entities should 
have access to our data is important to the general public is still open.  Most 
policymakers I talked to are of the belief that it is not important; one summed up the 
stance by saying, “relatively few people care about this one way or another.775”  Ethan 
Zuckerman, who helped pioneer pop-up ads, argues that “users now accept that this sort 
of manipulation is an integral part of the online exp rience… even when widespread, 
clandestine government surveillance was revealed by a whistleblower, there has been 
little organized, public demand for reform and change.”776  Privacy advocates countered 
that people do not care only because they do not know enough about what is going on.  
As DS argued, “It will become more and more important s people begin to understand 
just how much information is being collected about them, what is being used, and how 
many different entities end up using that information.”777  But if, as many polls show, it is 
acceptable to the US public for the US government to do some surveillance, then 
transparency would seem to be a necessity. 
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 Of course, transparency and intelligence are two concepts that do not traditionally 
work in tandem.  Secrecy fosters the NSA’s mission.  However, we may be able to ask 
for translucency if not transparency.778  Translucency can mean being open and forthright 
about the programs and their goals.  It can mean making public the decision criteria by 
which targets are chosen and decisions to look into domestic data are made.  Currently, 
those decisions have been left up to the NSA and its analysts on their own judgment, 
creating a system ripe for abuse.  This would allow f r the use of sorely needed cost-
benefit analysis of programs and could even lead to the end of the 215 program.  
Translucency does not have to mean publicizing who is under investigation at any 
particular time, but there could be a sunset provisi n where after 6 months or a year after 
an investigation, US persons under surveillance are notified or their names are made 
public.  Reforms along these lines recognize a digital world where data is everywhere and 
give some control over that data back to the person it is about. 
Lastly, such a conception of privacy would also help to make it accessible to more 
than those who can afford it.  David Husband spoke about how privacy is being protected 
most assiduously by the private sector in the creation of ‘black phones’ and encryption 
services.  However, this is not something that everyone has access to, making it 
something that only the affluent can afford as he suggested.779  Privacy as transparency 
and as control of information is, theoretically at least, something accessible to everyone.  
This is how one can take a universal goal and recognize that it needs to have different 
manifestations in different times and places.  Such a process places importance on the 
                                                           
778 This concept was given to me by Michael Hayden. Interview with Hayden 




context in which that action is undertaken. Undertaking piracy, assassination, and 
bombing poses a threat to a state in some contexts and a threat to the state in others. 
Ways Forward 
 I can picture three ways to build upon this study.  First, the ideal typical 
instruments developed here could be expanded to cases involving transboundary 
processes which do not contain ‘violence’.  How might these tools help us understand 
particular cases of migration, capital flows, environmental degradation, and other 
processes of globalization?  There may also be other episodes of revisionist violence to 
be explored.  The Earth Liberation Front may be one possibility, while ISIS could be 
another were it to turn into a proper caliphate.  Essentially, one way to expand this study 
is to see how useful the tools developed here are in other cases. This is especially true for 
episodes that have taken place exclusively in non-western regions.  This would allow us 
to see how weaker states deal with such threats.  This could give us a better idea of how 
weaker or non-western states deal with revisionist episodes of violence.  Are they 
reacting in similar ways?  Are they using the same narratives?  Do they even have the 
resources to combat them in any sustained manner?  It appears that the answers may be 
that they are quite different.  This also brings up other questions.  Why might some 
episodes of violence not have a revisionist narrative built around them when others with 
very similar characteristics – even illegibility – do not?  Why might some episodes be 
labeled as revisionist in the a non-western region and not be recognized as such by the 
system’s great powers?  Is there something about the state building narratives?  Is it 
something about those perpetrating violence?  All of these question can help us to 




 Another way forward would be to look more closely at how the other narratives 
are implicated in the boundaries of sovereignty authority.  I have stated above that entrant 
violence challenges physical boundaries and the distribution of power and resources 
within them, while resource violence is used by states to draw, maintain, and redraw 
boundaries, and criminal violence looks to create ‘zones of exception’.  However, each of 
these could be further demonstrated with the type of in depth case studies and narratives 
done here.  A deeper look at narratives of criminality in drug trafficking or piracy in the 
Gulf of Aden might reveal something more about how each relates to the boundaries of 
sovereign authority than my cursory treatment in Chapter 3.  The same goes with cases of 
entrant or resource violence.  In fact, such a study may even begin to challenge my 
typology by combining existing types of developing new ones. It would also help to 
stretch this study in to different regions as entrant, resource, and criminal violence is just 
as common in non-western regions as in the center of he system.   
 Finally, any particular episode of violence – especially those treated in this study 
– could be looked at more closely with an eye on narrative configuration.  Golden age 
piracy also had narratives of criminality and resource violence that are not fully explored 
in Chapter 4.  The same goes with anarchist violence (criminal and entrant) and al Qaeda 
(criminal, entrant, and resource).  This would not only help us to develop greater 
understandings of particular cases but could also have important theoretical implications 
by looking at how narratives combine and even compete.  In Chapter 3, I talk about how 
narratives can be complementary (as they are in my cases), competing, or parallel.  
Looking at a particular case with an eye to how narratives combine would help us to 




competing narratives become dominant while others are brushed aside?  A study of 
Piracy in the Gulf of Aden may help us to understand this.  How about the ways in which 
multiple narratives work alongside each other in ways that create a master narrative in 
which different aspects were given precedence at different times?  A study of the corso 
independente could help us to understand this.  Similarly, the ways in which we combat 
the threats of revisionist violence brings about new types of threats.  There are interesting 
ways to look at how narratives concatenate even if con igurations are context-specific. 
As a corollary, we can expand the study of each episodes covered here into other 
states.  In Chapter 4, England is the focus; further study could include multiple states 
(France, Spain, Portugal, Holland, etc.) and may uncover new narratives.   In Chapter 5, I 
mention the possibility of Spain and Russia forging a  alternative path to defeating 
propaganda by the deed, that of totalitarianism. Here the regimes paid a large price for 
not adjusting as England, France, the US, and Italy (among others) did, but the state itself 
survived. Going off this, one wonders what happens when the state itself is challenged.  
Can some states fail or do they succeed by copying what more powerful and influential 
states do?  Is this power in some ways dependent upo  the ability to adjust?  I would 
guess that there is some form of diffusion based on success but Spain and Russia’s 
experience challenges this.  The ‘split’ outcome of the anarchist case raises questions that 
I do not have the space to fully address in this study.   In Chapter 6, I largely ignore the 
narratives on al Qaeda coming from the Muslims that it claims to speak for.  Al Qaeda 
has also been more active in states at the periphery of the state system than either the 




More careful study of each case with a focus on multiple narratives could flesh 
out these ‘weak points’.  Carrying the theory to other cases, focusing on other narratives 
of violence, and expanding cases by looking at multiple narratives are all ways to expand 
and ‘test’ this theory.  The expectation would be that some of what is written in these 
pages would be challenged, but that it can also help us to understand the role that 
violence plays in drawing the boundaries of sovereignty authority and therefore the state 
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